NOTICES 


OF 


THE     WAR     OF     1812 


BY  JOHN  ARMSTRONG, 
M 

LATE   A   MAJOR-GENERAL   IN   THE   ARMY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES, 
AND   SECRETARY   OF   WAR. 


IN    TWO   VOLUMES. 
VOL.   I. 


NEW    YORK: 
PUBLISHED  BY  WILEY  &  PUTNAM. 

1840. 


354 


/.f 


ENTERED  according  to  the  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1836, 

BY    GEORGE    DEARBORN. 

in  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  Southern  District  oi 
New-York. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER    I. 

PAGE 

Causes  of  the  War. — Declaration  of  War  by  the  United  States. — 
Opposition  to  the  measure. — Its  character  and  effects.  .  .  9 

CHAPTER   II. 

Hull's  Expedition. — Loss  of  Michilimackinac. — Surrender  of  De 
troit,  the  Michigan  Territory,  and  the  Army.  .  .  .  .15 

CHAPTER    III. 

Militia  Operations  in  the  West. — Harrison's  Autumnal  and  Win 
ter  Campaigns.  .  .  ..  .  .,.  .  .52 

CHAPTER    IV. 

Operations  on  the  Niagara. — Partial  Armistice. — Renewal  of 
hostilities. — Van  Rensselaer's  attack  on  dueenstown. — 
Smyth's  invasion  of  Canada. — Dearborn's  Campaign  against 
the  British  advanced  posts  on  Lake  Champlain.  .  .  .97 

CHAPTER    V. 

First  investment  of  Fort  Meigs. — Dearborn  and  Chauncey's  Ex 
pedition. — Reduction  of  York  and  Fort  George. — Chandler's 
defeat  and  capture  on  Stony  Creek. — Bo3rstler's  defeat. — Af 
fair  of  Sacket's  Harbor.  121 

]* 


M82787 


vj  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER    VI. 

PAGE 

Second  investment  of  Fort  Meigs. — Gallant  defence  of  Fort  Ste- 
phenson. — Defeat  of  the  British  fleet  on  Lake  Erie. — Capture 
of  Amherstburg. — Recapture  of  Detroit  and  the  Michigan  Ter 
ritory. — Harrison's  pursuit  and  defeat  of  Proctor. — Arrival  of 
a  part  of  the  Western  Army  on  the  Niagara.  .r  .  .163 

Appendix.          ....    ''-'V1-*    .       ....  187 


"WERE  nations  to  review  in  peace  their  motives 
for  having  made  war,  with  the  means  they  em 
ployed,  and  the  method  by  which  they  conducted 
it,  they  would  in  general  find  much  to  blame  in 
a  moral  as  well  as  a  military  view  ;  the  conviction 
of  the  wrongs  they  did,  and  the  blunders  they  com 
mitted,  might,  on  another  and  similar  occasion, 
improve  both  their  ethics  and  their  tactics,  and 
make  them,  at  once,  better  men  and  abler  soldiers  ; 
but  as  nations  cannot  be  brought  together,  it.  rests 
with  governments  to  perform  this  duty  of  self- 
examination  ;  when,  if  they  omit  it,  the  task  de 
volves  on  the  historian." 

MABBY. 


NOTICES   OF   THE   WAR   OF   1812. 


CHAPTER/!. 


Causes  of  the  War. — Declaration  of  War  by  the  United  States.— 
Opposition  to  the  measure. — Its  character  and  effects. 

THE  Treaty  of  Paris  of  1783,  by  which  Great 
Britain  acknowledged  JHhe  freedom,  sovereignty, 
and  independence  of  the  United  States,"  was,  on 
the  part  of.  ..the  former,  virtually  a  truce,  not  a 
pacification;  a  temporary  and  reluctant  sacrifice  of 
national  pride  to  national  interest ;  not  a  frank  and 
honest  adjustment  of  differences,  seeking  no  cause, 
nor  indulging  any  disposition,  to  renew  the  contro 
versy.  Indeed,  so  little  careful  was  this  power  to 
conceal,  or  even  to  dissemble  her  temper  and  policy 
on  this  subject,  that  the  first  American  minister 
accredited  to  her  court,  had  scarcely  passed  the 
threshold  of  the  palace,  when  he  discovered,  that 
a  spirit  of  unextinguished  amrn^sity^tp wards  the 
United  States,  pervaded  alike  her  councils  and  her 
conduct. l  Nor  was  it  the  effect  of  longer  residence, 
or  more  intimate  acquaintance,  to  modify,  much  less 
to  efface  this  first  impression.  Every  overture  on 

i  Appendix,  No.  1. 


10  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812. 

his  part,  made  with  a  view  of  placing  the  diplo 
matic  relations  of  the  two  countries  on  a  fair  and 
friendly  footing,  was  disregarded ;  the  north-west- 
ern,  and  other  military  posts,  though  "confessedly 
\vithin  the  limits  of  the  United  States,  were  forcibly 
retained  ;!  the  Indian  nations  in  alliance  with  Great 
Britain,  were  openly  instigated  to  a  renewal  of  hos 
tilities  ;  and  vhen  a  c,  last,  this  diabolical  purpose 
'was  accomplished,  a*  if  to  leave  no  room  for  doubt 
ing  her  instrumentality  in  the  case,  she  was  found 
extending  her  territorial  encroachments,  and  taking 
a  new  and  formidable  position  on  the  Miami  of  the 
Lake ;  whence,  during  three  campaigns,  she  supplied 
the  wants,  and  prompted  the  attacks  of  these  savage 
tribes.2 

Checked  by  Wayne's  victory  in  1794,  in.  this  plan 
of  desolating  the  west,  she  next  employed  herself 
in  attempting  to  corrupt  the  east ;  and  in  1809, 
mistaking  the  freedom  of  political  discussion,  for  a 
spirit  of  revolt,  despatched  a  confidential  agent  to 
Boston,  with  authority  to  mature  the  terms  on  which 
that  section  of  the  country  would  separate  from  the 
Union,  and  reconnect  itself  with  the  British  Em 
pire.  The  failure,  no  less  than  the  atrocity  of  this 
project,  forbade  its  acknowledgment ;  but  though 
officially  disavowed,  the  number  and  character  of 

1  The  posts  retained  contrary  to  treaty,  were  Michilimackinac,  De 
troit,  Niagara,  Oswegotche",  Point  au  Fer,  and  Dutchman's  Point 

2  St.  Glair's  Narrative  of  the  campaign  of  1791,  and  Lord  Dorches 
ter's  Speech  to  the  Indians,  in  1794.     See,  also,  Washington's  letter 
to  Jay,  of  the  30th  of  August  of  the  same  year,  Appendix,  No.  3. 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812.  11 

the  documents  produced  in  support  of  the  charge, 
leave  no  doubt  of  its  validity.1 

It  cannot  be  supposed  that  the  spirit  of  hostility, 
thus^manifested 'o~ti  the  land,  would  be  slow  in  show 
ing  itself  on  the  ocean.  Having  in  1793,  become 
a  party  to  the  coalition  against  republican  France,2 
she  adopted  a  policy,  which  sought  at  once  to  dis- 
tresTand  impoverish  her  enemy  and  enrich  herself, 
at  the  ...expense _  j^f_nejatraj^^j^,nier£e  ;  and  accord 
ingly,  on  the  8th  of  June  of  that  year,  issued  an 
order  for  capturing  and  carrying  into  British  ports, 
"  all  vessels  laden  wholly  or  in  part  with  corn,  flour, 
or  meal,  and  destined  to  France,  or  to  other  coun 
tries.,  if  occupied  by  the  arms  of  that  nation." 

Offensive  as  this  measure  could  not  fail  to  be,  its 
vexations-aTTd"'rnjiii'ic3  were  nearly  forgotten,  in  the 
greater  mischief  and  malignity  which  characterized 
that  of  the  6th  of  November  of  the  same  year  ;  and 
which,  by  instructions  secretly  communicated  to  her 
cruisers,  subjected  "  to  capture  and  adjudication,  all 
vv.^els  laden  with  the  produce  of  any  French  colony, 
or  with  supplies  for  such  colony" — a  measure,  which 
in  the^ opinion  of.  a  careful  inqui  er  an ij  competent 
judge,  "annihilated  at  a  blow,  a  large  portion  of 
tlie  commerce  of  the  united  States.773  But  how 
ever  great,  in  this Tease,  the i  loss  to  us,  or  the  profit 

1  Appendix,  No.  4. 

2  The  basis  of  the  several  coalitions  against  France,  was  the  con 
ference  at  Mantua  in  1791 ;  to  which  the  King  of  England  was  a 
party,  as  elector  of  Hanover. — M.  Mollink's  Annals. 

3  Dallas' s  exposition  of  the  causes  and  character  of  the  late  war. 


12       NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812. 

to  her,  there  was  soon  superadded  another  measure, 
which  interdicted  all  neutral  commerce,  not  only 
with  ports  blockaded  by  forces  sufficient  for  the 
purpose,  (which  the  laws  of  war  would  not  have 
forbidden)  but  with  places  where  no  force  whatever 
existed ;  and  even  with  whole  coasts  of  territory, 
which  her  naval  means,  if  acting  in  concert,  would 
have  been  incompetent  to  blockade.  Still,  her  abuse 
Q^jpower  did  not  stop  here  ;  it  was  not  enough  that 
she  thus  outraged  our  rights  on  the  ocean ;  the 
bosoms  of  our  bays,  the  mouths  of  our  rivers  and 
even  the  wharves  of  our  harbors,  were  made  the 
theatres  of  the  most  flagitious  abuse ;  and,  as  if 
determined  to  leave  no  cause  of  provocation  untried, 
the  personal  rights  of  our  seamen.,  were  invaded  ; 
andrS5J3wrn  g  'iref no  alle  gian^e,nor  Ka  vifig  any 
connexion  with  her  policy  or  arms,  were  forcibly 
siezed,  dragged  on  board  her  ships  of  war  and  made 
to~~light  her  battles,  under  the  scourge  of  tyrants 
and  slaves,  with  whom  submission,  whether  right 
or  wrong,  forms  the  whole  duty  of  man.1 

Evils  of  such  magnitude  and  continuance,  could 
not  fail  to  produce  a  high  degree  of  excitement  in 
the  nation,  and  much  of  a  correspondent  feeling  on 
the  part  of  the  government ;  but  though  three  suc 
cessive  administrations  saw  in  the  conduct  of  Great 
Britain,  sufficient  cause  of  war,  all  doubted  the 
expediency  of  acting  upon  it.  Barely  recovered 
from  the  debility,  resulting  from  the  defects  of  their 

i  Official  letters  of  Mr.  King  while  Minister  at  London. 


NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812.        13 

first  Federal  compact,  and  but  just  entered  on  the 
experiment  of  another  of  more  efficient  character, 
forbearance  was  adopted  as  a  principle,  and  means 
simply  diplomatic  prescribed,  as  those  alone  which 
could  be  employed  with  safety  and  success.  Un 
fortunately,  this  estimate  of  their  value  was  decep 
tive,  and  the  event  showed,  that  with  a  nation  like 
Great  Britain,  which  makes  her  own  interest  and 
convenience  the  governing  rules  of  her  conduct, 
persuasion,  admonition,  remonstrance,  argument, 
and  even  concession,  are  alike  unavailing.  All 
these  elements  of  diplomacy  were  frequently  and 
faithfully  employed,  but  without  other  effect  than 
that  of  multiplying  and  augmenting  the  evils  they 
were  intended  to  mitigate  or  remove  ;  the  appetite 
of  _the  aggressor  grew  on  what  it  fed  f  her  insolence 
with  hpj  power,  and  the  v 


right,  was  made  to  justify  that  of  another;  when 
at  last,  tfiMainmg  longer  to  discuss  wrongs  she  had 
no  intention  to  redress,  she  officially  announced  — 
that  "  farther  negotiation  was  inadmissible."  l 

Having  thus  lost  the  respect  of  her  adversary,  it 
but  remained  for  the  United  States  to  decide,  whether 
she  would  preserve  her  own  ?  On  this  question,  she 
could  not  hesitate  long  or  seriously  ;  and  accord 
ingly,  on  the  18th  of  June,  1812,  declared  war 
against  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and 
Ireland  and  their  dependancies. 

It  must  not  however  be  dissembled,  that  this  act, 


l  Dallas's  Exposition. 
2 


14  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812. 

though  forced  upon  the  government  by  the  long- 
continued  and  increasing  injustice  of  England,  re 
ceived  from  the  community,  a  less  general  support, 
than  might  have  been  expected  from  the  purity  of 
the  motives  in  which  it  originated,  or  the  nature 
and  extent  of  the  evils  it  was  intended  to  redress. 
The  habitual  opponents  of  the  administration,  believ 
ing  the  circumstances  of  the  times  furnished  a  favor 
able  opportunity  for  attempting  the  recovery  of  the 
political  ascendency  they  had  lost,  hastened  to  in 
stitute  a  system  of  indiscriminate  opposition ;  directed 
as  well  against  measures  merely  preparatory  for  war, 
as  against  those  which  were  in  themselves  acts  of 
war.  In  this  headlong  career,  the  fiscal  operations 
of  the  government  were  opposed  ;  the  recruiting  ser 
vice  discountenanced  ;  the  militia  made  insubordi 
nate,  and  even  the  constitutional  authority  of  the 
President  to  organize  their  masses  and  direct  their 
services  within  the  states  respectively,  denied  and 
resisted.  We  need  hardly  add,  that  an  opposition, 
thus  active  and  lawless,  could  not  fail  to  be  mis 
chievous,  and  became,  as  will  be  seen  in  the  progress 
of  our  story,  the  source  of  both  calamity  and  disgrace 
to  the  nation.1 

i  Appendix,  No.  5. 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812.  15 


CHAPTER   II. 

Hull's  Expedition. — Loss  of  Michilimakinac. — Surrender  of  Detroit, 
the  Michigan  Territory,  and  the  Army. 

AMONG  the  measures  of  precaution,  taken  by  the 
Government  of  the  United  States,  previously  to  their 
declaration  of  war,1  was  that  "  of  placing  within 
the  Michigan  Territory,  a  force  that  should  be  com 
petent  to  the  defence  of  the  north-western  frontier 
against  Indian  hostility  ;  and  which,  in  the  event 
of  a  rupture  with  Great  Britain,  would  enable  the 
United  States  to  obtain  the  command  of  Lake  Erie ; 
and  with  it,  the  means  of  more  easily  co-operating 
with  such  other  corps,  as  might  be  destined  to  the 
invasion  of  the  Canadas."2  The  troops  assigned 
to  this  service,  amounting  to  two  thousand  men  of 
all  arms,3  were  placed  under  the  command  of  Brig 
adier-General  Hull,  then  Governor  of  the  Michigan 

1  The  principal  of  these  were,  an  Act  laying  an  embargo  on  ship 
ping — a  second,  authorizing  a  detachment  of  one  hundred  thousand 
militia — a  third,  for  increasing  the  regular  army — a  fourth,  for  the 
acceptance  of  volunteers — and  a  fifth,  for  borrowing  money  on  public 
account. 

2  President  Madison's  Message  to  Congress,  of  Nov.  4th,  1812. 

3  Three  companies  of  the  first  United  States  regiment  of  Artillery ; 
the  fourth,  and  part  of  the  first  regiment  of  Infantry ;  three  regiments 
of  Ohio  volunteers ;  the  Michigan  militia  and  one  company  of  Rangers. 


16        NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812. 

Territorjr ;  and  formerly  an  officer,  not  without  dis 
tinction,  in  the  war  of  the  revolution. 

This  General,  after  giving  the  necessary  attention 
to  the  equipment  and  subsistence  of  his  corps,1  began 
his  march  from  Dayton,  a  frontier  town  in  the  State 
of  Ohio,  on  the  first  day  of  June,  1812.  Though 
unencumbered  with  artillery,  and  in  no  way  impeded 
by  an  enemy,  his  progress  was  unavoidably  slow  ; 
from  the  necessity  of  opening  roads,  making  bridges 
and  constructing  blockhouses,  for  the  better  security 
of  his  rear,  and  of  the  supplies  and  reinforcements 
moving  upon  it.  It  was  not,  therefore,  until  the 
30t.li  of  the  month,  that  he  was  enabled  to  reach 
the  Miami  of  the  Lake  ;  where,  under  an  admoni 
tion,  recently  received  from  the  War  Department, 
"to  quicken  his  movements,"  he  determined  to 
avail  himself  of  the  means  of  navigation  which  now 
offered,  for  the  more  rapid  and  economical  trans 
portation  of  his  baggage,  stores,  sick  and  convales 
cent.2  Embarking  these,  accordingly,  on  board  of 
the  Cayahoga  Packet,  they  were  despatched  for 
Detroit ;  while  the  army,  with  the  same  destination, 
resumed  its  march  by  land. 

The  day  following  this  transaction,  the  General 

1  Hull  asserts,  that  he  found  the  Ohio  volunteers  deficient  in  arms, 
equipment  and  clothing ;  and  even  unprovided  with  either  contract, 
or  commissariat,  for  the  supply  of  their  food. — Hull's  Memoirs. 

2  Colonel  McArthur  admonished  the  General  against  this  measure, 
on  the  presumption  that  war  was  already  declared,  and  furnished 
strong  evidence  of  the  fact ;  but  with  so  little  effect,  that  the  General 
availed  himself  of  the  packet  to  forward,  even  "the  instructions  of  his 
government  and  the  returns  of  his  army." 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812.  17 

received  the  first  official  notice  of  the  declaration  of 
war  ;  and  on  reaching  the  river  Raisin,  was  made 
acquainted  with  the  fate  of  his  detachment ;  which, 
in  attempting  to  pass  the  British  post  of  Maiden, 
had  been  attacked  and  captured,  "by  a  subal 
tern  and  six  men,  in  a  small  and  open  boat." 

The  effect  of  this  disaster  on  General  Hull,  was 
not  such  as  might  have  been  expected  from  long 
military  service,  or  high  military  character  ;  and 
probably  produced  the  first  doubts  that  existed  of 
his  capacity  as  a  leader.  Instead  of  exciting  to 
increased  spirit  and  exertion,  which  would  soon 
have  compensated  for  the  loss  and  atoned  for  the 
disgrace  so  unexpectedly  incurred,  he  unfortunately 
saw  it  only  in  the  light  of  an  evil  omen,  and  pre 
cursor  of  an  attack,  fatal  alike  to  the  objects  and 
agents  of  the  expedition ;  and  accordingly  employed 
himself  in  imagining  and  practising  devices  to  avoid 
a  battle,1  which  all  circumstances — time,  place  and 
relative  strength — made  it  his  duty  to  seek.  Nor 
were  his  stratagems  on  this  occasion  unavailing  ; 
the  enemy  saw  and  respected  his  strength,  and  per 
mitted  him  to  reach  Detroit,  without  molestation  or 
menace. 

Finding  himself  now  vested  with  an  authority  to 
invade  the  Canada*,  "  if  consistent  with  the  safety 
of  his  own  posts,"  and  not  having,  as  he  believed, 
any  thing  to  fear  on  their  account,  he  on  the  12th 
of  July  crossed  the  river  Detroit  and  encamped  at 


i  Hull's  Memoirs,  p.  39. 
2* 


18  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812. 

Sandwich,  with  the  professed  object  of  marching 
directly  upon  Maiden — a  measure,  recommended 
by  many  considerations ;  but  more  particularly  by 
the  fact,  that  from  the  local  position  of  the  fort, 
(nearly  twenty  miles  in  the  rear  of  Detroit)  its  gar 
rison  had  the  power  of  destroying  or  obstructing  all 
supplies  coming  from  the  United  States,  unless  pro 
tected  by  a  force  superior  to  itself. 

In  prosecution  of  this  important  object,  the  Gene 
ral  began  by  issuing  a  proclamation  addressed  as 
well  to  the  hopes,  as  to  the  fears  of  the  Canadian 
colonists  ;  and  vaunting,  in  an  especial  manner,  the 
possession  of  a  force  "  equal  to  the  purpose  of  either 
protection  or  punishment."  Nor  did  the  party  ad 
dressed,  put  a  different  estimate  on  its  power  of 
doing  good  or  evil — "all  opposition  seemed  to  fall 
before  it;  one  month  it  remained  in  the  country, 
and  was  fed  from  its  resources.  In  different  direc 
tions,  detachments  penetrated  sixty  miles  into  the 
settled  parts  of  the  province,  and  the  inhabitants 
seemed  satisfied  with  the  change  of  situation  which 
appeared  to  be  taking  place.  The  militia  at  Am- 
herstburg  were  daily  deserting,  and  the  whole 
country  under  the  control  of  the  army,  asking  for 
protection — while  the  Indians  generally,  appeared 
to  be  neutralized  and  determined  to  take  no  part  in 
the  controversy."  l 

If  such  was  the  effect  of  the  mere  appearance  of 
the  American  army  within  the  limits  of  Canada, 

I  Hull's  official  letter  to  the  War  Department,  27th  August,  1312. 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812.  19 

what  might  not  have  been  expected  from  a  prompt, 
steady  and  well-directed  application  of  its  powers  1 
Maiden  was  but  eighteen  miles  from  Sandwich  ; 
the  road  between  the  two,  wholly  unobstructed  ; 
and  what  at  the  former  was  called  a  fortification, 
utterly  unworthy  of  the  name.1  Nor  was  the  gar 
rison  more  formidable  than  the  work  it  occupied  ; 
consisting  only  of  one  hundred  regular  troops,  and 
four  hundred  disaffected  militia  and  neutralized 
Indians.  Instead,  however,  of  availing  himself  of 
circumstances  thus  auspicious,  and  putting  into  his 
conduct  that  vigor  and  intelligence,  which  always 
deserve  success  and  often  command  it,  the  General 
unfortunately  took  council  only  from  his  fears,  and 
for  the  first  time  discovered,  that  "  he  had  neither 
cannon  nor  howitzers  of  large  calibre,  fit  to  travel  ; 
and  that  without  arms  of  this  description,  it  would 
be  unsafe  to  advance."  Artificers  were  therefore 
set  to  work  to  supply  the  deficiency,  and  at  the  end 
of  three  weeks,  two  twenty-four  pounders  and  three 
howitzers,  were  put  upon  wheels  strong  enough  to 
carry  them.2 

It   may  be   reasonably  supposed   that  this   long 
interval  had  not  been  permitted  to  escape,  without 


1  Hull's  trial ;  Cass  and  Miller's  testimony. 

2  General  Brock's  estimate  of  the  use  of  heavy  cannon  in  breaching 
earthern  walls  and  cedar  pickets,  was  very  different.     In  approaching 
Detroit,  a  work  of  much  more  strength  than  Maiden,  he  would  not 
encumber  his  movements  with  guns  of  larger  calibre  than  six  and 
three  pounders.     Yet  to  Brock's  knowledge  of  his  trade,  General 
Hull  bears  willing  testimony. 


20  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812. 

some  movements  calculated  to  try  the  strength  and 
temper  of  the  enemy  ;  and  more  particularly,  that 
the  approaches  to  his  position,  as  well  as  the  posi 
tion  itself,  had  been  thoroughly  reconnoitred  and 
ascertained.  Nothing,  however,  of  this  character 
was  either  meditated  or  executed,  if  we  except  two 
or  three  small  and  isolated  detachments,  sent  as  far 
as  the  river  Canard ;  but  without  any  sustaining 
corps,  to  enable  them  to  hold  what  they  gained,  if 
found  to  be  useful ;  nor  even  any  instruction  to  do 
so,  if  practicable,  by  the  means  they  possessed.  Of 
these,  the  detachment  commanded  by  Colonels  Cass 
and  Miller  is  most  worthy  of  notice. 

On  approaching  the  river  (a  narrow  but  deep 
stream  four  miles  from  Maiden)  a  British  picket 
was  found  in  possession  of  the  bridge,  and  appa 
rently  determined  to  hold  it.  After  a  short  trial  of 
strength,  the  position  was  turned  and  the  picket 
driven  back  upon  the  fort,  whither  the  fugitives 
carried  their  panic  along  with  them,  "creating  in 
the  garrison  much  alarm  and  confusion" — a  state 
of  things  which  continued  to  exist  until  it  was  dis 
covered  that  the  detachment,  instead  of  being  (as 
had  been  imagined)  the  precursor  of  an  army,  was 
merely  a  reconnoitring  party,  ignorant  of  the  value 
of  the  position  it  had  gained,  or  not  instructed  and 
prepared  to  maintain  it.1 

If  the  effects  of  this  experiment  on  the  enemy, 
appear  to  be  extraordinary  and  without  sufficient 

i  Hull's  trial ;  Forbish's  testimony. 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812.  21 

cause,  how  much  more  so  must  be  considered  those 
which  it  produced  on  the  American  commander  1 
When  the  success  of  the  party  in  taking  the  bridge 
and  driving  in  the  picket,  was  reported  by  Colonels 
Cass  and  Miller,  they  did  not  fail  to  report  also  the 
importance  of  the  acquisition  they  had  made  to  the 
future  objects  of  the  campaign  ;  and  entreated,  that 
if  any  circumstances  unknown  to  them,  made  it 
inexpedient  or  improper  to  move  the  army  to  this 
new  and  important  position,  they  might  themselves 
be  permitted  to  hold  it  and  be  sustained  in  doing 
so,  by  occasional  or  permanent  reinforcements  and 
supplies.  On  this  expression  of  facts  and  opinions, 
which  should  have  excited  only  respect  for  those 
who  had  given  them,  the  General  yielded  to  a 
paroxysm  of  ill-temper  and  obstinacy  ;  criminated 
the  attack  made  on  the  enemy,  as  a  breach  of 
orders  ;  rejected  the  advice  offered  to  him  in  all  its 
parts,  and  peremptorily  commanded  the  immediate 
return  of  the  detachment.  Nor  could  any  modifi 
cation  of  this  order  be  obtained,  but  on  condition 
that  Colonels  Cass  and  Miller  would  take  upon 
themselves  the  whole  responsibility  of  the  measure, 
without  any  corresponding  obligation  on  the  part  of 
the  General  to  supply  the  means  necessary  to  its 
execution — a  condition,  to  which  he  well  knew,  no 
prudent  officer  would  yield  his  assent.1 

i  Hull's  trial.  Colonel  Miller's  testimony. — "Witness  mentioned  to 
Colonel  Cass  and  they  agreed,  that  as  they  had  not  the  disposition  of 
the  whole  force,  they  should  not  take  the  responsibility."  See  also 
the  testimony  jf  Quartermaster-General  Taylor. 


22  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812. 

Such  want  of  knowledge,  of  judgment  and  of 
enterprise,  could  not  be  long  concealed  by  any 
devices ;  and  had  now  become  so  flagrant  and 
alarming,  that  even  the  General  appeared  to  be 
touched  by  a  desire  of  redeeming  what  he  had  lost. 
He  regretted  that  a  blow  had  not  been  already 
struck  ;  and  declared  himself  pledged  to  lead  the 
army  promptly  and  directly  to  Maiden.1  The  am 
munition  was  accordingly  placed  in  wagons  ;  the 
cannon,  on  floating  batteries  ;  and  every  other 
requisite  for  the  attack  prepared,  when  to  the  grief 
and  disappointment  of  all,  the  plan  was  abandoned, 
the  encampment  raised,  and  the  army,  with  the 
exception  of  a  small  detachment  of  one  hundred 
and  fifty  men,  recrossed  in  the  night  of  the  7th  of 
August,  to  the  town  and  fort  of  Detroit  ! 

While  the  American  commander  was  thus  de 
pressing  the  spirit  of  his  own  army,  raising  that  of 
his  enemy,  taking  from  the  savages  every  motive 
for  longer  inaction,  and  entirely  destroying  the  con 
fidence  reposed  in  his  promises  by  the  Canadian 
colonists,  his  adversary  (General  Brock)  was  pursu 
ing  a  system,  which,  in  all  respects,  tended  directly 
to  augment  and  confirm  these  effects.  Apprised, 
as  early  as  the  26th  of  June,  of  the  declaration  of 
war,2  he  hastened  to  transmit  the  information  to  his 
outposts  ;  and  without  waiting  the  instructions  of 
Sir  George  Provost,  suggested  to  the  commandant 

1  Colonel  Cass's  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  of  the  10th  Sep 
tember,  1812. 

2  Christie's  Memoir  of  the  late  war  in  the  Canadas. 


NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812.       23 

of  St.  Joseph's,  an  immediate  attack  on  Fort  Michi- 
limackinac,  as  the  best  mode  of  defending  his  own. 

Though  Captain  Roberts,  the  officer  to  whom 
this  suggestion  was  made,  found  himself  ill-pre 
pared  for  an  enterprise  of  such  moment  ;  yet  enter 
ing  fully  into  the  views  of  his  commander,  and 
being  cordially  supported  by  the  agents  of  the  two 
western  fur-companies,  he  in  the  short  space  of 
eight  days,  organized  a  force,  naval  and  military, 
with  which  on  the  17th  of  July  he  made  the  experi 
ment;  and  (it  may  be  safely  presumed,  as  much  to 
his  surprise,  as  entirely  to  his  satisfaction)  found 
the  commanding  officer  not  only  unprepared  for  the 
attack,  but  ignorant  of  the  declaration  of  war,  and 
not  unwilling  to  surrender  his  post,  without  even 
the  ceremony  of  a  refusal.1 

Having  thus  easily  and  cheaply  succeeded  in 
wresting  from  the  United  States  their  most  important 
western  position,  the  British  General  now  conceived 
a  project  of  yet  more  contemptuous  daring  ;  having 
for  its  object,  not  merely  the  safety  of  Maiden  and 
the  expulsion  of  the  American  army  from  Canada, 
but  the  pursuit  and  capture  of  this  very  army, 
within  its  own  territorial  limits  and  defences.  As 


i  This  surrender,  to  say  the  least  of  it,  was  precipitate.  Some 
experiment  of  the  enemy's  power  to  take  the  fort,  was  due  to  the 
American  flag  and  ought  to  have  been  made ;  and  the  more  so,  as 
the  result  would  probably  have  shown,  that  an  investing  corps,  com 
posed  of  thirty  regulars  and  a  rabble  of  engage's  and  savages,  with 
two  old  rusty  iron  guns  of  small  calibre,  was  much  less  formidable 
than  had  been  imagined. 


24  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812. 

a  first  step  in  this  new  career,  he  superseded  Colonel 
St.  George  in  the  command  of  the  district,  and  sub 
stituted  for  him  Colonel  Proctor.  This  officer,  who 
arrived  at  Maiden  on  the  29th  of  July,  brought 
with  him  no  important  accession  to  the  number  of 
the  garrison;1  but,  Avhat  was  justly  considered  as 
even  more  necessary, — a  competent  knowledge  of 
his  profession,  a  thorough  acquaintance  with  the 
views,  and  a  ready  submission  to  the  authority  of 
his  chief.  With  such  qualifications  it  is  not  to  be 
supposed  that  he  would  be  slow  in  appreciating  the 
advantages  to  be  derived  from  the  position  of  the 
fort  in  which  he  commanded  ;  the  concentrated 
state  of  the  force  it  contained,  and  the  naval  means 
given  him  to  employ  and  to  second  this.  He 
accordingly  determined  to  avail  himself  of  the 
swamps  and  defiles  on  the  American  side  of  the 
Detroit ;  and  by  thus  seizing  the  key  of  his  adver 
sary's  resources,  not  merely  recall  him  from  Canada, 
but  literally  compel  him  to  fight  for  his  daily  bread, 
or  surrender  at  discretion.  Nor  had  he  long  to  wait 
for  an  occasion,  on  which  to  test  the  value  of  the 
plan  he  had  adopted. 

Three  days  before  the  retreat  of  the  American 
army  from  Canada,  General  Hull,  who  had  hitherto 
shown  great  indifference  to  the  state  of  his  com 
munications,2  consented  to  the  march  of  a  detach- 

1  "  Ten  or  twelve  men."    Hull's  trial ;  Gooding's  testimony. 

2  "  The  Colonels  of  the  Ohio  militia  applied  for  leave  to  take  a  detach 
ment  and  open  a  communication  with  Brush,  and  bring  the  provisions 
in  safety  to  Detroit ;  but  the  General  refused  to  grant  the  request  and 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812.  25 

ment,  as  a  guard  to  the  mail  and  additional  convoy 
to  a  quantity  of  flour  and  a  number  of  cattle,  des 
tined  for  the  use  of  the  army,  which  the  policy, 
adopted  by  Proctor  and  already  detailed,  had  stopped 
at  the  river  Raisin.  With  that  infatuation,  how 
ever,  which  marked  so  much  of  his  public  con 
duct,  and  entirely  forgetting  the  panic  he  had 
himself  suffered  in  passing  the  denies  of  Maguago 
and  Brownstown,  on  the  preceding  4th  of  July, 
(though  then  at  the  head  of  an  army,)  he  per 
versely  limited  the  number  of  the  detachment  to 
two  hundred  men.1  This  small  body,  composed  of 
volunteers  and  militia,  and  inarching  with  that 
want  of  circumspection  which  so  often  occurs  in 
the  movements  of  troops  of  this  description,  fell  into 
an  ambuscade  prepared  for  them  near  Brownstown, 
and  were  immediately  beaten  and  dispersed ;  with 
the  loss  of  four  captains,  two  subalterns,  sixty  pri 
vates  and  the  public  mail,  of  which  they  had  been 
the  escort.  Major  Van  Home,  the  commanding 
officer,  did  what  was  possible,  to  lessen  the  loss  and 
prevent  the  disorder  of  the  retreat ;  and  thus  endea 
vored  to  atone  for  the  error  he  had  committed,  in 
disregarding  the  information  previously  given  him, 
of  the  strength  and  position  of  the  enemy  j  of 

appeared  indifferent  about  the  fate  of  the  Captain  and  the  provisions. 
On  the  6th,  the  Colonels  applied  for  five  hundred  men  to  bury  the 
killed  (in  Van  Home's  affair,)  and  to  open  the  communication  with 
Brush ;  but  the  General  refusing  to  let  them  take  more  than  one 
hundred,  and  this  being  a  number  much  too  small,  the  project  was 
abandoned." — McJffee's  History  of  the  War  in  the  West. 
1  Hull's  trial ;  McArthur's  testimony. 
3 


26       NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812. 

which,  had  a  proper  use  been  made,  the  misfortune 
might  have  been  easily  and  entirely  avoided.1 

To  fulfil  the  intention  of  this  unsuccessful  and 
ill-conducted  enterprise,  the  importance  of  which, 
(now  that  the  army  had  recrossed  the  Detroit  and 
could  no  longer  live  on  the  resources  of  the  enemy,) 
became  every  moment  more  obvious  and  urgent,  a 
second  detachment  was  ordered,  and  the  command 
assigned  to  Lieutenant-Colonel  Miller  of  the  fourth 
United  States  regiment  of  infantry.  But,  as  in  the 
former  case,  the  General  had  not  become  wise  by 
the  experience  of  others,  so  in  this,  he  continued  to 
be  ignorant  in  despite  of  his  own.  Disregarding 
the  admonition,  so  abundantly  furnished  by  the 
disaster  and  disgrace  incurred  on  the  5th,  and 
entirely  overlooking  the  fact,  that,  his  adversary 
having  now  nothing  to  fear  with  regard  to  Maiden, 
was  at  all  times  in  a  condition  to  repeat  the  lesson 
with  his  whole  force,  if  deemed  necessary, — he  per 
tinaciously  refused  to  extend  the  corps  beyond  five 
hundred  combatants ;  and  would  have  hazarded 
these  without  the  protection  of  a  single  piece  of 
artillery,  had  not  Colonel  Miller  insisted  upon  taking 
with  him,  one  six-pounder  and  one  five  and  a  half 
inch  howitzer.2 


i  "After  passing  the  Maguago  villages,  a  Frenchman  informed 
Major  Van  Home,  that  three  or  four  hundred  Indians  and  some 
British,  were  lying  in  ambush  near  Brownstown,  for  the  purpose  of 
intercepting  the  party.  Not  sufficiently  respecting  the  information, 
the  Major  marched  on." — McJlffee's  History. 

&  Dalliba's  Narrative. 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812.  27 

The  detachment  beginning  its  march  on  the  8th 
of  August,  and  being  conducted  with  the  necessary 
attention  and  skill,  suffered  no  serious  interruption 
from  the  enemy,  until  the  afternoon  of  the  9th  ; 
when  on  entering  a  wood  near  Brownstown,  the 
advanced  guard,  commanded  by  Captain  Snelling, 
found  itself  within  pistol-shot  of  a  long  and  hostile 
line,  covered  in  front  by  a  breastwork  of  logs  and 
brushwood,  and  strongly  flanked  by  the  Detroit  on 
one  side,  and  a  succession  of  swamps  and  thickets 
on  the  other.  A  heavy  and  destructive  fire  now 
opened  on  Snelling,  who  sustained  and  returned  it 
with  his  usual  gallantry,  until  Colonel  Miller  (by 
promptly  converting  his  order  of  march  into  an 
order  of  battle)  was  enabled  to  interpose  his  front 
line.  It  was  in  executing  this  manoeuvre,  that 
finding  himself  both  outflanked  and  outnumbered, 
and  perceiving  many  of  his  men  to  fall  and  some  to 
waver,  while  little  if  any  impression  was  made  on 
the  covered  ranks  of  the  enemy,  this  distinguished 
officer  determined  to  bring  the  contest  to  the  deci 
sion  of  the  bayonet.  The  execution  of  this  purpose 
was  not  less  rapid  than  its  conception  was  judicious ; 
the  order  to  charge  was  received  with  loud  and  re 
peated  huzzas  ;  the  breastwork  was  instantaneously 
mounted  and  passed,  and  the  centre  and  left  of  the 
enemy,  (composed  of  British  regulars  and  Canadian 
militia,)  not  merely  beaten,  but  decidedly  routed,1 

i  "  This  rout  continued  for  a  mile,  when  coming  into  a  piece  of  open 
ground,  they  endeavored  to  form,  but  on  the  approach  of  the  Ameri 
cans,  again  broke  and  fled  into  the  woods." — Dalliba's  Narrative. 


28  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812. 

Tecumseh,  who  at  the  head  of  what  remained 
of  his  tribe  formed  the  left  of  the  British  line,  was 
more  difficult  to  move.  Apparently  unaffected  by 
the  fate  of  his  ally,  he  continued  the  contest  with 
great  vigor  ;  and  when  compelled  to  abandon  the 
breastwork,  withdrew  to  the  neighboring  thickets, 
took  new  and  strong  positions,  and  for  a  moment 
rendered  it  doubtful,  whether,  after  all,  the  battle 
was  more  than  half  won.  Unfortunately,  these  last 
efforts,  (the  agonies  of  exhaustion  and  despair,) 
were  mistaken  by  Major  Van  Home,  who  com 
manded  the  right  flank  of  the  American  line,  as 
evidence  only  of  the  habitual  prowess,  untiring  en 
ergy  and  great  force  of  his  Indian  enemy  ;  which, 
as  he  concluded,  could  not  be  long  resisted,  with 
out  the  aid  of  a  re-enforcement.  A  message  to  this 
effect  overtook  Colonel  Miller,  while  closely  pursuing 
the  British  and  Canadian  fugitives,  a  circumstance 
which  could  not  fail  to  embarrass  his  movements. 
A  halt  was  accordingly  commanded,  when,  after 
a  moment's  reflection,  giving  up  the  glory  of  cap 
turing  one  half  of  his  enemy's  force,  he  rapidly 
retraced  his  steps  to  rescue  his  comrades  and  cannon 
from  the  grasp  of  the  other.  A  second  message, 
soon  after  received  from  the  right,  leaving  no  doubt 
that  the  victory  was  as  complete,  as  the  action  had 
been  general;  and  that  Tecumseh,  like  Muir,  had 
at  last  been  compelled  to  save  himself  by  flight. 
The  pursuit  of  the  latter  was  resumed  ;  but  with  the 
effect  only  of  increasing  the  regret,  at  the  well- 
meant  but  erroneous  estimate  of  the  powers  and 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812.  29 

perseverance  of  the  Shawanee  chief.  On  reaching 
the  shore  of  Lake  Erie,  the  flying  enemy  was  still 
visible ;  but  at  a  distance,  that  rendered  every 
attempt  at  farther  annoyance  useless,  and  on  an 
element  prohibiting  all  nearer  approach.1 

Returning  to  the  place  of  combat,  an  encamp 
ment  was  hastily  traced  and  the  necessary  guards 
posted  ;  when  the  American  commander  employed 
himself  in  collecting  the  wounded,  burying  the  dead, 
and  ascertaining  the  state  of  his  communications 
with  the  river  Raisin.  Receiving  on  this  last  head 
satisfactory  information,  that  the  Indian  villages  in 
his  front  were  abandoned,  and  that  there  no  longer 
existed  any  obstruction,  on  the  part  of  the  enemy, 
to  his  farther  progress,  he  hastened  to  detach  Cap 
tain  Snelling  to  General  Hull  with  an  account  of 
the  action,  and  a  requisition  for  boats  to  remove  the 
wounded ;  for  provisions,  of  which  he  was  already 
much  in  want ;  and  for  such  a  reinforcement  of 
men,  as  would  replace  those  who  had  fallen  in  the 
combat.  With  even  these  modest  and  moderate 
demands,  the  General  did  not  think  it  prudent  to 
comply.  Boats  were  indeed  permitted  to  be  sent, 
which,  by  the  exertion  of  Colonel  Me  Arthur,,  arrived 
at  nine  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  10th ;  but  a 
reinforcement  sufficient  to  fill  up  the  chasm  made 
in  the  ranks  of  the  detachment,  could  not  be  spared ; 
and  of  provisions,  so  much  only  was  forwarded,  as 
in  the  present  hungry  and  comfortless  condition  of 


S  Dalliba's  Narrative. 
3* 


30  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812. 

the  troops,  "  but  sufficed  for  a  single  meal."  l  Be 
lieving,  however,  that  the  scantiness  of  this  supply 
was  the  result  of  haste  or  accident,  rather  than  of 
design,  Colonel  Miller  despatched  a  second  requisi 
tion  on  the  contractor,  and  fresh  assurances  to  the 
General,  that  "his  communications  with  the  river 
Raisin  were  now  fully  re-established."  The  mes 
senger  employed  on  this  occasion,  by  some  misdi 
rection  of  his  route,  did  not  get  back  to  the  en 
campment  until  the  evening  of  the  llth,  and  to 
the  regret  and  astonishment  of  all,  brought  with 
him  not  the  required  supply  of  food,  but  a  written 
and  peremptory  order  "for  the  immediate  return  of 
the  detachment."  This  order  was  strictly,  though 
reluctantly  obeyed,  and  at  midday  of  the  12th,  the 
corps  re-entered  Detroit.2 

The  General's  conduct  on  this  occasion  could  not 
escape  animadversion.    His  more  severe  critics,  com- 

i  Hull's  trial ;  Miller's  testimony. 

8  The  American  General,  as  usual,  saw  every  thing  through  the 
medium  of  his  fears.  The  effect  of  even  this  victory  on  his'mind,  was 
depressing  and  degrading.  His  official  letter  giving  an  account  of  it, 
laments  "  that  nothing  was  gained  by  it  but  honor;  and  that  the  blood 
of  seventy-five  men  had  been  shed  in  vain  ;  as  it  but  opened  his  com 
munications  as  far  as  their  bayonets  had  extended."  It  is  thus  he  spoke 
of  a  victory,  which  drove  the  enemy  from  the  field  and  from  his  pur 
pose  ;  which  enabled  the  victors  to  remain  nearly  three  days  in  front 
of  Maiden  without  molestation ;  and  which,  but  for  his  orders  of 
recall,  would  have  enabled  them  to  accomplish  all  the  objects  of  the 
expedition.  What  would  a  bold  and  able  leader  have  made  of  the 
moral  effect  of  this  victory  on  his  own  troops  and  on  those  of  his 
enemy !  With  Mr.  Hull,  it  degenerated  into  a  chapter  of  lamentations 
on  the  value  of  a  soldier's  blood,  and  the  vanity  of  a  soldier's  honor. 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812.  31 

bining  his  uniform  indifference  to  the  state  of  his 
communications,  the  pressure  necessary  to  induce 
him  to  take  any  measures  for  re-opening  them,  and 
the  perverse  preference  given  to  those  of  the  most 
inefficient  and  hopeless  character,  with  this  last  act, 
of  recalling  a  corps,  which  had  beaten  and  routed 
the  enemy  from  a  fortified  position  of  his  own  choos 
ing,  and  which  had  thus  substantially  freed  from 
obstruction  the  short  remaining  distance  between 
itself  and  the  river  Raisin — did  not  scruple  to  im 
pute  to  him  a  secret  and  systematic  co-operation 
with  the  enemy ;  while  others,  less  prone  to  suspicion 
and  of  more  charitable  temperament,  ascribed  it  to 
an  honest  but  false  estimate  of  the  value  of  the  ob 
ject  to  be  attained,  or  of  the  degree  of  danger  to  be 
incurred  in  attaining  it ;  and  lastly,  to  a  persuasion 
that  the  safety  of  his  own  position,  now  required  a 
speedy  and  entire  concentration  of  his  forces.  But 
of  the  several  branches  of  this  apology  the  General 
hastened  to  deprive  himself,  by  organizing  a  new 
expedition,  having  the  same  object,  but  possessing 
inferior  means  ;  and  with  the  additional  objection, 
that  its  plan  involved  a  longer  march,  by  a  route 
merely  conjectural,  and  at  a  moment  when  the 
British  force  was  fast  accumulating  in  his  front,  and 
its  bold  and  active  leader  had  arrived  at  Maiden.1 

Colonel  McArthur,  the  officer  to  whom  the  com 
mand  of  this  new  detachment  had  been  assigned, 


i  General  Brock  arrived  at  Maiden  on  the  13th  of  August. — Chris 
tie's  Memoirs. 


32  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812. 

set  out  late  in  the  afternoon  of  the  14th,  and  after 
struggling  with  many  and  unforeseen  difficulties — 
with  thickets  nearly  impervious,  with  swamps  almost 
impassable,  and  with  hunger,  which  the  General  had 
forgotten  to  satisfy1 — was  at  last  compelled  to  retrace 
his  steps  towards  Detroit ;  and  arrived  in  the  neigh 
borhood  of  that  post,  in  time  to  share  in  the  misfor 
tune,  and  witness  the  disgrace,  which  now  awaited 
the  main  army. 

This  army,  as  has  been  already  stated,  recrossed 
the  river  Detroit  on  the  evening  of  the  7th  and 
morning  of  the  8th  of  August,  with  the  exception 
of  a  few  volunteers,  who,  in  madness  or  in  mockery, 
had  been  left  for  the  protection  of  such  British  colo 
nists  as  yet  adhered  to  the  American  standard.2  On 
the  llth,  this  shadow  of  support  was  also  withdrawn ; 
and  on  the  14th,  General  Brock,  in  prosecution  of 
the  plan  already  indicated,  appeared  at  Sandwich, 
and  immediately  employed  himself  in  constructing 
a  battery  to  protect,  at  once,  his  present  position  and 
future  operations.  In  executing  this  work,  he  met 
with  no  interruption  ;  as  every  species  of  annoyance 
was  either  indirectly  declined,  or  expressly  forbidden 


1  "  The  only  food  they  had  on  this  march,  was  green  corn  and 
pumpkins,  found  in  the  fields." — McJlffee. 

2  "  Major  Denny  was  left  at  the  stockade- work  at  Sandwich,  with 
one  hundred  and  thirty  convalescents  and  Anderson's  artillerists,  un 
der  orders  '  to  hold  possession  of  that  part  of  Upper  Canada ;  to  afford 
all  possible  protection  to  the  well-disposed  inhabitants,  and  to  defend 
his  post  to  the  last  extremity  against  musquetry ;  but  if  overpowered 
by  artillery,  to  retreat.'  " — Idem. 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812.  33 

by  General  Hull.  In  vain,  was  permission  solicited 
to  erect  a  battery,  with  which  to  dislodge  or  destroy 
the  enemy's  shipping  ;  in  vain,  a  small  detachment 
of  one  hundred  men,  required  for  the  purpose  of 
spiking  the  British  cannon  ;  to  these,  and  to  every 
similar  proposition,  involving  credit  to  himself  or 
danger  to  his  adversary,  the  General  turned  either 
a  deaf  ear,  or  a  positive  refusal.1 

Such  was  the  state  of  things  on  the  morning  of 
the  15th,  when  a  marquee  (the  top  of  which  was  so 
painted  as  to  give  it  a  strong  resemblance  to  the 
British  flag)  was  found  erected  in  the  centre  of  the 
American  encampment.  While  this  circumstance 
engaged  the  attention  of  the  troops,  exciting  the 
surprise  of  all,  and  the  suspicion  of  many,  a  boat 
from  the  enemy  was  seen  approaching  the  shore. 
The  officer  under  whose  direction  it  came,  having 
announced  himself  "  the  bearer  of  a  written  message 
from  General  Brock  to  General  Hull,"  was  promptly 
received  and  conducted  to  head-quarters.  On  ex 
amination,  the  letter  he  brought  was  found  to  con 
tain  a  demand  for  the  immediate  surrender  of  the 
fort,  and  a  menace  of  indiscriminate  massacre  in 
case  of  refusal. 

A  requisition  of  this  kind,  which,  in  all  its  aspects, 
was  alike  important  and  unexpected,  would,  no 

i  "  If  you  will  give  permission,  I  will  clear  the  enemy,  on  the  oppo 
site  shore,  from  the  lower  batteries?"  The  General  answered,  "Mr. 
Dalliba,  I  will  make  an  agreement  with  the  enemy,  that  if  they  will 
not  fire  on  me,  I  will  not  fire  on  them." — Dcdliba's  testimony; 
trial. 


34  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812. 

doubt,  have  warranted  an  immediate  recurrence  to 
a  council  of  war ;  but  no  such  step  was  either  taken 
or  suggested.  For  once,  the  American  General 
appeared  to  be  both  competent  and  willing  to  act 
without  advice,  and  to  take  upon  himself  all  respon 
sibility.  He  accordingly,  in  terms  sufficiently  decided, 
rejected  the  demand,  and  to  God  and  his  sword  com 
mitted  the  issue.  Unfortunately,  this  defiance  was 
addressed  to  one  who  knew  well  how  to  appreciate 
its  meaning ;  and  who  did  not  for  a  moment  suffer 
it  to  abate  his  diligence,  lessen  his  hopes,  or  even 
increase  his  circumspection.  His  measures  were 
pushed  with  a  haste  and  temerity,  which  excluded 
all  doubts  of  success  ;  and  with  a  disregard  to  rules, 
which  sufficiently  indicated  his  own  conviction  that 
he  was  but  taking  part  in  a  pantomime.1  The  re 
turn  of  his  messenger  becoming  the  signal  of  attack, 
a  fire  from  the  newly-constructed  battery  was  now 
opened  on  the  town  and  fort  of  Detroit.  This  con 
tinued  until  ten  o'clock  in  the  evening,  and  was 
recommenced  in  the  morning,  but  without  any  ma 
terial  injury  to  its  objects  ;  and  was,  in  fact,  but 
remarkable  from  its  being  the  only  semblance  of 
stratagem,  which  the  British  commander  conde 
scended  to  employ  in  passing  a  river  eleven  hundred 
yards  wide,  in  broad  day,  and  within  stroke  of  an 

1  So  satisfied  was  Brock  that  he  had  nothing  to  fear  from  his  enemy, 
that  when  advancing  to  the  storm  of  the  fort,  his  column  of  march  was 
not  preceded  by  a  vanguard  of  any  kind ;  and  the  General  himself 
was  seen  riding  alone,  two  hundred  yards  in  advance  of  his  column. 
— Snelling's  testimony;  Hull's  trial. 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812.  35 

enemy  not  less  strong  than  himself.  Nor,  as  the 
event  showed,  was  there  any  error  in  the  estimate 
(which  this  fact  presupposes)  of  a  want  of  courage, 
capacity,  or  fidelity  in  his  adversary ;  for,  on  making 
the  experiment,  it  completely  succeeded,  and  not 
merely  without  the  loss  of  a  single  life,  or  of  a  mo 
ment's  time,  but  under  a  full  demonstration  that 
neither  obstruction  nor  annoyance  of  any  kind  was 
meditated  by  the  American  General.1 

On  crossing  the  Detroit,  it  was  Brock's  intention 
to  establish  himself  at  Spring-Wells,  and  with  the 
aid  of  the  Indians,  so  to  interpose  between  the  Amer 
ican  army  and  its  resources,  as  to  compel  it  to  quit 
its  fortress,  and  risk  a  field-fight  for  the  defence  of 
its  communications  ;  but  having,  soon  after  landing, 
received  new  information  with  regard  to  the  fort  and 
army  generally,  and  having  in  particular,  assured 
himself  of  the  detachment  made  on  the  14th  from 
the  latter  under  the  command  of  Colonel  McArthur, 
he  determined  to  shorten  the  process,  and  substitute 
assault  for  investment.2  The  force  at  his  disposal 
for  this  purpose  did  not  exceed  seven  hundred  com 
batants,3  and  of  this  number,  four  hundred  were 
Canadian  militia  disguised  in  red  coats.  With  this 
small  corps,  preceded  by  five  pieces  of  light  artillery, 

1  "  On  the  12th,  (two  days  before  Brock's  demand  of  a  surrender,) 
the  commanding  officers  of  three  of  the  regiments  (the  fourth  being 
absent)  were  informed,  through  a  medium  admitting  of  no  doubt,  that 
the  General  had  stated  that '  a  capitulation  would  be  necessary.' " — 
Colonel  Cass's  Letter  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  September  IQth,  1812. 

2  Brock's  official  letter  of  the  17th  of  August,  1812.      3  Idem. 


36  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812. 

(six  and  three  pounders,)  he  began  his  march  along 
the  margin  of  the  river  ;  while  the  savages,  by  a 
parallel  movement  through  a  wood,  covered  his  left 
flank.  Between  eleven  and  twelve  o'clock,  the  head 
of  the  column  presented  itself  at  the  tanyards  below 
the  town,  (about  five  hundred  yards  from  the  fort,) 
when  the  American  officer,  commanding  an  exterioi 
battery  of  twenty-four  pounders  charged  with  grape 
shot,  believing  the  moment  had  arrived  when  hos 
tilities  could  no  longer  be  postponed  with  propriety, 
directed  his  men  to  point  their  guns  and  commence 
a  fire ;  but  the  order  was  immediately  counter 
manded,  and  another  issued  in  its  stead,  forbidding 
every  kind  of  hostility,  and  menacing  with  imme 
diate  death  all  who  should  dare  to  infract  it.1 

The  strength,  position,  and  supplies  of  the  Ameri 
can  army,  at  this  critical  moment,  have  been  fre 
quently  stated,  and  even  judicially  established.  The 
morning  reports  to  the  Adjutant-General,  made  its 
effective  force  one  thousand  and  sixty,  exclusive  of 
three  hundred  Michigan  militia,  and  as  many  Ohio 
volunteers,  detached  under  Me  Arthur.  Of  this  force, 
four  hundred  effectives  (infantry  and  artillerists  of 
the  line)  occupied  the  fort — a  work  of  regular  form 
and  great  solidity ;  surrounded  by  a  wide  and  deep 
ditch,  strongly  fraised  and  palisadoed,  and  sustained 
by  an  exterior  battery  of  two  twenty-four  pounders.8 
Three  hundred  Michigan  militia,  ready  to  combat  foi 

1  Me  Artec's  History. 

2  Hair'  ?  trial ;  testimony  of  Captain  Dalliba,  General  Taylor,  and 
Majo    Avsup. 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812.  37 

their  firesides  and  altars,  held  the  town,1  which  in 
itself  formed  a  respectable  defence  against  the  best 
troops,  and  one  quite  redoubtable  against  the  attacks 
of  Indians  or  militia.  Flanking  the  approach  to  the 
fort,  and  covered  by  a  high  and  heavy  picket-fence, 
lay  four  hundred  Ohio  volunteers,  expert  in  the  use 
of  their  weapons  and  anxious  to  employ  them ;  while 
one  mile  and  a  half  on  the  right,  advancing  by  long 
and  rapid  strides,  was  McArthur's  detachment,  re 
turning  by  a  route  which  (had  a  defence  been 
hazarded)  would  have  brought  them  directly  on  the 
rear  of  the  enemy.2  Of  provisions  and  ammunitions 
the  supply  was  abundant ;  fifteen  days  rations,  and 
much  fixed  and  loose  powder  and  lead,  were  amply 
sufficient  for  a  trial  of  strength  and  skill,  which  a 
single  hour  would  have  decided. 

Under  circumstances  thus  auspicious,  "  while  the 
troops,  in  sure  anticipation  of  victory,  awaited  the 
approach  of  the  enemy ;  when  no  sound  of  discontent 
was  heard,  nor  any  appearance  of  cowardice  or  dis 
affection  seen ;  when  every  individual  was  at  his  post, 
and  expected  a  proud  day  for  his  country  and  him 
self" — an  order  was  received  from  the  General  to 
withdraw  the  troops  from  all  exterior  positions  ;  to 
stack  the  arms  and  hoist  a  white  flag,  in  token  of 
submission  to  the  enemy  !  "  This  order  was  re 
ceived  by  the  men  with  a  universal  burst  of  indig 
nation  ;  even  the  women  were  ashamed  of  an  act, 
so  disgraceful  to  the  arms  of  their  country  ;  and  all 


Colonel  Cass's  letter,  10th  September.  a  Idem. 

4 


38  NOTICES    OP    THE    WAR    OF     1812. 

felt  as  was  proper  and  decorous,  except  the  man  in 
whose  hands  were  the  reins  of  authority."1 

The  terms  of  the  capitulation  which  followed, 
were  such  as  might  be  expected  from  the  views 
and  feelings  in  which  it  originated.  No  stipulation 
was  made  for  the  Canadian  colonists  who  had  joined 
the  American  standard ;  the  Ohio  and  Michigan 
militia  were  brought  under  engagements  not  to 
serve  again  during  the  war,  unless  exchanged;  the 
territory  in  its  whole  extent,  was  yielded  with  the 
army;  and  (that  even  more  might  be  granted  than 
was  asked,)  the  supplies  at  the  river  Raisin,  with 
their  convoy  and  McArthur's  detachment,  (the 
exact  situation  of  which  was  not  then  known  at 
the  fort,)  were,  on  the  suggestion  of  General  Hull, 
included  within  the  act  of  surrender.  By  another 
provision  of  this  instrument,  the  militia,  whether 
drafts  or  volunteers,  were  liberated,  while  Hull  and 
the  regular  troops  were  despatched  to  Montreal.2 

About  the  date  of  these  transactions,  a  calamity 
of  similar,  and  to  the  individuals  concerned,  of 
severer  character,  awaited  the  garrison  of  fort  Dear 
born, — a  military  post  on  the  south-western  extrem 
ity  of  Lake  Michigan,  possessing  as  was  believed,  a 
considerable  influence  over  Indian  wants  and  policy. 


1  Colonel  Cass's  letter  of  the  10th  September. 

«  "General  Hull  with  the  officers  and  men  of  his  army,  were  intro 
duced  into  Montreal  on  the  evening  of  the  6th  of  September,  in  a  tri 
umphal,  though  mock  procession,  amidst  the  shouts  of  a  scornful 
multitude,  indignant  at  the  savage  threat  of  extermination  breathed  in 
his  proclamation." — Christie's  Memoirs. 


NOTICES    OP    THE    WAR    OF     1812.  39 

Forgotten  alike  by  the  government  and  the  General 
until  about  the  middle  of  July,  an  order  was  then 
sent  by  the  latter  to  Captain  Heald,  "to  dismantle 
the  fort,  destroy  the  surplus  arms  and  ammunition, 
and  withdraw  the  garrison  to  Detroit."  From  an 
ill-judged  mode  of  communication,  this  order  did 
not  reach  the  fort  until  the  12th  of  August.  On 
the  14th,  the  garrison,  reinforced  by  a  few  Miami 
Indians,  under  the  command  of  Captain  Wells, 
began  its  intended  march ;  but  had  not  proceeded 
more  than  a  mile,  when  it  was  attacked,  in  both 
front  and  rear,  by  a  body  of  five  or  six  hundred 
savages,  whom  it  had  left  at  Chicago,  professing 
a  neutral,  if  not  a  friendly  character.  Captain 
Heald,  after  a  hard  and  unequal  combat,  in  which 
fifty  of  his  party  fell,  (and  being  himself  wounded 
and  deserted  by  the  Miamis,)  was  compelled  to 
accept  a  proposition  for  a  parley,  which  was  soon 
and  necessarily  followed  by  a  surrender,  on  condi 
tion  that  the  lives  of  the  American  survivors,  not 
now  exceeding  twenty,  should  be  spared.1 

Such  was  the  termination  of  this  first  expedition 
of  the  new  war  ;  the  details  of  which,  have  in  them 
so  little  to  natter,  and  so  much  to  mortify  the  pride 
of  the  American  arms.  Nor  must  it  be  forgotten 
that  this  catastrophe,  however  disgraceful  in  itself 

i  Captain  Heald,  his  wife  and  some  third  person,  fell  to  the  share 
of  a  party  of  Indians  living  at  St.  Josephs.  Carried  thither  by  their 
savage  masters,  they  soon  possessed  themselves  of  a  boat,  in  which 
they  made  their  escape  to  Michilimackinac,  where  they  found  protec 
tion  and  the  means  of  returning  to  the  United  States. 


40  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OP    1812. 

or  disastrous  in  its  consequences,  was  not  the  result 
of  any  of  those  occurrences,  which,  in  the  affairs  of 
nations  and  of  individuals,  are  denominated  acci 
dents  ;  and  which  sometimes,  triumph  alike  over 
the  precautions  of  wisdom  and  the  efforts  of  valor. 
We  have  seen  that  the  army,  in  its  march  from  the 
place  of  its  rendezvous  to  that  of  its  destination, 
was  neither  melted  by  heat,  nor  frozen  by  cold  ; 
neither  persecuted  by  storms,  nor  crippled  by  ene 
mies  ;  neither  wasted  by  disease,  nor  exhausted  by 
famine  ;  but  that  on  the  5th  of  July  it  arrived  at 
Detroit,  in  unimpaired  health  and  spirits.  From  its 
friends,  it  received  a  cordial  welcome,  abundant 
supplies  and  a  respectable  addition  to  its  force  ;  and 
in  its  subsequent  descent  upon  Canada,  was  scarcely 
less  fortunate,  as  it  found  the  British  colonists  indif 
ferent,  if  not  repugnant  to  the  war ;  the  Indian 
iribes,  though  secretly  hostile,  cautious  and  calcu 
lating  ;  and  the  fortress  of  Maiden,  which  alone 
sustained  the  enemy's  interest  in  that  section  of  the 
country,  wholly  indefensible.  When  at  last,  impor 
tant  changes  had  been  wrought  in  this  state  of 
things,  by  the  fall  of  Michilimackinac,  the  defeat  of 
Van  Home,  the  obstruction  given  to  our  communi 
cations,  the  altered  tone  and  temper  of  the  British 
and  savage  population,  and  the  doubts  and  mis 
givings  which  could  not  but  prevail  in  our  own 
ranks — when,  in  a  word,  fortune  appeared  to  have 
decidedly  taken  part  with  the  enemy  against  us,  it 
was  but  to  lead  him  into  indiscretions ;  which,  had 
they  been  seen  and  punished,  would  have  promptly 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812.  41 

reinstated  our  ascendency  and  accomplished  the 
principal  objects  of  the  campaign.  Like  other  ad 
vantages,  these  were  permitted  to  escape,  probably 
without  notice,  and  certainly  without  improvement; 
leaving  us  only  the  mortifying  reflection,  that  our 
disasters  were  of  our  own  making,  and  the  neces 
sary  consequence  of  an  ignorance,  which  knew  not 
what  to  do  ;  of  a  self-sufficiency,  refusing  to  be 
instructed ;  and  of  a  cowardice,  that  in  its  terrors, 
lost  all  sense  of  national  interest,  personal  dignity 
and  professional  duty.1 

REMARKS.  The  crimes  and  errors  of  public  func 
tionaries,  however  calamitous  and  disgraceful,  are 
not  without  their  uses  ;  and  that  on  this  occasion, 
the  bitter  fruits  of  experience  may,  if  possible,  be 
converted  into  wholesome  aliment,  we  subjoin  a  few 
observations  indicating  the  principal  faults  commit 
ted,  and  the  means  by  which  they  might  have  been 
substantially  obviated,  if  not  entirely  avoided. 

I.  "  Every  commander  of  a  corps,  destined  to  the 
reduction  of  a  fortress  by  siege  or  investment,  ought, 
if  possible,  to  draw  his  antagonist  from  behind  his 
works,  and  induce  him  to  risk  an  action  in  the 
open  field."  This  maxim,  nearly  as  old  as  the  art 
to  which  it  belongs,  is  founded  on  a  reason  suffi 
ciently  obvious,  viz.  that,  u  as  forts  make  the  weak 
strong,  and  the  strong  stronger,  it  necessarily  fol 
lows,  that  it  will  be  more  easy  to  beat  your  enemy 

i  Hull's  trial ;  testimony  of  Jessup,  Snelling,  Taylor,  Eastman,  &c. 


42  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812. 

without,  than  within  his  intrenchments."  Of  this 
rule  and  the  reason  on  which  it  is  founded,  General 
Hull  was  either  entirely  ignorant  or  utterly  regard 
less  ;  for  though  on  the  2d  of  July,  according  to  his 
own  statement,  he  found  his  adversary  willing  to 
forego  the  advantages  given  him  by  his  fortress, 
and  determined  to  risk  a  battle  against  a  force 
much  superior  to  his  own ;  and  with  the  additional 
disadvantage  of  interposing  between  himself  and 
his  only  place  of  refuge,  a  wide  and  rapid  river, — 
the  challenge  was  not  merely  declined  on  our  part, 
but  such  cunningly  devised  fables  transmitted  to 
Colonel  St.  George,  as  induced  that  officer  to  aban 
don  his  chivalrous,  but  unmilitary  project.1 

II.  Another  maxim  of  the  art,  which,  like  the 
preceding,  is  but  a  dictate  of  common  sense,  level 
to  any  ordinary  capacity  and  requiring  no  scientific 
research,  is, — that  "whenever  it  be  sufficiently  as- 
certained,  that  your  enemy  is  suffering  under  any 
extraordinary  degree  of  debility,  arising  from  defi 
cient  supplies,  prevailing  diseases,  impaired  disci- 

l  "  A  large  body  of  the  militia  had  reinforced  the  British  garrison, 
and  all  the  surrounding  tribes  of  Indians  had  been  invited  to  his 
standard.  Every  preparation  for  attack  was  made  on  the  5th  of  July, 
and  it  was  only  prevented  by  a  communication  made  to  a  person  in 
Maiden,  who  had  the  confidence  of  the  commander ;  that  it  was  not 
the  intention  of  the  army  to  march  to  Detroit ;  that  all  the  boats  were  col 
lected  on  the  west  side  of  the  river;  that  cannon  had  been  sent  for  to 
Detroit;  and  that  my  intention  was  to  cross  the  river  and  attack  the  fort. 
This  information  canned  the  commanding  officer  to  abandon  the  enterprise, 
and  concentrate  all  his  forces  for  the  defence  of  his  post. — HuLVs  Me 
moirs,  p.  29. 


NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812.        43 

pline,  disaffection  or  want  of  numbers  in  his  ranks, 
or  ill-condition  of  his  defences,  it  becomes  your  duty 
to  assail  him  incessantly  and  vigorously." 

It  has  been  abundantly  established,  that  between 
the  5th  and  20th  of  July,  fort  Maiden  was,  in  all 
its  parts,  in  a  dilapidated  state,  and  on  two  of  its 
sides,  (the  north  and  west,)  wholly  indefensible  ;  that 
during  the  same  period,  its  nominal  garrison  did 
not  exceed  seven  hundred  men,  of  which,  more  than 
six  hundred  were  militia  and  savages  ;  the  one, 
indifferent,  if  not  disaffected  to  the  war,  and  the 
other,  professing  neutrality  and  strictly  forbidden 
by  their  military  usages,  from  taking  part  in  the 
defence  of  fortified  places.1  From  these  facts  we 
are  authorized  to  conclude,  that  had  General  Hull, 
at  any  time  between  the  5th  and  20th  of  July, 
pushed  boldly  forward  and  presented  his  columns  of 
attack  before  Maiden,  the  place  would  have  been 
surrendered  to  him,  with  as  little  ceremony  as  he 
surrendered  Detroit  on  the  16th  of  August  ;  a  con 
clusion,  put  beyond  all  doubt  by  this  additional  fact, 
that  when,  on  the  16th  of  July,  the  British  out 
post  on  the  Canard  was  defeated  and  the  bridge 
taken,  so  great  was  the  alarm  in  Maiden,  that  the 
shipping  was  brought  up  to  the  wharves,  and 
actually  employed  in  taking  in  the  baggage,  &c.a 

1  Teeumseh's  speech  to  General  Proctor,  18th  September,  1813, — 
"  you  told  us  that  we  need  not  trouble  ourselves  about  the  enemy's 
garrisons,  and  that  you  would  take  good  care  of  your  men;  which 
made  our  hearts  glad." 

2  "There  was  a  great  deal  of  confusion  in  the  town,  moving  effects, 


44  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812. 

III.  Nothing-  can  be  more  ill-judged  and  ruinous, 
than  to  send  out  small  parties  on  services  which 
necessarily  expose   them    to    the   attacks   of  large 
ones  ;  and  hence  the  maxim,  that  "  the  strength  of 
a  detachment  should  be   proportioned,    1st,  to  the 
importance  of  the  object  to  be  obtained  in  sending 
it ;  and   3d,  to  the  disposable  means  possessed  by 
the  enemy  of  embarrassing  or  defeating  the  attain 
ment  of  that  object."     In  none  of  the  detachments 
made  by  General  Hull,  were  these  conditions  ful 
filled  ;   and  in  that  of  Major  Van  Home,  both  were 
directly  and  grossly  violated.     What  object  could 
have  been  more  important  to  the  American  army, 
situated  as  it  then  was,  than  the  re-establishment  of 
its  communications  with  the  State  of  Ohio  ;  from 
which  alone  were  to  be  expected  reinforcements  of 
men  and  supplies  of  provision  ?     And  again,  what 
fact  was  better  ascertained,  than   the  facility  with 
which  the  whole  British  force  concentrated  at  Mai 
den,  and  amounting  to  seven  hundred  combatants, 
could  be  brought  to  act  upon  any  American  detach 
ment,   marching   by  the   route    of  Maguago    and 
Brownstown  ?     Yet  was  Van  Home  sent  to  fulfil 
that  object  and  by  this  route,  with  only  two  hun 
dred  militia-riflemen!1 

IV.  When,  on  the  8th  of  August,  Colonel  Miller 
was  detached   to  effect  the  purpose   which  Major 

&c.  The  dueen  Charlotte  came  to  the  wharf  and  took  in  the  women 
and  baggage,  and  had  her  topsails  loose  and  ready  to  sail." — Forbish 
and  Gooding's  testimony  on  Hull's  trial. 

l  Hull's  official  report  of  the  26th  of  August,  1812. 


NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812.        45 

Van  Home  had  failed  to  accomplish  on  the  5th,  it 
required  no  spirit  of  prophecy  to  foresee,  that  Proctor 
(the  British  commander)  would  make  every  possible 
effort  to  overwhelm  the  second  detachment  as  he 
had  done  the  first ;  but  that  to  this  end  he  must 
employ  the  whole  force,  composing  the  garrison  under 
his  command.  It  is  extraordinary,  that  this  simple 
and  obvious  view  of  the  subject,  should  have  escaped 
the  attention  of  any  man  to  whom  military  ideas 
were  at  all  familiar  ;  or  if  it  did  occur  to  General 
Hull,  that  it  should  have  failed  to  suggest  the  only 
means  left  for  prosecuting  his  own  objects,  and  con 
verting  the  policy  and  enterprise  of  his  antagonist 
into  folly  and  misfortune.  These  means  obviously 
were — so  to  strengthen  Miller's  detachment,  as  to 
leave  nothing  to  chance  ;  and  thus  to  assure  him 
self  not  merely  of  the  discomfiture,  but  of  the 
destruction  of  whatever  force  the  enemy  might 
hazard  on  the  southern  side  of  the  Detroit ;  while, 
contemporaneously  with  Miller's  movement,  a  second 
and  small  detachment  should  silently  and  rapidly 
descend  the  river  to  the  neighborhood  of  Maiden, 
and  thence  proceed  to  assail  and  carry  the  fort. 
That  both  parts  of  this  plan  (had  it  been  adopted) 
would  have  entirely  succeeded,  there  cannot  now 
be  a  doubt ;  since,  with  the  corps  he  had,  Miller 
defeated  Muir  at  the  head  of  the  whole  British, 
Canadian  and  Indian  force  ;  and  since,  from  the 
evening  of  the  7th  to  the  9th  of  August,  fort  Mai 
den  (ordinarily  requiring  the  defence  of  seven  hun- 


46  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812. 

dred  men)  was  left  to  the  custody  of  a  sergeant's 
guard  !l 

V.  Notwithstanding  these  repeated  blunders  of 
the  American  General,  fortune  did  not  yet  entirely 
abandon  him  ;  and  on  the  16th  of  August,  pre 
sented  a  new  occasion,  requiring  on  his  part  only 
the  vulgar  quality  of  defensive  courage,  to  have 
completely  baffled  the  designs  of  Brock  and  re 
established  his  own  ascendency  on  the  Detroit. 
This  occasion  was  found  in  the  indiscretion  of  his 
adversary ;  who,  on  crossing  the  river  with  a  force 
smaller  than  that  it  was  his  purpose  to  assail,  had 
hastily  determined  to  risk  the  storm  of  a  fortifica 
tion,  strong  in  itself,  abundantly  supplied  and  suffi 
ciently  garrisoned.  If  it  be  thought  extraordinary, 
that  under  these  circumstances,  General  Brock 
should  have  forgotten  all  the  dissuasives  from  at 
tack  furnished  by  history,  it  was  certainly  still  less 
to  be  expected,  that  General  Hull  should  have  for 
gotten  all  the  motives  for  defence  furnished  by  the 
same  source.  Such,  however,  was  the  fact ;  the 
timidity  of  the  one  kept  pace  with  the  temerity  of 
the  other  ;  and  at  last,  in  an  agony  of  terror,  which 
cunning  could  no  longer  dissemble  and  which  his 
tory  is  ashamed  to  describe,  the  fort,  army  and  ter 
ritory  were  surrendered  without  pulling  a  trigger ! 

The  errors  which  yet  remain  to  be  noticed  are 
attributable  to  the  administration — a  fact,  furnish- 

l  Lieutenant  Forbish's  testimony. 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812.  47 

ing  no  reason  why  they  should  be  treated  with 
more  ceremony  than  others,  with  which  they  were 
associated.  They  will  be  sufficiently  indicated  by 
the  following  remarks. 

VI.  The  nation  which  meditates  the  invasion  of 
a  neighboring  territory,  should  be  careful  to  employ 
the  last  moments  of  peace,  in  acquiring  a  thorough 
knowledge  of  the  force  it  may  have  to  encounter. 
Another  duty,  not  less  obvious  and  imperative  than 
the  preceding,  will  be  that  of  speedily  withdrawing 
or  promptly  reinforcing  its  own  remote  and  isolated 
posts.     If  there  be  any  thing  in  the  local  position 
of  these,  that  may  render  their  retention  important 
to  the  progress  or  issue  of  the  war,  the  latter  course 
should  be  pursued — but  if  on   the  contrary,  it  will 
have   no  material  bearing  on  either,  the  garrisons 
should  be  speedily  recalled  and  the  posts  abandoned, 
while    this   can    be    done  successfully   and   safely. 
Yet  were   both   these   important  duties   neglected. 
When   Hull  arrived  at   Detroit,   he  was    ignorant 
alike  of  the  condition  of  Maiden  and  the  number  of  its 
garrison.     So  also  the  commandant  of  Michilimack- 
inac  continued  to  be  uninformed  of  even  the  declara 
tion  of  war,  until  after  the  investment  and  surrender 
of  his  post ;  while   the  garrison  of  fort  Dearborn, 
still    more    remote,   remained  unrecalled,  until   the 
middle  of  August,  when  retreat  had  become  wholly 
impracticable. 

VII.  We  have  seen  that  General  Hull  lost  his 
own  baggage  and  that  of  the  army,  the  whole  of  his 
hospital  stores  and  intrenching  tools,  and  sixty  men,  in 


48  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812. 

consequence  of  the  ill-judged  and  tardy  manner 
employed  in  transmitting  to  him  the  declaration  of 
war.  A  fact,  so  extraordinary  in  itself,  and  so  pro 
ductive  of  injury  to  the  public,  calls  for  more  devel 
opment  than  has  yet  been  given  to  it.  It  will  be 
remembered  that  a  declaration  of  war  was  autho 
rized  on  the  18th  of  June,  1812.  On  this  day, 
Secretary  Eustis  wrote  two  letters  to  General  Hull. 
In  one  of  these,  no  mention  was  made  of  this  impor 
tant  event ;  in  the  other,  it  was  distinctly  and  offi 
cially  announced.  The  former  of  the  two,  was 
carefully  made  up  and  expedited  by  a  special  mes 
senger,  who  arrived  in  the  General's  camp  on  the 
24th  of  June  ;  while  the  latter,  was  committed  to 
the  public  mail  as  far  as  Cleveland;  and  thence, 
through  a  wilderness  of  one  hundred  miles,  to  such 
conveyance,  "as  accident  might  supply."  The  result 
was,  that  the  declaration  did  not  reach  its  destina 
tion  until  the  2d  of  July,  two  days  after  it  had  been 
received  by  the  enemy  at  Maiden.  On  this  occasion, 
the  British  government  was  better  served  :  Provost 
received  notice  of  it  on  the  24th  of  June,  at  Quebec ; 
Brock,  on  the  26th,  at  Newark  ;  St.  George,  on  the 
30th,  at  Maiden  ;  and  Roberts  on  the  8th  of  July, 
at  St.  Josephs.  But  a  fact,  still  more  extraordinary 
than  the  celerity  of  these  transmissions  is,  that  the 
information  thus  rapidly  forwarded  to  J\falden  and 
St.  Josephs,  was  received  under  envelopes,  franked  by 
the  Secretary  of  the  American  Treasury.1 

i  Official  Report  of  Captain  Hanks   to  the  commanding  General 
at  Detroit,  see  also  Appendix,  No.  6. 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812.  49 

VIII.  Few  things  are  more  self-evident,  than  that 
so  long  as  the  enemy  had  a  fleet  on  Lake  Erie  and  we 
had  none,  Maiden  could  be  supplied  and  reinforced 
by  the  British  posts  below ;  and  that  if  hardly  pressed, 
its  garrison  could  be  safely  withdrawn  to  one  or  other 
of  these  posts.  To  meet  these  contingencies,  and  to 
protect  Hull's  long  line  of  provisionment  from  inter 
ruption,1  two  suggestions  were  made — the  one,  to 
construct  a  navy  competent  to  the  command  of  the 
lake  ;2  the  other,  to  assemble  on  the  Niagara  a  mili 
tary  force,  which  by  menacing  the  safety  of  forts 
Erie  and  George,  would  prevent  Brock  from  making 
detachments  to  Maiden.  In  choosing  between  these 
alternatives,  the  government  did  not  hesitate — they 
promptly  rejected  the  former,  and  adopted  the  latter ; 
but,  unfortunately,  without  taking  measures  suffi 
ciently  decided  for  giving  it  execution.  When,  ac 
cordingly,  Hull  perceived  that  the  enemy's  force  at 
Maiden  was  increased  and  increasing,  he  called  aloud 
on  the  militia  officer  commanding  at  Buffalo  for  sup 
port — who  announced  in  reply,  that  "  he  had  none  to 
give,  direct  or  indirect."  So  also,  when  the  Secretary  of 
War  ordered  Major-General  Dearborn  to  make  speedy 
movements  on  the  British  posts  in  his  front,  the  General 
answered — that  "till  then,  he  had  not  known  that  the 
troops  on  the  Niagara  made  part  of  his  command."3 

i  The  line  extended  two  hundred  miles  through  a  desert,  and  in 
a  great  part  of  its  length  was  skirted  by  the  lake,  commanded  by  the 
British  ships. 

a  Hull's  Memoirs  ;  testimony  of  Mr.  Eustis  on  Hull's  trial. 

3  Appendix  No.  7. 


50  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OP    1812. 

IX.  The  principal  advantage  accruing  to  a  nation, 
which  is  the  first  to  declare  war,  is  that  of  selecting 
its  time  and  point  of  attack,  and  of  concentrating-  on 
the  latter,  such  force  as  will  ensure  victory,  and  the 
moral  effect  produced  by  it  on  both  belligerents.  Of 
this  truth,  so  obvious  in  itself,  the  American  cabinet 
of  1812,  do  not  appear  to  have  been  apprised — for 
when  (according  to  General  P.  B.  Porter's  testimony) 
Hull  required  three  thousand  men,  as  the  least  num 
ber  with  which  all  the  objects  of  the  campaign  could 
be  successfully  prosecuted  ;  the  government  replied, 
that  "more  than  two  thousand  could  not  be  given."1 

Whether  this  decision  be  examined  in  relation  to 
the  capacity  of  the  nation ;  to  the  variety  and  im 
portance  of  the  services  to  be  performed  ;  or  to  the 
means  necessary  to  their  execution,  nothing  could 
have  been  more  erroneous.  To  those  who  know  any 
thing  of  the  character  or  numbers  of  the  western 
population,  or  of  their  peculiar  interests  and  feelings 
at  that  period  and  on  this  subject,  we  need  but  re 
mark,  (and  without  any  fear  of  contradiction,)  that 
five  thousand  men  could  have  been  obtained  as 
promptly  as  t\vo  thousand.  When'  again  it  is  recol 
lected,  that  the  defence  of  our  western  posts  and  ter 
ritory  ;  the  prevention  of  a  war  with  the  savages ; 
the  capture  of  Maiden;  the  command  of  Lake  Erie, 
and  the  means  of  a  prompt  co-operation  with  the 
troops  destined  to  act  on  the  Niagara,  formed  the 
objects  of  the  campaign — who  can  for  a  moment  doubt 

1  Hull's  trial ;  General  P.  B.  Portei's  testimony. 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812.  51 

their  magnitude  or  interest?  And  lastly,  though  it 
be  readily  admitted,  and  we  hope  sufficiently  proved, 
that  the  force  given  to  General  Hull  was  competent 
to  the  capture  of  Maiden  and  the  preservation  of 
Detroit,  still  it  by  no  means  follows,  that  it  was  com 
mensurate  with  all  the  objects  of  the  expedition ; 
since  among  these  were  to  be  found,  "  the  capture 
or  destruction  of  the  British  fleet,"1  an  object  which, 
in  the  absence  of  all  naval  means,  could  only  be 
effected  by  such  an  augmentation  of  the  army,  as 
would  have  entirely  excluded  that  arm  from  the  shores 
of  the  lake. 

Had  the  government  taken  this  short  and  plain 
view  of  the  subject,  and  invited  Governor  Shelby  of 
Kentucky,  or  Governor  Meigs  of  Ohio,  to  follow  in 
Hull's  track,  with  two  thousand  gun-men  and  Win 
chester's  brigade  of  infantry,  how  different  would  have 
been  the  issue  of  the  campaign  ?  Unfortunately,  we 
began  by  weighing  military  expeditions  in  gold  scales ; 
and  the  experiment  proved  (as  it  will  never  fail  to  do) 
that  parsimony,  always  paltry,  in  war  is  the  most 
lavish  and  criminal  prodigality. 

'  President's  Message  of  November  4th,  1812. 


52  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812. 


CHAPTER   III. 

Militia  Operations  in  the  West. — Harrison's  Autumnal  and  Winter 
Campaigns. 

OF  the  disasters  detailed  in  the  preceding"  chapter, 
those  of  most  early  occurrence — the  fall  of  Michili- 
mackinac,  the  occlusion  of  supplies  from  Ohio,  the 
defeat  of  Van  Home,  and  the  retreat  of  the  army  from 
Canada,  were  more  productive  of  surprise  than  alarm  : 
all  wondered  at  the  events  which  had  so  unexpect 
edly  taken  place ;  but  few,  if  any,  ascribed  them  to 
their  true  cause,  or  foresaw  either  the  extent  of  the 
evil,  or  the  means  most  proper  for  remedying  it. 
The  executive  confidence  in  the  competency  of  the 
commander,  continued  to  be  unshaken ;  and  no 
doubts  were  entertained,  but  that  with  the  aid  of  a 
prompt  reinforcement  and  a  vigorous  diversion  on 
the  Niagara,  he  would  be  able  to  hold  what  he  pos 
sessed,  recover  what  he  had  lost,  and  eventually 
accomplish  all  the  objects  of  the  expedition. 

With  these  views  of  the  subject,  orders  were  issued 
for  immediately  organizing  two  corps  in  the  wesl ; 
one  of  which,  to  consist  of  sixteen  hundred  volun 
teers  and  four  hundred  regular  troops,  under  the 
command  of  Brigadier-General  Winchester,  was  des 
tined  to  the  support  of  Hull ;  the  other,  to  be  com- 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812.  53 

posed  of  three  regiments  of  Kentucky  militia,  sub 
jected  to  the  orders  of  Brigadier-General  Harrison, 
was  assigned  to  the  defence  of  Indiana  and  Illinois ; 
while  the  army  of  the  north,  under  the  command  of 
Major-General  Dearborn,  was  directed  to  hold  itself 
in  readiness,  for  an  immediate  attack  upon  one  or 
more,  of  the  British  positions  in  its  front. l 

Of  these  orders,  the  first,  so  far  as  regarded  the 
assembling  of  the  troops,  was  promptly  executed  ; 
and  the  corps  assigned  to  Winchester,  actually  in 
motion  for  the  Ohio  frontier,  when  on  the  24th  of 
August,  the  appalling  information  was  received, 
that  Detroit,  the  territory,  and  the  army,  had  been 
already  surrendered  to  the  enemy.  Unexpected  ca 
lamities  are  in  general  bad  counsellors,  and  often 
hurry  those  disposed  to  listen  to  them,  into  the  adop 
tion  of  measures  little  calculated  to  promote  their 
own  objects.  On  the  present  occasion,  the  govern 
ment,  adhering  to  its  policy  of  carrying  the  war  into 
Canada,  without  apparently  perceiving  the  want,  and 
certainly  without  providing  the  aid,  of  any  co-ope 
rating  naval  force,  now  hastily  determined  to  put  its 
trust  in  an  unlimited  employment  of  militia  and  a 
lavish  expenditure  of  money — a  plan  which,  though 

i  On  the  1st  of  August,  Mr.  Eustis  gave  notice  to  General  Dearborn 
of  the  contents  of  a  letter  received  from  General  Hull,  of  July  19th,  by 
express,  in  consequence  of  which  he  subjoins  the  following  order : — 
"  You  will  make  a  diversion  in  his  (General  Hull's)  favor  at  Niagara 
and  at  Kingston,  as  soon  as  may  be  practicable,  and  by  such  other  ope 
rations  as  may  be  within  your  control."  See  vol.  6th,  p.  199,  Records 
of  the  War  Department  These  orders,  substantially,  were  repeated 
in  several  subsequent  communications. 
5* 


54        NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812. 

far  short  of  its  objects,  was,  notwithstanding,  well 
adapted  to  the  feelings,  wants,  and  calculations  of 
the  west. 

The  sedative  effect  produced  by  the  war  on  the 
value  of  ordinary  labor  and  its  products  ;  the  com 
paratively  ample  compensation  given  for  military 
service  ;  the  political  excitement  of  the  times,  and  the 
increased  impulse  given  to  this  by  the  late  disaster 
at  Detroit,  operating  conjointly  on  an  abundant,  un 
occupied,  and  high-spirited  population,  could  not  fail 
to  bring  together  a  large  mass  of  ill-equipped  and 
undisciplined  men,  who  believing  in  the  infallibility 
of  western  courage  and  rifles,  sought  no  auxiliary  in 
fulfilling  the  intentions  of  government,  within  even 
the  short  period  of  their  own  engagements.1  The 
force,  which  under  these  influences  was  in  a  few 
weeks  assembled  at  different  points  of  the  frontier, 
exceeded  ten  thousand  combatants  ;2  of  which,  that 
portion  originally  destined  to  the  support  of  Hull, 
and  best  prepared  for  immediate  service,  was  de 
tached  to  fort  Wayne — .a  small  post  on  the  Miami 
of  the  Lake,  already  sustaining  an  Indian  investment, 
and  still  farther  menaced  by  a  British  detachment, 
advancing  under  the  command  of  Major  Muir.  But 
of  these  enemies,  the  former  disappeared  on  the  ap 
proach  of  the  American  column,  without  making 
any  resistance  ;  and  the  latter,  not  showing  more 
disposition  to  hazard  a  contest,  hastily  withdrew  to 
its  boats  and  returned  to  Maiden.  It  was  now  deemed 

i  McAffee.  s  Idem. 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812.  55 

proper,  as  well  for  the  purpose  of  giving  occupation 
to  the  troops,  as  for  that  of  preventing  any  new  at 
tempt  on  the  fort,  to  direct  a  few  detachments  against 
such  of  the  Indian  villages  as  had  most  contributed 
to  the  late  investing  party  ;  but  though  made  with 
sufficient  zeal  and  activity,  the  experiment  failed 
in  producing  any  effect  more  important  than  the 
destruction  of  a  few  cabins  and  the  corn  growing 
around  them. 

While  these  circumstances  were  taking  place  in 
the  northern  section  of  the  district,  others,  of  a  mixed 
character,  good  and  bad,  grave  and  ludicrous,  were 
occurring  in  the  southern.  Early  in  September,  a 
small  band  of  savages,  of  the  Potowatamie  and  Win- 
ebago  tribes,  appeared  at  fort  Harrison  ;  and  feigning 
weariness  and  hunger,  besought  for  the  night  the 
shelter  and  hospitality  of  the  fort.  But  on  finding 
that  Captain  Taylor,  the  commanding  officer,  gave 
no  credit  to  their  story,  and  even  suspected  their 
hostility,  they  threw  off  the  mask,  and  collecting 
their  associates,  (who  had  hitherto  lain  concealed  in 
the  neighboring  thickets,)  united  in  a  bold  and  per 
severing  attack  on  the  fort.  During  the  progress  of 
this,  the  assailants  found  means  to  burn  a  block 
house,  (which  made  part  of  the  work,)  and  thus 
opened  to  themselves  a  new  passage  to  the  interior ; 
but,  though  making  many  strenuous  efforts  to  profit 
by  this  advantage,  they  failed  in  all,  and  were  ulti 
mately  repulsed  with  considerable  loss.  To  make 
up  in  some  degree  for  this  disappointment,  the  party 
repaired  to  a  frontier  settlement  on  the  Pigeon's 


56        NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812. 

Roost,  where  they  killed  or  captured  twenty-one  of 
the  inhabitants. 

This  last  incident  would,  perhaps,  have  been  alone 
sufficient  to  have  called  forth  a  new  display  of  Ken 
tucky  population  and  patriotism  ;  but  to  its  authority 
was  superadded  that  of  a  requisition  from  General 
Harrison  for  a  force,  which,  with  the  three  regiments 
already  detached  to  Vincemnes,  would  be  competent 
not  merely  to  the  defence  of  Indiana  and  Illinois,  but 
to  the  punishment  of  such  Indian  tribes  as  were  most 
likely  to  disturb  and  molest  any  neighboring  terri 
tory.1  Governor  Shelby,  upon  whom  the  requisition 
was  made,  hastened  to  give  it  execution,  and  with 
not  more  of  attention,  than  the  General  himself  had 
employed,  in  proportioning  the  quantum  of  force  to 
the  nature  and  exigencies  of  the  service.  When, 
therefore,  we  consider  that  the  invitation  to  the  field 
was  without  limitation  as  to  numbers  ;  that  the 
causes  requiring  it  were  not  a  little  exaggerated,8 
and  that  the  policy,  no  less  than  the  patriotism  of 
the  state,  induced  every  man  to  become  a  soldier, 
we  can  no  longer  wonder  that  the  Governor's  proc 
lamation  should,  within  twenty  days,  have  assem 
bled  an  army  of  four  thousand  men,  equipped  for 
service,  and  all,  Tartar-like,  mounted  on  horseback. 

The  command  of  this  formidable  array  was  com 
mitted  to  Major-General  Hopkins  of  the  militia, 
who  reached  fort  Harrison  about  the  10th  of  Octo 
ber.  Finding  nothing  nearer  to  his  own  frontier  to 

1  McAfFee. 

2  Harrison's  letter  to  Shelby,  5th  Sept  1812 ;  McAffee,  p.  156» 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812.  57 

give  him  occupation,  lie  on  the  14th,  began  his 
march  for  the  Indian  villages  on  the  Wabash  and 
Illinois.  Much  of  the  ground  he  had  to  traverse 
was  of  the  prairie  character,  (scantily  supplied  with 
water  and  entirely  destitute  of  wood,)  but  abound 
ing  in  tall,  coarse  grass.  The  effect  of  this  redun 
dant  herbage  on  the  army  resembled  enchantment ; 
every  step  they  took  upon  it,  abated  alike  their 
ardor  and  intelligence  ;  the  guides  lost  their  way  ; 
the  General  his  authority,  and  the  troops  their  sub 
mission  ;  arid  on  the  fourth  day  after  leaving  fort 
Harrison  (discovering  that  the  prairie  was  on  fire, 
and  mistaking  this  for  a  ruse  of  the  enemy)  this 
"  press  of  western  chivalry"  turned  their  backs  on 
the  war,  and  withdrew  en  masse  to  Kentucky. 

About  the  same  time,  and  in  concert  with  the 
preceding  movement,  an  expedition  on  a  smaller 
scale,  but  of  more  successful  character,  was  insti 
tuted  by  Governor  Edwards  of  the  Illinois  Territory, 
and  conducted  by  Colonel  Russell  of  the  rangers. 
Its  object  was  an  Indian  town  at  the  head-waters 
of  Lake  Peoria,  which,  by  a  rapid  and  well-directed 
march,  the  detachment  was  able  to  surprise  and 
destroy.  On  the  first  alarm,  the  savages  betook 
themselves  to  a  neighboring  swamp,  whither  they 
were  hotly  pursued  and  speedily  routed — leaving 
behind  them  twenty  dead  bodies,  a  considerable 
store  of  corn,  and  sixty  horses  laden  with  baggage. 

A  second  expedition  under  the  direction  of  Gene 
ral  Hopkins,  and  made  for  the  laudable  purpose  of 
fulfilling  the  intentions  and  wiping  out  the  disgrace 


58  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812. 

of  the  first,  was  now  organized  at  fort  Harrison. 
The  corps  employed  on  this  occasion,  was  composed 
of  a  few  regular  troops,  about  fifty  mounted  gun 
men,  and  the  three  regiments  of  Kentucky  militia, 
detached  under  the  first  requisition  ;  who,  directing 
their  march  along  the  eastern  bank  of  the  Wabash, 
in  eight  days  reached  their  first  object,  and  destroyed 
in  succession  three  of  the  principal  Indian  villages, 
with  the  loss  of  eighteen  of  their  own  corps  ;  who, 
by  some  negligence  or  misdirection  in  their  march, 
fell  into  an  ambuscade  of  the  enemy.  Admonished 
alike  by  this  disaster,  the  nakedness  of  the  troops, 
an  unfavorable  change  in  the  weather,  and  the 
impossibility  of  bringing  the  savages  to  a  general 
action,  the  commanding  officer  thought  it  advisable 
to  return  to  Vincennes. 

Such  was  the  state  of  things  on  the  western 
frontier,  when  the  government,  having  decided  the 
rival  pretensions  of  Generals  Winchester  and  Harri 
son,  vested  in  the  latter  the  command  of  the  army 
and  district  ;l  with  orders  sufficiently  definite  as  to 

i  The  intrigue  by  which  this  outrage  on  military  rules  and  the  laws 
of  Kentucky  was  accomplished,  will  be  found  in  McAffee,  pp.  107 — 
8,  and  is  substantially  as  follows :  Governor  Scott  had  a  desire  to 
commission  Harrison  as  a  Major-General  of  the  Kentucky  militia, 
with  a  view  of  thus  enabling  him  to  supersede  Winchester  in  the  com 
mand  ;  but  to  the  honest  and  unsophisticated  mind  of  Scott,  the  ar 
rangement  appeared  impossible,  inasmuch  as  by  the  laws  of  Kentucky, 
officers  of  militia  must  be  inhabitants  of  the  state — a  qualification 
which  did  not  apply  to  General  Harrison.  To  get  over  these  scruples 
of  conscience  on  the  part  of  the  Governor,  a  few  casuists  were  em 
ployed  to  change  his  opinions,  and  in  this  they  at  last  succeeded.  For 
the  General's  own  agency  in  the  business,  see  Appendix,  No.  6, 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812.  59 

the  objects  to  be  pursued,  but  entirely  discretionary 
as  to  the  time  and  mode  of  pursuing  them.  Avail 
ing"  himself  of  the  latitude  given  by  this  new  and 
increased  authority,  the  General  hastened  to  re 
model  his  plan  of  campaign,  and  promptly  rejecting 
his  first  project  of  recapturing  Detroit  by  a  coup  de 
main,1  substituted  for  it  a  march  by  three  separate 
and  distant  routes  across  the  swampy  and  unin 
habited  region  in  his  front,  to  the  Rapids  of  the 
Miami — whence,  "  after  accumulating  one  million 
of  rations  for  the  troops,  and  forage  for  two  thousand 
horses  and  oxen*  he  proposed  inarching  rapidly  on 
Brownstown,  crossing  the  river  Detroit,  and  before 
the  commencement  of  winter,  taking  Maiden  and  recap- 
luring  the  Michigan  Territory" 

1  While  acting  in  a  subordinate  capacity  to  Winchester,  the  Gene 
ral  had  no  doubt  of  being  able,  with  a  few  mounted  men,  to  retake 
Detroit  by  a  coup  de  main,  and  was  careful  so  to  inform  the  govern 
ment. — Mcilffc.e,  p.  166.     When,  however,  by  means  of  this  and  other 
representations,  having  the  same  object,  he  became  commanding  offi 
cer  of  the  army  and  district,  his  views  suddenly  changed  ;  the  rapid 
and  certain  process  by  a  coup  de  main  was  abandoned  as  hopeless, 
(McJlffee,  p.  141,)  and  one,  more  systematic  and  imposing,  substituted 
for  it — requiring  as  a  preliminary  to  any  direct  movement  on  Maiden 
or  Detroit,  an  accumulation  at  the  Rapids  of  twelve  months'  forage  and 
provisions,  with  carts,  wagons,  &c.,  necessary  to  transport  them  from 
the  place  of  deposit  to  the  scene  of  action — or,  in  other  words,  the 
entire  purchase  of  all  surplus  corn,  flour  and  fodder,  oxen,  horses, 
carts,  wagons,  &c.,  to  be  found  within  the  State  of  Ohio ;  and  this  at 
a  time,  (22d  of  October,)  when  he  says  of  the  roads — "to  get  supplies 
forward  through  a  swampy  wilderness  of  near  two  hundred  miles,  in 
wagons,  or  on  pack-horses,  which  are  to  carry  their  own  provisions,  is 
absolutely  impossible." 

2  McAffee,  p.  167. 


60  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812. 

In  prosecution  of  this  plan,  the  army  was  divided 
into  three  columns  ;  that  of  the  left,  composed  of 
Kentucky  militia  and  the  seventeenth  United  States 
regiment,  (commanded  by  Brigadier-General  Win 
chester)  was  assigned  to  the  route  of  the  St.  Mary ; 
the  central  column,  consisting  of  twelve  hundred 
Ohio  militia  and  eight  hundred  mounted  infantry, 
commanded  by  Brigadier-General  Tupper,  to  that  of 
fort  McArthur;  while  the  column  of  the  right,  made 
up,  or  intended  to  be  made  up,  (for  all  its  elemen 
tary  parts  had  not  yet  arrived)  of  three  brigades  of 
militia  from  Pennsylvania,  Virginia  and  Ohio,  led 
by  General  Harrison  in  person,  was  to  approach  its 
object  by  the  two  Sandusky's. 

Under  these  arrangements,  the  General  had  hopes 
on  the  4th  of  October,  that  "within  a  fortnight  from 
that  date"  he  would  be  able  to  accumulate  at  the 
Rapids  the  necessary  supply  of  food  and  forage,  as 
semble  the  several  parts  of  the  army  and  begin  his 
intended  movement  on  Brownstown.  But  these 
hopes,  which  had  little  if  any  thing  to  justify  them, 
were  not  fated  to  be  of  long  duration  ;  as  on  the 
very  day  on  which  they  were  expressed,  the  column 
of  the  left  was  found  to  be  on  the  verge  of  mutiny 
and  desertion.  This  conduct  in  a  corps,  which  had 
hitherto  showed  only  zeal  in  forwarding  the  objects 
of  the  expedition,  was  produced  by  the  increased 
coldness  of  the  weather  and  the  miserable  condition 
of  their  clothing  ;  by  a  state  of  the  roads,  rendering 
them  nearly  impassable  ;  by  a  deficiency  of  food, 
not  easily  to  be  accounted  for ;  and  by  a  discovery 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812.  61 

(in  which  they  but  anticipated  their  commander) 
that  his  project  of  an  autumnal  campaign  was  wholly 
impracticable. l  In  this  dilemma,  the  General  found 
it  prudent  to  employ  persuasion  rather  than  author 
ity,  and  invoking  the  aid  of  Colonel  Allen's  elo 
quence  in  addition  to  his  own,  prevailed  upon  the 
column  to  prolong  its  slay  and  its  efforts. 

With  Brigadier-General  Tnpper  and  the  mounted 
men  of  the  central  column,  he  was  less  fortunate. 
Learning  while  at  Winchester's  cantonment  that  a 
party  of  Indians  occupied  the  Rapids,  (his  intended 
point  of  concentration,)  he  ordered  Tupper  with 
eight  hundred  mounted  men  to  advance  and  dis 
lodge  them,  but  this  order,  though  reinforced  by 
another  from  Winchester,  was  from  time  to  time 
scandalously  evaded — when  the  troops  losing  all 
confidence  in  their  General  and  the  General  in 
the  troops,  they  mutually  agreed  to  withdraw  to 
Urbanna. 

To  this  useless  band  succeeded  another,  fortu 
nately  possessing  a  leader  of  more  efficient  character. 
Colonel  Allen  Trimble  having  arrived  at  St.  Mary 
with  a  corps  of  five  hundred  mounted  infantry,  was 
directed  to  march  to  the  defence  of  fort  Wayne, 
(now  menaced  with  a  second  investment  by  the 
Indians,)  and  thence  to  the  Potowatomie  villages, 
on  the  sources  of  the  river  St.  Joseph.  No  enemy 
being  found  at  the  fort,  the  Colonel  hastened  to 
execute  the  remaining  and  secondary  part  of  the 


l  McAffee,  p.  146.  183—4. 
6 


62  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812. 

expedition,  when  one  half  of  the  corps,  in  the  exer 
cise  of  its  volunteer  rights,  refused  to  go  farther. 
The  Colonel,  being  thus  left  to  choose  between  an 
abandonment  of  his  purpose,  or  an  attempt  to  exe 
cute  it  with  half  the  force  originally  assigned  to  the 
enterprise,  did  not  hesitate  to  adopt  the  latter;  and 
supplying  the  want  of  numbers  by  vigilance  and 
activity,  was  soon  able  to  reach  and  destroy  the  two 
villages  indicated  in  his  orders. 

It  was  now  the  28th  of  October.  The  fortnight 
which,  according  to  General  Harrison's  calculations, 
was  to  have  done  much,  had  passed  away  without 
doing  any  thing  ;  the  rainy  season  had  already  be 
gan  ;  land  transportation,  always  difficult,  was  now 
impracticable;  and  idleness,  nakedness  and  hunger 
were  working  their  ordinary  effects  on  the  health, 
habits  and  temper  of  the  troops ;  rendering  them  sick, 
and  sour,  and  restless — a  state  of  things  which  the 
General  could  no  longer  conceal  from  himself,  and 
which  brought  him,  at  last,  to  the  reluctant  confes 
sion,  that  the  project  of  an  autumnal  campaign  must 
be  abandoned,  and  a  winter  expedition  adopted  in  its 
stead.  "My  present  plan,"  he  says,  in  a  letter  of 
the  preceding  date,  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  "  is  to 
occupy  Sandusky  and  accumulate,  at  that  place,  as 
much  provision  and  forage  as  possible  ;  to  be  taken 
from  thence  in  sleds  to  the  river  Raisin.  For  to  get 
supplies  forward  through  a  swampy  wilderness  of 
nearly  two  hundred  miles  extent,  in  Avagons,  or  on 
pack-horses  carrying  their  own  provender,  is  impos 
sible.  Still  the  main  object  may  be  accomplished 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812.  63 

by  using  the  frozen  margin  of  the  lake,  if  the  troops 
are  provided  with  warm  clothing,  and  the  winter  be 
such  as  it  usually  is  in  this  climate."1 

As,  however,  many  weeks  must  elapse  between 
the  date  of  this  new  determination  and  the  actual 
occurrence  of  such  a  condition  of  weather  as  could 
alone  render  it  practicable,  it  was  deemed  expedient 
to  employ  the  interval  in  destroying  such  Indian 
lodgements,  temporary  and  permanent,  as  from  ac 
tual  force  or  locality  of  position,  were  most  likely  to 
disturb  the  left  wing  of  the  army,  or  the  transporta 
tion  of  supplies  going  011  under  its  protection.  Of 
these  lodgements,  one  had  recently  been  made  at 
the  foot  of  the  Rapids  ;  ostensibly  for  the  purpose 
of  gathering  and  transporting  corn,  but,  as  was 
suspected,  secretly  destined  to  co-operate  with  the 
Miamis  in  some  military  enterprise  on  our  frontier 
posts  and  convoys.  To  break  up  this  party  became, 
therefore,  a  matter  of  moment ;  and  to  effect  it,  Gen 
eral  Tupper,  whose  feats  in  arms  we  have  already 
commemorated,  was  detached,  early  in  November, 
at  the  head  of  six  hundred  and  fifty  Ohio  militia  and 
a  few  mounted  rangers.  On  approaching  his  object, 
he  prudently  employed  a  reconnoitring  party  to 
ascertain  whether  any  changes  had  taken  place  in 
the  force  or  position  of  the  enemy  ?  And  being  as- 

i  It  was  by  thus  qualifying  his  real  opinions,  that  he  carried  the 
cabinet  along  with  him  in  his  attempts  to  execute  his  absurd  projects. 
They  at  last  saw,  or  thought  they  saw,  in  these  contradictory  state 
ments,  a  desire  on  the  part  of  the  General,  to  escape  responsibility, 
and  a  design  to  induce  them  to  incur  it 


64  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812. 

sured,  on  the  return  of  the  party,  that  the  allies,  red 
and  white,  besides  continuing  where  they  had  been, 
and  without  any  material  increase  of  numbers,  were 
"now indulging  themselves  in  singing  and  dancing," 
lie  manfully  determined  to  cross  the  Miami  and  take 
part  in  the  revel  ;  but  defeated  in  this  by  the  depth 
of  the  water  and  strength  of  the  current,  instead  of 
ascending  the  river  and  seeking  a  fording  place  of 
safer  and  quieter  character,  (which  might  have  been 
readily  found,)  he  followed  the  stream  downward, 
and  placing  himself  directly  in  front  of  the  British 
and  Indian  camp,  sufficiently  announced,  not  only 
his  arrival,  but  his  intention  also  of  shifting  from 
himself  and  imposing  on  his  enemy,  both  the  trouble 
and  danger  of  crossing  the  river.  In  this  last  cal 
culation,  however,  he  entirely  lost  sight  of  the  anti- 
chivalrous  character  of  Indian  warfare.  The  first 
care  of  the  red  man  of  the  forest  is  to  take  care  of 
himself;  and  the  second,  so  to  measure  the  strength 
and  temper  of  his  antagonist  as  will  enable  him  to 
judge,  not  merely  on  what  side  of  a  stream  he  shall 
fight,  but  whether  he  shall  fight  on  either  side  of  it. 
With  this  view,  on  the  present  occasion,  after  send 
ing  their  women  and  children  to  the  woods,  and  their 
allies  to  their  boats,  the  Indians  made  a  show  of 
engaging  at  long  shot ;  while  a  few  mounted  par 
ties  despatched  across  the  Miami,  soon  found  out 
the  flanks  and  rear  of  their  adversary,  and  sufficiently 
indicated  their  intention — not  of  fighting  a  pitched 
battle,  but  of  harassing  his  progress  when  he  moved, 
and  disquieting  his  positions  when  he  became  sta- 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812.  65 

tionary.  As  this  was  a  state  of  things  the  General 
had  not  foreseen,  and  greatly  disliked,  he  quickly 
resorted  to  the  only  expedient  by  which  he  supposed 
it  could  be  remedied ;  and  accordingly,  early  in  the 
night  of  the  15th,  began  a  rapid  retreat  to  fort  Mc- 
Arthur.1 

While  Tupper  was  making  this  second  display 
of  military  talent,  another  expedition,  under  bet 
ter  auspices,  was  preparing  at  Franklintown.  A 
corps  of  six  hundred  mounted  men,  selected  from 
the  army,  were  placed  under  the  direction  of  Lieu 
tenant-Colonel  Campbell,  with  orders  to  march 
against  the  Indian  villages  on  the  Missisineway. 
Of  these,  they  reached  the  most  northwardly,  at 
daybreak  on  the  18th  of  December,  but  without 
having  been  able  to  surprise  it  completely.  A  por 
tion  of  the  occupants  escaped  across  the  river  ; 
whilst  the  remainder,  after  a  short  and  feeble  resist 
ance,  surrendered  to  the  assailants.  No  time  was 
lost  in  pursuing  this  advantage,  and  three  other  vil 
lages  were  visited  and  destroyed  by  the  party. 

The  troops,  having  been  now  thirty-six  hours  on 
horseback,  and  having  suffered  much  from  cold, 
hunger,  and  fatigue,  encamped  for  the  night  on 
the  bank  of  the  river,  where  they  remained  undis 
turbed  till  near  daylight;  when  the  outposts  were 
furiously  driven  in,  and  the  camp  sharply  and  gen 
erally  assailed,  but  without  producing  the  smallest 
ill-effect  on  its  spirit  and  order.  At  the  dawn  of 


l  McAffee,  p.  171. 
6* 


66  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812. 

day,  when  a  proper  direction  could  be  given  to  the 
movement,  both  flanks  of  the  Indian  line  were  rapidly 
turned,  and  its  rear  charged  and  routed.  The  gen 
eral  result  of  the  expedition,  however,  was  not  flat 
tering  :  twenty-three  Indians  were  killed,  forty-two 
taken,  and  four  out  of  five  villages,  destroyed  ;l 
while  on  our  side,  ten  men  were  killed,  forty-eight 
wounded,  and  nearly  two  hundred  rendered  unfit  for 
service,  by  disease  and  frost-bitten  hands  and  feet. 

These  preliminary  steps  taken,  and  the  column 
of  the  right  with  the  park  of  artillery  arrived  at  San- 
dusky,  orders  were  now  given  to  General  Winchester, 
who  had  hitherto  occupied  a  position  near  the  mouth 
of  the  Au  Glaize,  to  push  forward  to  the  Rapids ;  clear 
the  front  and  flanks  of  that  post  of  hostile  parties  ; 
construct  huts  for  the  better  protection  of  the  ad 
vancing  supplies;  and  prepare  sleds  for  the  intended 
movement  on  Maiden.  Under  these  orders,  the  Gen 
eral  commenced  his  march  on  the  31st  of  December, 
at  the  head  of  about  one  thousand  effectives  ;  but 
the  roads  becoming  much  obstructed  by  snow,  it  was 
not  till  the  10th  of  January,  that  he  reached  the  point 
to  which  he  was  destined.  Finding  on  his  arrival 
no  traces  of  an  enemy,  excepting  a  single  and  small 
Indian  encampment,  (the  occupants  of  which  were 
promptly  pursued  and  routed,)  he  now  directed  his 
attention  to  the  preparatory  labors  already  indicated 
— when  on  the  13th,  14th,  and  15th  of  the  month, 


i  The  fifth,  and  unapproached  village,  contained  the  principal  Indian 
force. 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812.  67 

expresses  were  received  from  the  inhabitants  of 
Frenchtown,  representing  the  many  and  aggravated 
horrors  of  their  situation,  and  entreating  the  interpo 
sition  of  the  American  arms.  "  The  British,"  they 
said,  "  no  longer  conceal  their  intention  of  carrying 
off  our  grain  and  our  cattle ;  and  the  savages  menace 
us  with  the  destruction  of  our  dwellings,  and  the 
massacre  or  captivity  of  our  persons.  Without  your 
aid,  we  have  no  hope  ;  with  it,  we  may  be  able  to 
defend  ourselves,  our  wives,  and  our  children  ;  but 
this  aid,  to  be  effectual,  must  be  prompt.  The  pres 
ent  number  of  the  enemy  among  us,  does  not  exceed 
three  hundred  combatants — a  force  that  will  be  soon 
and  considerably  augmented  ;  after  which,  your  in 
terposition  would  be  useless,  and  our  ruin  complete." 
An  appeal  like  this,  addressed  to  men  of  high  and 
liberal  views,  could  not  be  made  in  vain.  The  warm 
hearted  and  gallant  Allen,  became  its  ready  and 
zealous  advocate.  To  his  quick  and  intelligent 
mind,  the  policy  it  invoked  appeared  to  be  sustained 
by  every  motive  that  ought  to  govern  in  the  case — 
sympathy  for  the  afflicted  ;  duty  to  fellow-citizens, 
and  a  correct  interpretation  of  military  maxims. 
"  Can  we,"  he  said,  "turn  a  deaf  ear  to  the  cries  of 
men,  women  and  children,  about  to  perish  under  the 
scalping-knife  and  tomahawk  of  the  savage  ?  Can 
we  regard  with  indifference  the  perils  of  those  whose 
attachments  to  the  United  States  have  alone  rendered 
them  obnoxious  to  the  calamities  they  dread  1  Can 
it  be  possible,  that  the  wisdom  of  beating  an  enemy 
in  detail,  can  either  escape  our  notice  or  require  argu- 


68  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812. 

ments  to  obtain  our  approbation  ?  For  what  purpose 
are  we  here,  but  to  seek,  to  find,  and  to  fight  this 
very  enemy  ?  And  shall  we  permit  his  advanced 
guard  to  perpetrate  all  the  mischief  it  meditates,  and 
return  in  safety  to  its  main  body  1  Is  it  by  such  con 
duct  that  we  shall  wipe  out  the  disgrace  of  Hull's 
surrender,  or  fulfil  the  promises  made  to  our  friends 
when,  leaving  our  own  firesides,  we  took  upon  us  the 
temporary  profession  of  arms  1  And  if  not,  by  what 
considerations  is  it  recommended  ]  Will  it  be  said, 
that  the  force  of  the  hostile  detachment  is  too  great 
to  be  successfully  combated,  or  in  other  words,  that 
a  thousand  freemen  are  unequal  to  a  contest  with 
three  hundred  savages  and  slaves?  The  supposition 
is  degrading,  and  merits  not  the  ceremony  of  a  refu 
tation.  Will  it,  on  the  other  hand,  be  alleged,  that 
it  is  too  inconsiderable  to  be  noticed  ?  This  also 
would  be  an  error — for  besides,  that  victory,  on  any 
scale,  is  not  without  its  moral  effects  on  both  bellige 
rents,  an  abstraction  of  three  hundred  men  from  the 
present  force  of  the  enemy,  would  materially  dimm 
ish  his  power,  and  give  us  a  decided  ascendency  in 
prosecuting  what  remains  of  the  campaign.  Again : 
will  it  be  said,  (and,  if  I  mistake  not,  it  has  been 
said,)  that  so  near  an  approach  to  the  den  of  the 
Lion  would  be  imprudent  1  To  this  I  reply,  that 
danger  is  inseparable  from  war,  and  that  the  soldier 
who  goes  upon  the  plan  of  running  no  risk,  is  ne 
cessarily  self-condemned  to  inaction  and  disgrace  ; 
whereas  he  who  dares  boldly,  may  do  much.  Since 
then,  activity  and  enterprise  are  the  elements  of 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812.  69 

victory,  let  us  beware  of  calculating  dangers  too 
nicely — this  was  the  fault  and  ruin  of  Hull,  and 
cannot  surely  be  thought  worthy  of  our  imitation. 
If  the  Lion,  as  he  has  been  called,  moves  at  all,  he 
will  do  so  in  one  of  two  ways: — he  will  either  send 
a  second  detachment  to  support  the  first,  in  which 
case,  both  may  be  separately  beaten, — or  he  will  put 
his  whole  force  in  motion,  arid  thus  furnish  us  with 
a  sufficient  excuse  for  falling  back  upon  our  own 
army,  which  cannot  noAV  be  far  in  the  rear.  From 
this  brief  and  general  view  of  the  subject,  I  am 
led  to  conclude,  that  we  should  hasten  our  march 
to  Frenchtown  ;  attack,  and  if  possible,  destroy  the 
advanced  corps  of  the  enemy  ;  give  protection  to  a 
meritorious  and  suffering  people,  and  obtain  the  con 
trol  of  resources,  of  which  we  are  much  in  want, 
and  which  otherwise  will  go  to  sustain  the  war 
against  us." 

The  effects  of  this  address  were  not  equivocal — 
the  General  no  longer  hesitated,  and  the  council, 
not  having  many  or  important  doubts  to  remove,1 
it  was  speedily  determined  that  "  a  detachment 
should  be  sent,  as  expeditiously  as  possible,  to 
Frenchtown."  A  corps  was  organized  accordingly, 
and  beginning  its  march  on  the  17th,  it  was  able  at 
three  o'clock,  P.  M.  of  the  18th,  to  present  itself  in 
front  of  the  town,  when  the  fire  of  the  British  artil- 


1  Colonel  Lewis  and  Major  Madison  stated,  that  according  to  their 
recollection,  the  opinion  of  the  council  of  war  was  unanimous  for 
proceeding  to  Frenchtown, 


70        NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812. 

lery  opened  upon  it.  The  measures  taken  by  Colonel 
Lewis,  the  commander  of  the  American  detach 
ment,  were  well-timed  and  well-judged.  Without 
the  smallest  unnecessary  delay,  he  ordered  the  two 
battalions  of  Graves  and  Madison,  (preceded  by  Bal- 
lard's  light  infantry,)  to  cross  the  river1  and  drive 
the  British  and  their  allies  from  the  houses  and 
picket  fences,  of  which  they  had  hitherto  availed 
themselves  ;  while  the  remaining  battalion,  under 
the  command  of  Colonel  Allen,  was  so  posted  on 
the  right  as  to  flank  any  retrograde  movement 
made  or  attempted  by  the  enemy.  The  first  of 
these  orders  was  gallantly  executed,  and  in  a  few 
minutes,  Reynolds,  the  British  commander,  was 
driven  from  the  village  and  compelled  to  seek  an 
other  position.  In  doing  this,  he  was  soon  and 
necessarily  brought  into  contact  with  Allen's  bat 
talion,  by  which  he  was  vigorously  attacked  and 
pursued,  until  at  last,  the  shelter  of  a  second  group 
of  houses  and  a  wood  enabled  him  to  renew  his 
defence. 

Lewis's  conduct  under  these  new  circumstances 
was  not  less  prudent  and  proper  than  on  the  former 
occasion.  Retaining  Allen's  battalion  on  the  ground 
it  occupied,  and  which  menaced  at  once  the  front 
and  left  of  the  enemy's  position,  he  detached  those 
of  Graves  and  Madison  to  turn  his  right  and  rear. 
The  firing  which  grew  out  of  this  manoeuvre  be 
came  the  signal  for  Allen  to  act ;  when,  under  the 

1  The  river  was  then  covered  by  a  thick  and  strong  ice. 


NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812.        71 

pressure  of  the  two  attacks,  Reynolds  was  again 
routed  and  compelled  to  betake  himself  wholly  to 
the  forest.  It  was  here  that  his  Indian  auxiliaries 
found  their  true  champ  de  battaille ;  for  though  kept 
in  constant  retreat  for  three  miles  in  succession,  they 
maintained  the  conflict  with  great  obstinacy,  and 
but  yielded  at  last  to  the  superior  force  and  well- 
conducted  charges  of  the  Kentucky  militia.  Colonel 
Lewis  now  led  back  his  detachment  to  the  town, 
and  hastened  to  inform  General  Winchester  of  the 
events  of  the  day. 

If  victory  often  impairs  the  faculties  of  strong 
and  practised  minds,  what  ill-effects  may  it  not  pro 
duce  on  those  of  less  power,  wholly  unacquainted 
with  war  as  a  science  1  Unfortunately,  on  the 
present  occasion,  its  only  product  was  a  self-suffi 
ciency,  in  which  every  thing  approaching  the  char 
acter  of  military  foresight  and  discretion  was  for 
gotten.  A  council  of  war,  convened  on  the  morning 
of  the  19th,  determined  "to  maintain  their  new 
position  and  wait  the  arrival  of  reinforcements,"  and 
in  this  decision,  the  two  Generals,  Winchester  and 
Harrison,  united,  but  without  sufficiently  foreseeing 
the  necessity  of  rendering  more  defensible  an  open 
village,  within  stroke  of  the  enemy,  and  unprotected 
by  a  single  cannon.  Nor  was  it  the  effect  of  the 
arrival  of  the  former  of  these  commanders  to  correct 
or  in  any  degree  to  qualify,  this  oversight.  On  the 
contrary,  the  small  accession  of  force  brought  by 
him,  (not  exceeding  two  hundred  and  fifty  men,) 
became  the  cause  of  an  increased  security,  which 


72  NOTIC  IS    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812. 

set  aside  even  the  most  ordinary  precautions  ;  as  on 
the  night  of  the  21st,  (though  informed  that  the 
enemy  meditated  an  attack,)  the  troops  were  neither 
kept  together,  nor  was  a  picket-guard  placed  on 
the  only  road,  by  which  their  position  could  be 
readily  or  conveniently  approached.1 

While  thus  in  the  American  camp  nothing  was 
seen,  but  disregard  for  themselves,  nor  any  thing 
heard,  but  contempt  for  their  enemy,  Proctor,  the 
British  commander,  was  fast  advancing  from  Mai 
den,  at  the  head  of  his  whole  disposable  force,  and 
was  even  permitted  to  establish  a  battery  within 
point-blank  shot  of  the  town,  without  being  either 
disturbed  or  discovered.  Instead,  however,  of  avail 
ing  himself  of  this  advantage,  and  making  his 
attack  before  daybreak,  which  would  have  best 
secured  him  against  Kentucky  rifles,  and  probably 
effected  the  complete  surprise  of  his  adversary,  he 
waited  the  approach  of  dawn,  and  thus  became 
visible  to  an  out-lying  sentinel,  who  gave  the  alarm 
at  the  moment  that  the  American  drums  were  pre 
paring  to  beat  the  reveille.  Failing,  therefore,  to 
catch  his  enemy  asleep,  and  forbidden  alike  by  sea 
son,  weather  and  want  of  preparation,  from  employ 
ing  siege  or  investment,  he  resorted  to  assault,  as 
the  only  means  he  had  left  for  accomplishing  his 
purpose  ;  and  with  this  view,  covering  his  front 
with  artillery  and  his  flanks  with  Indian  marksmen, 
he  began  his  movements  on  the  town,  and  had  ap- 

i  McAffee,  p.  302. 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812.  73 

preached  within  musket-shot  of  the  pickets,  when  he 
was  met  by  a  fire  so  galling  and  incessant,  as  made 
an  immediate  retreat  necessary.1 

The  left  of  his  attack  was  more  fortunate.  In 
the  hasty  dispositions  made  for  defence,  the  de 
tachment  of  two  hundred  and  fifty  men  brought 
by  Winchester  on  the  20th,  instead  of  being  posted 
behind  the  pickets  and  held  there  in  reserve,  or 
made  to  occupy  the  houses  which  entirely  com 
manded  the  approaches  to  the  place,  were  most 
preposterously  drawn  out  in  line,  on  the  right  of 
the  town,  and  without  a  point  d'appui,  for  either 
flank.  This  weak  and  isolated  position  could  not 
long  escape  the  notice  of  the  enemy,  who  hastened 
to  concentrate  upon  it  all  his  disposable  means,  In 
dian  and  British  ;  and  in  twenty  minutes,  threw  the 
American  line  into  a  state  of  confusion,  which  no 
possible  exertion  could  restrain,  and  which  soon  and 
necessarily  terminated  in  the  capture  or  slaughter 
of  nearly  all  the  fugitives,  including  two  companies 
of  fifty  men  each,  led  from  behind  the  pickets  by 
Colonels  Lewis  and  Allen.  Yet  with  even  this  decided 
advantage,  Proctor  indicated  little,  if  any  disposition, 
to  renew  the  attack  on  his  first  object.  The  experi 
ment  he  had  made  on  the  covered  part  of  the  Ameri 
can  position,  had  taught  him  a  lesson  of  prudence  he 
could  not  forget.  He  had  lost  by  it  nearly  one  fourth 
of  his  regular  force,  without,  having  made  any  serious 
impression  upon  either  the  strength  or  the  spirit  of 

i  McAffee,  p.  215. 
7 


74        NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812. 

his  adversary  ;  and  to  incur  a  similar  loss  by  a 
second  attempt,  though  attended  by  success,  would 
in  effect  be  exhausting  on  an  advanced  corps,  the 
means  given  him  of  resisting  the  main  body.  Other 
considerations  may  be  supposed  to  have  increased 
the  weight  of  this  reasoning — the  weather  was  cold, 
the  snow  deep,  and  Harrison's  head-quarters  already 
advanced  to  the  Rapids  ;  while  his  own  corps  was 
neither  sufficiently  provided  against  the  elements  nor 
the  enemy.  What,  therefore,  could  not  be  done  by 
a  coup  de  main,  (a  sudden  attack  and  speedy  retreat) 
he  should  forbear  to  attempt ;  and  the  more  so,  as 
he  was  now  encumbered  with  prisoners,  and  with 
the  wrounded  of  both  armies.  The  pause  in  his 
operations,  which  took  place  about  this  time,  may, 
therefore,  be  justly  ascribed  to  reasoning  like  this, 
which  must  have  been  conclusive,  and  would  have 
sent  him  back  to  Maiden,  satisfied  with  the  advan 
tage  he  had  gained,  but  that  information  was  now 
brought  that  General  Winchester  was  among  the 
number  of  prisoners  made  by  the  Indians.  This  un 
expected  incident,  suggested  to  Proctor  a  new  course 
of  proceeding,  of  which  he  hastened  to  make  the  ex 
periment.  Causing  the  prisoner  to  be  brought  before 
him,  he  dilated  freely  on  the  extent  of  his  force, 
and  still  more  on  that  of  his  humanity.  "  I  have," 
he  said,  "  the  means  of  setting  fire  to  every  house 
in  the  village,  without  risk  to  myself;  and  may 
thus,  soon  and  safely  reduce  the  party,  which  so 
unwisely  attempts  to  defend  it.  But  in  this  case, 
what  will  be  the  fate  of  the  inhabitants,  men,  women 


NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812.        75 

and  children,  and  of  the  American  militia  associated 
with  them  1  Such  of  these  as  may  escape  the  fire 
of  our  musketry  and  cannon,  will  unavoidably  fall 
under  the  tomahawks  of  our  allies,  whom  it  will  be 
impossible  to  restrain  in  the  heat  of  action.  May  I 
never  witness  such  a  spectacle !  But,  need  I  tell 
you,  that  private  feelings  cannot  be  indulged  at  the 
expense  of  public  duty  ;  and  that,  however  agreea 
ble  it  would  be  to  me  as  a  man,  to  avoid  the  employ 
ment  of  means,  so  terrible  in  themselves  as  those  I 
have  suggested,  yet  as  an  officer,  I  cannot  be  justi 
fied  in  omitting  to  do,  whatever  may  be  necessary 
or  useful  to  the  King's  service.  I  have,  therefore, 
to  submit  to  you  a  single  and  short  proposition,  con 
taining  the  only  remedy  the  case  admits  of,  and 
that  is — that  in  your  quality  of  commanding  Gene 
ral,  you  will  immediately  surrender  to  me  French- 
town  and  the  garrison  it  contains." 

To  Winchester,  the  situation  of  the  gallant  band, 
whom  Proctor  called  the  garrison  of  Frenchtown, 
appeared  to  be  hopeless.  He  saw  no  reason  to  ex 
pect  any  interposition  in  their  favor  from  the  Rapids, 
and  from  no  other  quarter  wras  it  possible  to  obtain 
any,  in  time  to  be  useful;  yet  without  a  reinforce 
ment,  the  contest,  as  he  supposed,  must  be  short 
and  unavailing.  He  had,  besides,  just  witnessed  the 
slaughter  or  capture  of  nearly  one  half  of  his  com 
mand;  and  saw  with  horror  what  would  probably  be 
the  fate  of  the  other,  if,  as  menaced  by  Proctor,  it  was 
deprived  of  its  covering  and  obliged  to  combat  on  the 
open  ground.  His  decision  on  Proctor's  proposition 


76  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812. 

was,  therefore,  soon  and  humanely  taken,  and  hav 
ing-  yielded  his  assent,  he  immediately  despatched 
an  Aid-dec  amp  to  inform  Majors  Graves  and  Madison, 
that  "  they  and  their  followers  had  been  surren 
dered  prisoners  of  war,  to  the  arms  of  his  Britannic 
Majesty."1 

This  annunciation  of  the  unconditional  surrender 
of  a  corps,  which  had  hitherto  triumphed  over  every 
attack  made  upon  it,  and  which  yet  believed  in  its 
capacity  of  self-defence,  could  not  fail  to  be  ill-re 
ceived  by  those  to  whom  it  was  addressed.  Though 
entertaining  no  doubts  of  the  purity  and  benevolence 
of  the  General's  views  in  taking1  this  step,  they  did 
not  scruple  to  question  the  validity  of  any  eng-age- 
ment  made  by  him  in  their  behalf,  after  he  had  be 
come  a  prisoner  ;  and  the  less  so,  as  the  agreement 
actually  entered  into  and  communicated,  contained 
no  security  whatever  against  Indian  or  other  out 
rage,  in  the  event  of  their  acceding-  to  it.  The  de 
termination  of  Major  Madison  (whom  the  disasters 
of  the  day  had  now  made  commandant  of  the  corps) 
was  therefore  judiciously  taken. — "We  shall  run  all 
risks,"  he  said,  "  of  a  prolonged  resistance,  and  per 
ish,  if  such  must  be  our  fate,  in  a  free  and  full  use 
of  our  arms,  unless  the  British  commander  will  come 
under  a  solemn  eng-ag-ement  that  private  property 
shall  in  all  cases  be  respected  ;  that  the  side-arms 
of  officers  shall  be  restored  to  them  on  their  arrival 
at  Amherstburg ;  that  the  wounded  shall  be  promptly 

i  McAffee,  p.  215. 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812.  77 

and  securely  transported  to  that  post ;  and  that,  until 
this  last  provision  be  complied  with,  a  guard  suffi 
cient  for  their  protection  shall  be  assigned  to  them." 
These  conditions,  though  altogether  such  as  brave 
men  had  a  right  to  demand,  and  a  liberal  enemy 
would  have  had  no  hesitation  in  granting,  were  for 
a  time  resisted  by  Proctor;  but  finding  that  his  at 
tempts  at  either  duping  or  intimidating  his  adversary 
were  unavailing,  and  feeling  the  importance  to  him 
self  of  even  a  qualified  surrender,  which  should  make 
unnecessary  a  renewed  attack  on  the  town  or  a  longer 
continuance  before  it,  he  at  last,  after  an  altercation 
as  little  honorable  to  his  manners  as  to  his  princi 
ples,1  yielded  his  objections,  and  entered  into  the 
engagements  proposed  to  him. 

What  remained  of  the  day  was  assiduously  em 
ployed  by  the  enemy  in  preparing  for  an  immediate 
retreat,  and  in  actually  retreating,  as  far  as  Stony 
Creek.  At  twelve  o'clock,  the  prisoners  (amounting 
to  about  six  hundred)  were  put  in  motion,  and  in 
the  evening  of  the  23d,  arrived  at  Amherstburg ; 
where  "they  were  penned  up  in  a  small  and  muddy 
wood-yard,  and  exposed  throughout  the  night  to  a 
cold  and  constant  rain,  without  tents  or  blankets, 
and  with  only  fire  enough  to  keep  them  from  freez 
ing."2  The  dead,  who  lay  where  they  had  fallen, 

l  In  detailing  the  circumstances  of  this  meeting,  Major  Madison 
stated  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  that  "  Proctor's  conduct  at  French- 
town  was  as  unmanly,  as  at  Maiden  it  was  6ose" — alluding  to  his  im 
pudent  denial,  that  "  any  engagements  favorable  to  the  prisoners  had 
been  entered  into  by  him,"  2  McAffee. 


78  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812. 

in  Frenchtown  and  its  neighborhood,  were  not  merely 
disregarded,  but  "  formally  denied  the  rights  of  sep 
ulture,  and  left  a  prey  to  the  hogs  and  dogs  of  the 
village  ;'n  while  the  wounded,  still  more  unfortunate, 
were  literally  abandoned  to  the  mercy  of  the  savages ; 
who,  it  was  tauntingly  remarked,  "  would  be  found 
to  be  excellent  surgeons,"2  Soon  after  sunrise,  the 
day  following,  instead  of  the  sleighs  which  Proctor 
had  promised,  and  which  were  anxiously  expected, 
came  two  hundred  Indians,  hideous  as  yells  and 
paint  could  make  them  ;  who,  after  plundering  the 
two  houses  in  which  the  wounded  were  collected, 
set  them  on  fire,  and  repulsing  every  attempt  of  the 
prisoners  at  escape,  burnt  the  whole  to  the  ground.3 
Information  of  this  disaster  reached  the  Rapids  at 
twelve  o'clock  of  the  day  of  its  occurrence,  and  pro 
duced  effects  there,  which  had  no  tendency  to  miti 
gate  the  evil.  The  first  intention  of  the  commanding 
General,  (who  had  arrived  at  this  post  early  on  the 
morning  of  the  £0th)  was  to  push  forward  such  force 
as  could  be  speedily  assembled,  interpose  it  between 
the  flying  troops  and  their  pursuers,  and  save  if  pos 
sible,  the  wreck  of  the  American  detachment.  But 
being  informed  at  the  end  of  a  single  hour's  march, 
that  the  retreating  party  (when  last  seen  by  such 
of  the  fugitives  as  had  been  able  to  make  good  their 
escape)  was  reduced  to  less  than  forty  men,  much 
exhausted  by  fatigue,  and  hotly  pursued  by  a  body 
of  mounted  Indians,  he  abandoned  his  purpose,  and 

1  McAffee.  s  Idem.  3  Idem. 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812.  79 

committing  the  service,  originally  proposed  for  him 
self,  to  a  small  detachment,  he  speedily  retreated  to 
the  Rapids  and  immediately  assembled  a  council  of 
war.  To  the  wisdom  of  this  enlightened  body,  it 
appeared  not  merely  possible,  but  highly  probable, 
that  Proctor  would  follow  up  the  blow  he  had  already 
given,  and  attack  the  post  they  now  occupied  ;  or, 
that  leaving  this  behind  him,  he  would  throw  him 
self  on  the  head  or  flanks  of  the  column  of  the  right 
and  the  convoys  moving  in  its  rear.  From  such 
premises,  it  was  not  difficult  to  come  to  a  conclu 
sion — that  the  post  must  be  abandoned;  its  defences, 
and  the  stores  collected  in  them,  destroyed  ;  and  the 
garrison,  amounting  to  eight  or  nine  hundred  men,1 
instantly  withdrawn  behind  Portage  river.  Orders 
in  conformity  with  this  decision,  were  speedily  given 
and  executed,  and  with  this  event,  virtually  ter 
minated  General  Harrison's  second,  or  winter  cam 
paign  ;  which,  unfortunately,  having  recovered  no 
ground  we  had  lost,  nor  effaced  any  disgrace  we 
had  suffered,  utterly  failed  in  accomplishing  its 
objects  ;  and  as  matter  of  history,  is  only  remarka 
ble  for  a  waste  of  money,  time,  character  and  life. 

REMARKS.  Of  the  many  errors  which  signalize 
this  expedition,  the  first  in  date  as  well  as  in  char 
acter,  was  the  plan  of  campaign,  suggested  by  the 
government,  and  pursued  by  the  General ;  and 
which  differed  but  little  from  that  prescribed  to 

i  McAffce,  p.  236. 


80        NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812. 

Hull,  with  respect  to  route,  object  and  means.  It 
may  be  concisely  described  as  follows  : — "  Get  to 
gether  a  large  mass  of  militia  and  volunteers  ;  arm, 
equip,  subsist  and  march  them  without  loss  of  time 
through  the  wilderness  ;  give  protection  to  the  fron 
tier,  recapture  Detroit,  and  invade  Canada."  In 
thus  substantially  renewing  their  first  and  ill-fated 
plan,  the  government  entirely  overlooked,  or  disre 
garded  the  circumstances  which  induced  and  jus 
tified  the  first  expedition,  and  the  very  important 
changes  wrought  in  these,  by  Hull's  surrender  and 
other  causes,  in  relation,  as  well  to  their  own  con 
dition,  as  to  that  of  the  enemy. 

When  on  the  1st  of  June,  1812,  Hull  began  his 
march  to  Detroit,  we  had  an  Indian  war  to  prevent, 
which  could  be  best  accomplished  by  augmenting 
our  military  means  in  the  neighborhood  of  the 
lakes  ;  we  had  several  old-established  forts  on  the 
frontier,  which,  from  different  views,  it  was  deemed 
important  to  sustain  ;  we  had  a  young  and  increasing 
settlement  bordering  on  a  British  province,  which 
both  justice  and  policy  commanded  us  to  protect  ; 
we  were  yet  in  a  state  of  peace,  which  enabled  us 
to  carry  on  our  operations  without  interruption  ;  we 
had  the  summer  before  us,  from  which  to  select  the 
moments  most  propitious  for  crossing  the  swampy 
region,  which  separated  us  from  our  objects  ;  and 
lastly,  we  had  an  organized  corps,  equipped,  supplied 
and  ready  for  service.  Such  was  the  state  of  things 
on  the  1st  of  June,  when  Hull  began  his  march  for 
Detroit.  But  how  changed  in  all  respects  was  it 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812.  81 

by  the  30th  of  September — the  day  on  which  Har 
rison  reached  the  St.  Mary,  and  took  command  of 
the  army  and  district  1  It  will  be  remembered,  that 
at  this  period,  we  were  at  open  war  W7ith  Great 
Britain  ;  that  our  frontier  settlements  and  posts  had 
been  wrested  from  us  ;  that  the  Indian  tribes  of  the 
west,  with  few,  if  any  exceptions,  had  taken  part  with 
the  enemy  ;  that  the  rainy  season  had  already  com 
menced,  and  the  roads  (always  precarious)  had  be 
come  difficult  for  infantry  and  nearly  impracticable 
to  carts  and  wagons  ;  that  the  means  of  both  sub 
sistence  and  transportation,  (beyond  contract  limits) 
were  yet  to  be  provided  ;  that  the  artillery,  destined 
for  the  service  and  indispensable  to  it,  wTas  not  far 
ther  advanced  than  Pittsburg ;  that  several  corps 
of  the  army  were  also  far  in  the  rear,  and  that  all, 
whether  present  or  absent,  required  supplies,  reorgan 
ization  and  instruction. 

The  condition  of  the  enemy  had  also  undergone 
changes,  quite  as  important  as  our  own,  but  of  a 
character  altogether  different.  In  acquiring  Detroit, 
he  had  become  possessed  of  a  fortress,  much  more 
defensible  than  Maiden  ;  and  in  the  general  issue 
of  the  campaign,  had  completely  re-established  the 
allegiance  and  services  of  his  militia.  In 

receiving  the  submission  of  Michigan,  lie  had  ac 
quired  the  command  of  such  supplies  as  that  terri 
tory  could  furnish,  and  of  as  much  of  the  personal 
labor  of  its  inhabitants,  as  was  necessary  to  military 
purposes;  and  lastly,  in  securing  the  attachment  of 
the  Indian  tribes,  he  had  obtained  an  ally,  of  all 


82  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812. 

others  the  most  important  to  him,  and  formidable 
to  us. 

That  circumstances,  thus  multiplied  and  impor 
tant,  all  forbidding  a  prosecution  of  the  prescribed 
plan  of  campaign,  and  all  pointing  distinctly  to  the 
safer,  the  shorter  and  more  efficient  plan  of  a  joint 
operation  of  naval  and  military  means,  in  the  spring, 
were  either  overlooked  or  underrated  by  the  cabinet, 
is  not  to  be  doubted ;  but  of  this  apology,  the  com 
manding  General  has  deprived  himself  by  his  own 
written  acknowledgment?  -,  for  in  a  letter  of  the  4th 
of  January,  1813,  he  says,  "The  experience  of  a 
few  days,  was  sufficient  to  convince  me,  that  the 
supplies  of  provision  could  not  be  procured  for  an 
autumnal  advance  ;  and  if  even  this  difficulty  was 
removed,  another  of  equal  magnitude  existed,  in 
the  want  of  artillery."  l  On  another  occasion,  he 
says,  "  A  suspension  of  the  operations  of  this  army 
for  the  winter,  without  having  accomplished  the 
principal  objects  for  which  it  was  embodied,  is  an 
event,  which  has  been  long  looked  for  by  well-in 
formed  men,  who  know  the  character  of  the  country 
and  recollect,  that  the  army  of  General  Wayne, 
after  a  whole  summer's  preparation,  was  unable  to 
advance  more  than  seventy  miles  from  the  Ohio  ; 
and  that  the  prudent  caution  of  President  Washing 
ton  had  directed  it  to  be  placed  in  winter  quarters,  at 
the  very  season  when  our  arrangements  were  beginning."3 

1  Harrison's  official  letter  of  the  4th  January,  1813. 

2  Letter  of  the  8th  of  January,  1813. 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812.  83 

On  another  occasion,  he  says,  "  From  my  know 
ledge  of  the  cost  of  transportation,  I  do  believe  that 
the  expense,  that  will  be  incurred  in  the  course  of 
six  weeks  in  the  spring,  in  moving  the  provisions  of 
the  army  along  the  roads  leading  from  the  Rapids 
to  Detroit,  would  build  and  equip  all  the  vessels 
necessary  to  give  us  the  command  of  the  lake  j"1 
to  which,  in  a  subsequent  letter,  he  adds, — "  If  a 
small  proportion  of  the  sums  that  will  be  expended 
in  the  Quartermaster's  department,  in  an  active  pro 
secution  of  the  campaign  during  the  winter,  was 
devoted  to  obtaining  the  command  of  Lake  Erie, 
the  wishes  of  the  government,  in  their  utmost  ex 
tent,  could  be  accomplished  without  difficulty,  in 
the  months  of  April  and  May.  Maiden,  Detroit, 
and  Mackinaw,  would  fall  in  rapid  succession." 

With  such  decided  convictions  of  what  was  wrong, 
in  the  plan  he  was  pursuing,  and  of  what  would 
be  right,  in  the  measure  he  suggests  as  its  sub 
stitute,  we  certainly  had  reason  to  expect,  that  the 
General,  possessing  as  he  did,  a  carte  blanche  for 
conducting  the  war,  would  have  instantly  aban 
doned  his  crusade  upon  the  elements  and  the  trea 
sury  ;  taken  a  new  and  better  frontier  on  the  eastern 
side  of  the  swampy  region  ;  retained  barely  troops 
enough  to  occupy  and  defend  it  during  the  winter, 
u\d  dismissed  without  farther  ceremony  or  hesita 
tion,  the  mass  of  his  militia  to  their  own  firesides. 
Or,  if  failing  to  do  this,  that  he  would,  at  least, 

i  Letter  of  December  12th,  1812. 


84  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812. 

have  made  a  prompt  and  full  disclosure  of  the  prin 
cipal  facts  connected  with  the  case,  and  of  his  own 
impressions  under  them,  without  the  smallest  ad 
mixture  of  other  matter,  having  a  tendency  to  neu 
tralize  their  effects  and  keep  up  a  false  confidence 
in  a  mode  of  operating,  which  he  thought  so  ob 
viously  wrong. 

Had  he  pursued  either  of  these  courses,  he  would 
have  acted  wisely  and  deserved  well  of  his  country ; 
but  unfortunately  he  pursued  neither.  The  hope 
less  business  of  transportation  was  kept  up,  not 
merely  until  its  follies  and  abuses  became  apparent 
to  all,  but  until  it  had  actually  ceased  to  be  practi 
cable  in  any  possible  way ;  until  two  teams  had 
become  necessary  to  carry  the  forage  for  a  third  ;* 
until  two  trips,  from  one  blockhouse  to  another, 
were  sufficient  to  destroy  a  whole  brigade  of  pack- 
horses  ;  until  the  whole  route  was  marked  with  the 
wrecks  of  carriages  and  their  lading,  abandoned  by 
their  drivers  and  given  up  to  destruction  ;  until  the 
creeks  and  rivers  had  become  as  impracticable  for 
boats,  as  the  roads  were  for  carts  and  wagons  ;  and 
lastly,  (notwithstanding  these  wasteful  and  injudi 
cious  efforts,)  until  his  advanced  corps,  though  not 
now  exceeding  one  thousand  men,  were  literally 
starving  in  his  front,  and  "  compelled  to  subsist 
from  the  10th  to  the  22d  of  December,  on  bad  beef 
and  the  boiled  roots  of  the  hickory-tree."2 


1  General  Harrison's  letter  of  the  22d  December,  1812. 
«  McAffee,  p.  184,  5. 


NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812.        85 

Nor  will  the  time,  or  the  manner,  selected  by  the 
General  for  disclosing  his  opinions  and  convictions 
to  the  government,  be  more  likely  to  satisfy  an 
impartial  inquirer ;  for  though  these,  as  we  have 
seen,  were  matured  as  early  as  the  last  of  Septem 
ber,  or  beginning  of  October,  1812,  they  were  not 
communicated  until  the  December  or  January  fol 
lowing  ;  and  when  they  did  make  their  appearance, 
were  accompanied  by  so  much  that  shook  their 
authority  and  even  led  to  opposite  conclusions,  that 
the  cabinet,  not  inexpert  at  deciphering  military 
diplomacy,  and  peculiarly  shy  of  incurring  any  re 
sponsibility  it  could  avoid,  determined  (with  perhaps 
less  of  patriotism  than  of  prudence)  to  leave  the 
question  of  continuing  the  winter  campaign  exclu 
sively  with  the  General ;  who,  appearing  to  hold  two 
opinions  on  the  subject,  and  being  already  vested 
with  full  authority  for  deciding  between  them, 
would,  it  was  presumed,  select  that,  which  under 
all  circumstances,  would  be  the  safest  and  best.1 

But  if.  Mr.  Harrison's  conduct  was  culpable  in 
adhering  to  a  campaign,  forbidden  alike  by  political 
and  physical  reasons,  the  course  he  adopted  in  prose 
cuting  it,  was  not  less  open  to  censure,  in  a  military 
view ;  as  in  this,  he  scrupled  not  to  violate  the 
plainest  and  most  important  maxims  of  the  art  he 
professed  ;  and,  with  a  uniformity,  indicating  either 
an  entire  ignorance  of  their  existence,  or  an  utter 
contempt  for  their  authority.  Of  these  maxims,  we 

i  McAffee,  p.  190. 

8 


86  .       NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812. 

subjoin  the  following,  with  a  few  brief  remarks, 
applying  them  to  the  cases  to  which  we  refer. 

1  st.  "  Of  all  military  operations,  winter  campaigns 
are  the  most  to  be  condemned ;  because,  most  de 
structive  to  health,  temper,  habiliments  and  equip 
ments.  The  best  troops  cannot  long  sustain  them." 
Yet  did  General  Harrison  institute  a  winter  cam 
paign,  though  left  by  the  government  to  choose 
between  that,  and  one  in  the  spring;  and  though 
affecting  to  consider  the  former  as  doubtful,  if  not 
dangerous,  and  the  latter  as  safe,  economical  and 
efficient — thus  virtually  convicting  himself  of  omit 
ting  to  do  what,  he  believed  to  be  right,  and  of 
actually  doing  what,  he  knew  to  be  wrong. 

2d.  "Every  military  expedition  ought  to  have 
a  useful  and  important  object ;  for  without  such, 
however  successful  it  may  be,  it  will  be  fruitless; 
and  of  course,  a  mere  waste  of  time,  treasure  and 
life."  By  the  General's  letter  of  the  12th  Decem 
ber,  1812,  we  find,  that  "the  sole  object  he  could 
certainly  promise  to  accomplish,  was  the  recapture  of 
Detroit,"  of  which  he  says,  "  this  will  be  worse  than 
useless,  so  long  as  the  enemy  hold  Maiden  in  my 
rear,  and  Sandwich  in  my  front;  as  from  the  former, 
he  can  intercept  my  supplies  ;  and  from  the  latter, 
by  a  shower  of  shot  and  shells,  compel  me  to  hide 
the  army,  for  its  preservation,  in  the  adjacent 
swamps."  Yet  did  the  General  prosecute  a  cam 
paign,  having  this  worthless  object,  and  such  dan 
gerous  consequences  ! 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812.  87 

3d.  "  In  offensive  war,  a  single  line  of  operation 
is  to  be  preferred ;  as  it  keeps  your  forces  in  a  state 
that  best  enables  you  to  make,  or  to  repel  attacks." 
The  General,  in  his  wisdom,  came  to  a  different 
conclusion  ;  and  accordingly,  instead  of  keeping  his 
force  together,  divided  it  into  three  corps. 

4th.  u  Other  things  being  equal,  the  shortest 
line  of  operation  is  the  best,  as  it  most  economizes 
time  and  money,  and  offers  to  your  enemy  the  fewest 
opportunities  for  attack  or  annoyance."  Hull's  road 
would  have  best  satisfied  the  demands  of  this  rule, 
as  its  distance  to  the  point  of  rendezvous  was  less, 
and  its  central  position  the  safest.  Yet  to  this  route, 
was  assigned  the  smallest  and  least  efficient  of  the 
three  corps. 

5th.  "Double,  or  multiplied  lines,  are  only  to  be 
employed  when  your  enemy  has  committed  the 
error  of  forming  similar  lines  exterior  to  yours." 
But  as  in  this  case,  Proctor  committed  no  such 
fault,  the  reason,  which  could  alone  justify  the 
General's  arrangement,  did  not  exist. 

6th.  "  Double,  or  multiplied  lines,  whenever 
adopted,  should  be  kept  within  sustaining  distance 
of  each  other ;  and  to  this  end,  their  movements 
must  be  simultaneous."  This  maxim,  of  the  first 
importance  in  itself,  was  wholly  disregarded  ;  as  the 
General's  lines  were  so  far  apart,  and  so  deficient 
in  the  ordinary  means  of  communication,  as  in  a 
military  sense  to  be  completely  isolated.  Nor  was 
the  last  injunction  of  the  rule  better  observed  than 
the  firsf;  as  Winchester's  march  from  Defiance  to 


88  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812. 

the  Rapids,  was  made  without  any  corresponding 
movement  on  the  part  of  either  Tupper  or  Harrison. 

7th.  "  Military  magazines  should  invariably  be 
formed  in  the  rear  of  the  army  they  are  intended  to 
supply.  If  established  in  its  front,  they  invite  attacks 
from  the  enemy  ;  and  if  captured  or  destroyed,  com 
pel  an  immediate  retreat."  Instead,  however,  of 
acting  on  this  rule,  the  General's  constant  effort  and 
greatest  care,  was  to  accumulate  a  million  of  rations 
at  the  Rapids,  forty  miles  in  front  of  his  central 
column,  and  seventy  in  front  of  his  right  wing,  and 
without  other  protection  than  Winchester's  corps, 
now  reduced  by  disease  or  fatigue  to  eight  or  nine 
hundred  combatants,  destitute  alike  of  fortifications 
and  artillery,  and  but  fifty  miles  distant  from  the 
enemy's  main  body.1 

8th.  "  On  a  rigid  maintenance  of  discipline,  Avill 
depend  the  safety  of  the  country,  the  preservation 
of  the  army,  and  the  successful  prosecution  of  any 
enterprise  in  which  it  may  be  employed."  This 
maxim  is  so  universally  known,  and  so  generally 
admitted,  as  to  render  unnecessary  any  new  illustra 
tion  of  it.  It  but  remains,  therefore,  to  inquire,  how 
far  this  sine  qua  non  of  successful  war,  was  attended 
to  by  General  Harrison  1  On  beginning  his  career, 
this  officer  unfortunately  adopted  a  theory  with  re 
gard  to  western  militia  which,  though  it  sufficiently 
answered  his  purpose  of  displacing  a  senior  officer 
and  securing  to  himself  the  command  of  the  army, 
operated  very  mischievously  on  the  public  interests, 
l  Appendix,  No.  7. 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812.  89 

In  his  letter  to  the  War  Department,  of  the  3d  of 
September,  1812,  he  says,  "The  backwoodsmen  are 
a  singular  people.  They  are  susceptible  [capable 
he  probably  meant]  of  the  most  heroic  achievements; 
but  they  must  be  taken  in  their  own  way.  From 
their  affection  and  attachment,  every  thing  is  to  be 
expected  ;  but  I  will  venture  to  say,  that  they  never 
did,  nor  ever  will  perform  any  thing  brilliant  under 
a  stranger."  All  which,  when  translated  into  plain 
English,  amounts  to  this — the  men  of  the  west  ac 
knowledge  no  principle  of  obedience,  stronger  or 
safer,  than  that  of  personal  attachment  to  their  chief. 
With  them,  respect  for  the  government,  reverence 
for  the  laws,  sensibility  to  the  national  interest,  and 
even  a  decent  regard  to  their  own  characters,  avail 
nothing,  unless  to  all  these  be  superadded,  the  ap 
pointment  of  a  leader  "  who  will  take  them  in  their 
own  way" — or  in  other  words,  who  will  gratify  their 
whims,  yield  to  their  opinions,  overlook  their  follies, 
and  connive  at  their  faults. 

We  need  hardly  remark,  that  a  creed  like  this, 
founded  on  an  assumed  insubordination  on  the  part 
of  the  troops,  and  an  unavoidable  compliance  on  that 
of  the  General,  is  incompatible  with  every  thing  de 
serving  the  name  of  discipline  ;  and  will  never  fail 
to  terminate  in  waste,  peculation,  disorder,  and  de 
feat.  Nor  were  its  effects  different  on  the  present 
occasion,  as  may  be  seen  by  recurring  to  many  of 
the  incidents  mentioned  in  the  text ;  and  still  more 
distinctly  by  the  following  extracts,  made  from  the 
General's  official  correspondence  ;  from  McAffee's 
8* 


90  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812. 

history  of  the  war  in  the  west  j1  and  lastly,  from  the 
journal  of  the  late  Colonel  Wood  of  the  Engineer 
corps.  In  a  letter  of  the  12th  of  December,  to  the 
War  Department,  when  assigning  the  reasons  why 
he  did  not  sooner  apprize  the  government  of  the  im 
pediments  that  obstructed  his  progress,  he  says — 
"  Though  I  was  always  sensible  that  there  were 
great  difficulties  to  be  encountered,  &c.,  I  did  not 
make  sufficient  allowance  for  the  imbecility  and  inex 
perience  of  public  agents,  and  the  villany  of  the  con 
tractors."  In  the  second  letter  of  the  25th  of  January? 
in  attempting  to  explain,  why,  after  censuring  Win 
chester  so  freely  for  hazarding  Lewis's  movement 
on  Frenchtown,  he  directed  that  officer  to  hold  the 
position  "at  any  rate"  he  says,  "I  am  persuaded  that 
nothing  but  a  reiterated  order  would  have  produced 
obedience  on  the  part  of  the  troops."2  To  these 
sentiments,  Wood's  Journal  is  an  echo.  "  In  the 
use  of  the  axe,  the  mattock,  and  the  spade,"  says 
the  Engineer,  "  consisted  the  chief  military  knowl 
edge  of  our  army."  And  again : — speaking  of 
Lewis's  expedition  and  the  arrangement  of  the 
troops  at  Frenchtown,  he  adds — "  Not  the  least  re 
gard  was  paid  to  defence,  order,  regularity,  or  sys 
tem,  in  posting  the  different  corps."  The  historian, 
however,  is  still  more  frank  in  his  confessions, 
than  the  General  or  the  Engineer,  for  according  to 

1  Report  says,  this  work  was  principally  founded  on  documents 
furnished  and  revised  by  the  General,  with  a  view  to  his  biography. 

2  If  such  would  have  been  the   effect  of  a  second  order,  why 
hesitate  to  give  if! 


NOTICES  OP  THE  WAR  OF  1812.        91 

him, — "  Chaos  and  misconduct  reigned  in  every  de 
partment,  and  particularly  in  that  of  the  supplies ;  in 
which  the  best  organization  and  arrangements  were 
necessary  to  meet  the  inconceivable  difficulties  which 
were  to  be  surmounted  in  that  line.  The  General 
had  excellent  materials  for  an  army  in  the  Kentucky 
militia  ;  but  he  had  no  time  to  spend  in  preparing 
them  for  the  field.1  The  only  persons  that  could  be 
procured  as  packhorse-drivers  were,  generally,  the 
most  worthless  creatures  in  society  ;  who  neither 
took  care  of  the  horses,  nor  of  the  goods  with  which 
they  were  intrusted.  The  horses  were  of  course  soon 
broke  down,  and  many  of  the  packs  lost.  The  teams 
hired  to  haul,  were  also  commonly  valued  so  high 
in  coming  into  service,  that  the  owners  were  willing 
to  drive  them  to  debility  and  death,  to  get  the  price ; 
and  in  addition  to  this,  no  bills  of  lading  were  used, 
or  accounts  kept,  with  the  wagoners  ;  of  course, 
each  had  an  opportunity  to  plunder  the  public  with 
out,  much  risk  of  detection."2 

9th.  "The  General  who  divides  his  forces,  will 
be  beaten  in  detail.  Officers  who  have  neglected 
this  rule,  have  generally  paid  a  heavy  penalty  for 
doing  so.  Never,  therefore,  when  acting  offensively, 
make  a  detachment."  In  the  wisdom  and  authority 
of  this  maxim,  the  General  appeared  to  concur  ;  as 
he  more  than  once  asserts,  that  he  "made  it  a  rule, 
never  to  hazard  a  detachment  that  was  not  in  itself 
sufficiently  strong  to  resist  the  whole  force  of  the 

l  McAffee,  p.  141.  2  Idem,  p.  184. 


92  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812. 

enemy."  If,  however,  we  test  this  assertion  by 
facts,  we  shall  soon  discover  that,  in  this  respect, 
the  General  has  greatly  over-rated  his  own  discre 
tion  ;  and  that  his  actual  conduct,  so  far  from  ob 
serving1  the  rule  by  which  he  says  he  was  always 
governed,  was  often  a  direct  violation  of  it. 

We  have  already  detailed  the  progress  and  for 
tunes  of  three  detachments,  made  under  his  direction, 
viz.,  Tupper's  two  attempts  on  the  Rapids,  and  that 
of  Campbell  against  the  Missisineway  villages  ;  all 
of  which  failed  to  accomplish  the  objects  prescribed 
to  them,  either  from  the  deficient  number  of  the 
party,  (as  in  the  case  of  Campbell)  or  from  the  in- 
competency  of  the  leader,  as  in  that  of  Tapper.  In 
these  instances,  therefore,  Mr.  Harrison  was  no  strict 
observer  of  his  own  rule ;  nor  will  his  general  plan 
be  found  to  be  better  conformed  to  it,  than  his  occa 
sional"  practice  ;  for,  from  the  moment  he  divided  his 
army  into  three  corps,  and  so  placed  these  as  to 
render  mutual  support  impracticable,  he  virtually 
converted  them  into  detachments  of  the  worst  kind ; 
and  of  course,  subjected  them  to  all  the  evils  incident 
to  subdivision,  and  himself,  to  all  the  censi  re  attach 
ing  to  so  great  an  error. 

10th.  "  When  the  head  of  your  line  of  operation 
is  carried  near  to  your  enemy's  principal  station,  it 
ought  to  be  carefully  strengthened ;  for  if  it  be  weak, 
he  will  certainly  attack  and  probably  destroy  it." 
Such,  however,  was  not  the  General's  opinion ;  since, 
far  from  strengthening  Winchester,  when  approach 
ing  the  enemy,  he  would  have  taken  two  regiments 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812.  93 

from  him,  and  thus  reduced  the  advanced  corps  to 
four  or  five  hundred  men.1 

Conduct  like  this,  could  only  be  justified  by  one 
or  more  of  the  following-  reasons  ;  that  the  strength 
of  the  whole  army  was  so  small,  as  to  forbid  an  aug 
mentation  of  any  particular  part ;  that  the  objects 
to  be  gained  or  secured,  by  re-enforcing  the  advanced 
guard,  were  comparatively  unimportant ;  that  the 
state  of  the  roads  and  weather,  rendered  the  move 
ment  of  troops  impracticable  ;  or,  that  the  enemy's 
demonstrations,  against  other  and  important  parts 
of  the  line,  not  only  made  a  diminution  from  their 
strength  improper,  but  justified  a  recall  of  a  part  of  the 
vanguard,  for  the  purpose  of  strengthening  the  men 
aced  points.  Unfortunately  for  the  General,  every 
fact  here  assumed,  is  without  a  shadow  of  foundation. 
The  nominal  force  of  the  army  amounted  to  ten 
thousand  men  ;  and  its  effective  or  disposable  force, 
to  six  or  seven  thousand.2  The  object  to  be  attained, 
(by  re-enforcing  Winchester)  was  of  the  highest  im 
portance,  as  well  in  itself,  as  in  its  consequences; 
being  nothing  less  than  the  security  of  the  million 
of  rations,  collected  and  collecting  at  the  Rapids; 
and  without  which,  in  the  General's  opinion,  the 
expedition  must  fail.  The  Aveather  and  roads,  far 
from  presenting  any  serious  obstruction,  were,  during 
twenty  days  of  December,  peculiarly  favorable  ;3 

i  Appendix,  No.  7.  3  McAffee's  History. 

3  Letter  from  General  Harrison  to  the  War  Department,  of  the  4th 
of  January,  1813. 


94  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812. 

nor  was  there  any  thing  in  the  movements  of  the 
enemy  alarming  to  other  parts  of  the  line.  It  would 
be  unjust  to  Mr.  Harrison  not  to  add,  that  he  made 
no  attempt  to  exculpate  his  conduct  on  either  of 
these  grounds  ;  and  had  he  been  equally  prudent 
in  forbearing  to  employ  the  defence  he  actually  set 
up,  it  would  have  furnished,  at  least,  one  occasion 
for  speaking  favorably  of  his  discretion.  But  what 
can  we  think  of  the  capacity  of  a  General,  who, 
when  the  magazines  necessary  to  his  own  eventual 
success  were  in  jeopardy,  could  seriously  wish  to 
send  back  one  half  of  the  small  corps  employed  in 
their  protection  ?  And  for  what  purpose  1  For  a 
pitiful  saving,  arising  from  the  mere  difference  be 
tween  contract  and  commissariat  prices,  to  be  made 
on  the  few  rations  necessary  to  the  subsistence  of 
five  or  six  hundred  men  !l 

llth.  "Every  position,  taken  by  an  advanced 
corps  in  the  face  of  an  enemy's  army,  (if  too  weak 
to  defend  itself)  should  be  promptly  abandoned,  or 
speedily  re-enforced  and  fortified."  And  again  : — 
"  No  advanced  corps  should  be  hazarded,  beyond 
sustaining  distance  from  its  own  army."  Inatten 
tion  to  these  two  rules,  was  no  doubt  the  proximate 
cause  of  the  disaster  at  French  town,  and  the  subse 
quent  defeat  of  the  campaign.  For,  who  will  be  hardy 
enough  to  assert,  that  if  (after  the  affair  of  the  18th) 
Winchester's  corps  had  been  withdrawn,  or  his  posi- 

l  McAffee,  p.  193. 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812.  95 

tion  re-enforced  and  fortified  :  or  lastly,  if  Harrison 
had  been  within  sustaining  distance  of  it,  the  loss 
and  disgrace  suffered  on  the  22d}  would  not  have 
been  avoided  ? l 

The  first  notice  of  the  expedition  to  Frenchtown, 
reached  the  commanding  General  on  the  16th.  Its 
effects  on  him  and  the  troops  he  commanded,  is  thus 
described  by  the  late  Colonel  Wood. — "  This  news, 
for  a  moment,  paralyzed  the  army,  or  at  least,  the 
thinking  part  of  it  ;  for  no  one  could  imagine  that 
it  was  possible  for  him  [Winchester]  to  be  guilty  of 
such  a  hazardous  step.  General  Harrison  was  as 
tonished  at  the  imprudence  and  inconsistency  of 
such  a  measure  ;  which,  if  carried  into  execution, 
could  be  viewed  in  no  other  light,  than  as  attended 
with  certain  and  inevitable  destruction  to  the  left 
wing.  Nor  was  it  difficult  for  any  one  to  foresee 
and  predict  the  terrible  consequences  which  were 
sure  to  mark  the  result  of  a  scheme,  no  less  rash  in 
its  conception  than  hazardous  in  its  execution."2 
What  then,  we  ask,  under  convictions  thus  full  and 
distinct,  of  the  folly  and  danger  of  the  enterprise, 
was  the  duty  of  the  commanding  General  1  Un 
questionably,  to  prevent  the  movement  if  possible  ; 
and  if  not,  to  recall  the  detachment  without  a  mo 
ment's  delay.  Yet  were  both  entirely  omitted !  No 
order,  forbidding  the  expedition,  was  given  by  Har- 


1  Appendix,  No.  9,  affidavit  of  Governor  Madison,  &c. 

2  McAffee's  History  p.  228. 


96  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812. 

rison ;  nor  after  his  arrival  at  the  Rapids  on  the  20th, 
did  any  issue  for  recalling  the  troops.  On  the  con 
trary,  he  on  that  day,  despatched  his  Inspector- 
General  with  an  order  to  Winchester,  "  to  hold  fast 
the  position  at  any  rate"  or  in  other  words,  at  every 
risk, — thus  making  himself  entirely  responsible,  for 
whatever  consequences  might  follow. 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812.  97 


CHAPTER   IV. 

Operations  on  the  Niagara. — Partial  Armistice. — Renewal  of  hostilities. 
— Van  Rensselaer's  attack  on  Glueenstown. — Smyth's  invasion  of 
Canada.— Dearborn's  Campaign  against  the  British  advanced  posts 
on  Lake  Champlain. 

WE  have  already  stated,  that  to  lessen  the  pres 
sure  made  upon  Hull,  and  to  reinstate  the  ascen 
dency  he  had  lost  on  the  Detroit,  Major-General 
Dearborn,  who,  in  the  distribution  of  service  for  the 
year  1812,  had  been  assigned  to  the  command  of  the 
northern  army,  was  directed  to  make  such  move 
ments  against  the  British  posts  in  his  front,  as  would 
have  the  effect  of  preventing  them  from  re-enforcing 
the  garrison  of  Maiden  ;  or  otherwise  altering  the 
relations  as  to  strength,  which  had  hitherto  existed 
between  Hull  and  Proctor.  But  for  this  service, 
the  Major-General  had  made  no  preparation,  and  ap 
peared  to  have  little  relish  j1  as  on  the  very  day  on 
which  he  was  thus  instructed  by  the  government, 

i  In  the  General's  letter  of  the  8th  of  August,  we  find  an  apology  for 
this  inaction,  quite  as  unjustifiable  as  the  inaction  itself — "  Till  now," 
he  says,  "  I  did  not  consider  the  Niagara  frontier  as  coming  within  the 
limits  of  my  command," — an  assertion  directly  contradicted  by  the 
armistice  entered  into  between  him  and  Provost,  and  utterly  inconsis 
tent  with  the  orders  he  received,  from  the  26th  of  June,  to  the  1st  of 
August.  For  these  orders,  see  Appendix,  Nos.  10  and  14. 
9 


98  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812. 

(though  sufficiently  apprised  that  detachments  had 
been  sent  to  Maiden,  and  that  the  situation  of  Hull 
was  becoming  more  critical  every  moment)  he  did 
not  hesitate  to  enter  into  an  armistice,  by  which  he 
completely  disabled  himself  from  giving  any  aid  to 
that  officer ;  either  by  vigorously  assailing  the  British 
posts  in  his  front,  (now  rendered  comparatively  weak 
by  the  absence  of  Brock  and  the  troops  carried  with 
him,)  or  by  extending  to  him  or  his  army,  the  ben 
efits  of  the  temporary  suspension  of  hostilities  into 
which  he  had  entered.  Nor  did  this  extraordinary 
policy,  on  the  part  of  the  General,  stop  here — for 
though  promptly  informed,  that  the  arrangement  he 
had  made  was  disapproved  by  the  President,  and 
though  peremptorily  ordered  to  put  an  end  to  it  as 
speedily  as  possible,  he  notwithstanding,  continued 
its  operation  till  the  29th  of  August ;  thus  enabling 
Brock,  not  only  to  consummate  his  victory  on  the 
Detroit,  but  to  lead  back  his  detachment  and  re 
establish  his  defences  on  the  Niagara.1 

It  would  be  a  mere  waste  of  time  to  inquire  into 
the  motives  of  the  British  commander,  in  proposing 
an  arrangement,  productive  of  such  decided  advan 
tage  to  himself  and  his  army  ;8  but  why  the  Amer 
ican  General  should  have  consented  to  it,  in  the  first 


1  Brock  left  York  on  the  5th  of  August ;  arrived  at  Maiden  on  the 
13th;    received  Hull's  surrender  on  the  15th;  returned  to  his  post 
on  the  Niagara,  on  the  25th ;  visited  York  on  the  27th ;  and  early 
in  October  was  again  at  Fort  George,  playing  off  his  artifices  on 
General  Van  Rensselaer. 

2  For  the  use  made  of  the  armistice  by  Provost,  see  Appendix,  No.  1 1. 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812.  99 

instance,  or  continued  it  in  the  second,  contrary  to 
the  express  orders  of  his  government  ]  are  problems 
less  easily  solved.  Two  official  solutions  have,  how 
ever,  been  given  of  them,  which  it  is  our  duty  to 
commemorate  ;  and  which,  if  they  do  not  instruct, 
can  hardly  fail  to  amuse  the  reader.  According  to 
that  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  the  General  had  only 
mistaken  a  private,  for  a  public  letter  ;  and  presum 
ing  that  it  contained  some  new  and  important  over 
ture  on  the  subject  of  peace,  hastened  to  adopt  the 
preliminary  measure  of  an  armistice.  But  however 
well  this  solution  may  account  for  the  General's  first 
step  in  the  business,  it  entirely  fails  to  explain  the 
second  ;  which  must  have  been  made  with  a  full 
knowledge,  that  his  mountain  had  not  even  pro 
duced  a  mouse,  and  that  the  despatch  to  which  he 
had  ascribed  so  much  importance,  had  neither  been, 
nor  was  intended  to  be,  communicated  to  the  Amer 
ican  Government.  To  supply,  therefore,  this  obvious 
defect  in  the  Secretary's  explanation,  we  must  recur 
to  that  of  the  General,  who  in  a  letter  of  the  27th 
of  August,  lets  us  into  the  secret  that  the  ruse  was 
altogether  on  his  side  ;  that  it  was  now  in  full  ope 
ration,  and  [though  it  might  have  deprived  him 
of  the  power  of  saving  Hull,  or  of  capturing  the 
enemy's  posts  in  his  front]  was  not  to  be  either 
too  much  undervalued,  or  hastily  given  up  ;  "  as  he 
had  yet  on  hand  some  useful  stores  which  must  be 
forwarded  to  Sacket's  Harbor."1 

l  Dearborn's  letters  of  the  9th  and  20th  of  August,  1812. 


100  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812. 

But  the  time  had  now  arrived,  when  something- 
more  important  than  the  transportation  of  puncheons 
and  packages,  was  expected  from  an  army  impatient 
of  longer  inactivity ;  and  loudly,  if  not  seriously, 
demanding  an  opportunity  of  meeting  the  enemy 
in  the  field.  To  this  ostensible  ardor,  the  gallant 
and  successful  enterprise  of  Lieutenant  Elliot  of  the 
navy,  (aided  by  Captain  Towson  and  a  detachment 
of  the  army)  in  capturing  two  armed  brigs  of  the 
enemy  under  the  guns  of  Fort  Erie,  gave  a  new  and 
increased  impulse  ;  approaching  so  nearly  to  a  state 
of  insubordination  on  the  part  of  the  militia,  that 
motives  of  personal  safety  and  reputation,  no  less 
than  those  derived  from  a  sense  of  public  duty,  made 
a  compliance  with  it  indispensable.1  Major-General 
Van  Rensselaer,  (the  local  commanding  officer)  hav 
ing  accordingly  made  such  preparations  as  he  deemed 
necessary  ;  and  having  besides  assured  himself,  that 
"  General  Brock  had  again  set  out  for  Maiden  with 
a  considerable  re-enforcement,"9  selected  the  morn 
ing  of  the  llth  of  October,  for  making  an  attack  on 
Queenstown — a  small  village  on  the  Canada  side 
of  the  strait,  defended  by  three  batteries,  a  few  artil 
lerists,  two  companies  of  the  49th  British  regiment, 
and  a  small  detachment  of  York  volunteers. 

The  corps  designated  for  this  service,  and  princi 
pally  composed  of  militia,  assembled  punctually  and 
in  good  order,  at  the  place  of  rendezvous  ;  and  with 

1  General  Van  Rensselaer's  report  of  October  14th,  1812. 

2  Idem. 


NOTICES  OF  THE  *.VAR  CF  1G12.       101 

the  exception  of  the  weather,  which  was  wet  and 
windy,  every  thing  wore  a  propitious  aspect.  But 
when,  after  long  and  patiently  abiding  the  pelting 
of  a  north-easterly  storm,  the  embarcation  was  or 
dered,  and  the  boats  called  for,  none  were  found  to 
be  in  readiness  ;  and  on  inquiry,  it  was  discovered, 
that  the  person  having  charge  of  them,  had  not  only 
withdrawn  himself,  but  had  carried  with  him  all  the 
oars,  necessary  for  the  service.  For  this  unexpected 
occurrence,  there  was  no  remedy  but  patience  ;  the 
expedition  was  accordingly  suspended,  and  the  troops 
sent  back  to  their  cantonments. 

On  the  13th,  the  project  was  renewed,  without 
any  essential  change  in  relation  to  its  object,  or  the 
mode  of  obtaining  it.  The  former,  continued  to  be 
the  mere  expulsion  of  the  enemy  from  Queenstown, 
and  the  occupation  of  that  village,  "  as  a  covering 
for  the  American  army  against  the  inclemency  of 
the  weather  ;"1  while  the  latter,  proposed  only  a 
hardy  attack  on  that  portion  of  the  enemy's  line  of 
defence,  which  confronted  the  American  camp  at 
Lewistown.  To  effect  these  purposes,  a  corps  of  six 
hundred  infantry,  composed  in  equal  parts  of  regular 
troops  and  militia,  commanded  by  Lieutenant-Colo 
nels  Van  Rensselaer  and  Christie,  were,  under  cover 
of  the  night,  to  cross  the  Niagara  and  carry  the  bat 
teries  by  assault ;  after  which,  the  residue  of  the 
army  was  to  follow  and  occupy  the  heights  and  the 
village. 

In  prosecution  of  this  plan,  the  infantry  selected 

for  the  attack,  assembled  at  the  lower,  or  old  French 
iApp.  No.  25.  9  * 


102  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OP    1812. 

Ferry,-  near  '.Ljewisfeown,'  about  four  o'clock,  A.  M. ; 
when,  notwithstanding  the  recent  admonition  on  the 
subject  of  boats,  it  was  found  that  those  provided  for 
the  present  occasion,  "were  insufficient  to  transport 
more  than  three  hundred  men  at  a  single  trip."1 
Two  companies  of  the  13th  United  States  regiment, 
forming  the  right  of  the  line,  and  commanded  by 
Captains  Armstrong  and  Malcom,  were  the  first  em 
barked  ;  and  from  good  fortune  and  skilful  pilotage, 
were  able  to  reach  the  opposite  shore  without  either 
annoyance  or  discovery.  Other  and  smaller  parts 
of  the  same  regiment  followed,  and  with  equal  suc 
cess,  until  the  whole  number  who  had  made  good 
their  landing,  amounted  to  somewhat  more  than  one 
hundred  combatants;  when  it  was  deemed  advisable 
to  quit  the  shore,  and  take  a  position  on  the  first  or 
river  bank,  and  there  await  the  arrival  of  the  resid 
uary  part  of  the  corps.  In  executing  this  movement, 
noises  which  could  not  be  entirely  avoided,  reached 
the  British  sentinels  on  the  heights,  and  produced  an 
immediate  and  general  alarm.  A  random  cannon 
ade,  on  the  course  of  the  Ferry  and  place  of  American 
embarcation,  followed ;  while  the  two  flank  com 
panies  of  the  49th  and  the  York  militia,  forming  the 
garrison  of  the  post,  concentrated  their  fire  (from 
different  parts  of  the  hill)  on  the  ground  occupied  by 
the  American  detachment,  and  with  so  much  effect, 
that  every  commissioned  officer  belonging  to  it  was 
in  a  few  minutes  either  killed  or  wounded.2  Lieuten- 

i  Appendix,  No.  12.  2  Idem. 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812.  103 

ant-Colonel  Van  Rensselaer,  who  had  accompanied 
this  party,  though  among  the  latter  and  suffering 
severely,  was  yet  able  to  stand  ;  and  from  a  first  and 
hasty  consideration  of  the  case,  directed  the  men  to 
withdraw,  and  shelter  themselves  under  the  bank  ; 
but  soon  perceiving  that  a  position  of  this  kind  was 
not  less  dangerous  than  the  former,  and  wholly  in 
efficient  as  regarded  the  enemy,  he  hastened  to  issue 
the  wiser  and  more  military  order,  that  "all  such  as 
could  move,  should  immediately  mount  the  hill  and 
storm  the  batteries."  Captains  Ogilvie  and  Wool 
of  the  13th,  (the  former  of  whom  had  about  this 
time  crossed  the  river,)  promptly  undertook  the  exe 
cution  of  this  order,  and  ascending  the  heights, 
turned  the  British  position,  seized  the  battery,1  and 
drove  the  covering  party  (composed  of  the  two  flank 
companies  of  the  49th)  into  a  strong  stone  building 
near  the  water's  edge.  From  this  fortress,  the  com 
panies  soon  after,  made  two  or  more  vigorous,  but 
unsuccessful  efforts,  to  recover  the  ground  they  had 
lost ;  in  the  last  of  which,  the  gallant  Brock  was 
fated  to  fall : — a  circumstance  which,  for  the  mo 
ment,  gave  the  American  party  full  and  undisturbed 
possession  of  the  heights  of  Queenstown. 

During  the  pause  that  now  followed  in  the  com 
bat,  several  attempts  were  made  to  carry  over  from 
the  American  camp,  supplies  necessary  to  the  further 
prosecution  of  the  general  plan  ;  but  so  few  and  in 
sufficient  were  the  means  provided  for  the  purpose, 

i  This  battery  was  a  redan, — open  in  the  rear,  by  which  the  assail 
ants  entered. 


104       NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812. 

and  so  disorderly  the  employment  of  such  as  did 
exist,  that  the  effects  expected  from  them  were  very 
inadequately  produced.  Of  artillery,  but  one  gun 
could  be  brought  to  the  west  side  of  the  river ;  of 
ammunition,  but  a  small  quantity  ;  and  of  entrench 
ing  tools,  all  were  forgotten  and  left  at  the  place  of 
embarcation.  Nor  was  the  transportation  of  the 
army,  more  successful  than  that  of  the  supplies. 
Two  detachments  of  the  6th,  13th  and  23d  regiments 
of  infantry,  led  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Christie  and 
Major  Mullany,  found  means  to  cross,1  and  were 
soon  followed  by  Brigadier-General  Wadsworth  and 
a  small  battalion  of  militia ;  but  the  mass  of  this 
latter  description  of  force  was  immoveable.  Neither 
entreaty  nor  threats — neither  arguments  nor  ridicule 
availed  any  thing.  They  had  seen  enough  of  war, 
to  satisfy  them  that  it  made  no  part  of  their  special 
calling ;  and  at  last,  not  disdaining  to  employ  the 
mask,  invented  by  faction  to  cover  cowardice  or 
treason,  fifteen  hundred  able-bodied  men,  well  armed 
and  equipped,  who  a  week  before  boasted  loudly  of 
patriotism  and  prowess,  were  now  found  openly  plead 
ing  constitutional  scruples,  in  justification  of  disobe 
dience  to  the  lawful  authority  of  their  chief ! 

While  this  degrading  scene  was  going  forward  on 
the  eastern  bank  of  the  river,  occurrences  no  less  in 
teresting,  but  of  a  character  somewhat  different,  were 
taking  place  on  the  western.  Between  two  and  three 
o'clock,  P.  M.,  a  scattering  fire  was  heard  on  the 
southern  side  of  the  heights,  produced  by  an  Indian 
i  Appendix,  No.  12, 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812.  105 

attack  made  on  a  small  party  of  straggling  militia  ; 
who  being  completely  surprised,  fled  in  great  con 
fusion,  and  carrying  their  panic  along  with  them, 
threatened  to  extend  the  infection  to  other  corps.  It 
was  at  this  critical  moment  that  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Scott  of  the  second  regiment  of  artillery,  placing  him 
self  at  the  head  of  a  few  platoons  of  regular  troops, 
charged  the  savages  with  a  gallantry  which  soon 
checked,  and  at  length  drove  them  into  a  neigh 
boring  wood  ;  where  the  combat  became  nearly  sta 
tionary,  and  a  mere  trial  of  skill  at  sharp-shooting. 
Perceiving  that  a  champ  de  battaille  like  this,  secured 
to  the  Indians  all  the  advantages  of  their  habitual 
and  peculiar  mode  of  fighting ;  while  to  his  own 
troops  it  produced  effects  directly  the  reverse,  the 
Lieutenant-Colonel  prudently  withdrew  his  party  to 
the  open  ground ;  and  there  took  a  position  which, 
though  it  did  not  entirely  put  an  end  to  the  attack, 
made  it  too  inefficient,  longer  to  disturb  the  order  of 
the  American  line. 

A  discovery  was,  however,  soon  made,  that  the 
savages  were  not  the  only  enemy  the  invading  corps 
would  have  to  contend  with.  From  the  heights  of 
Queenstown,  in  the  distance  eastward,  was  now  seen 
advancing  a  column  of  artillery  and  infantry.  Its 
approach,  though  slow  and  circumspect,  was  steady 
and  unremitting  ;  and  of  its  character  and  objects 
there  could  be  no  doubts.  About  three  o'clock,  P.  M., 
General  Sheafe,  the  successor  of  Brock  and  leader 
of  the  column,  after  turning  the  village  and  throw 
ing  into  it  a  detachment  competent  to  its  defence, 


106  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812. 

presented  himself  and  a  force  of  eight  hundred  regu 
lars,  militia  and  Indians,  in  front  of  the  American 
line — now  reduced  to  less  than  three  hundred  com 
batants,  and  sustained  but  by  a  single  piece  of  artil 
lery,  badly  supplied  with  ammunition.  In  this  state 
of  things,  a  note  was  received  from  General  Van 
Rensselaer,  advising  an  immediate  retreat,  and  pro 
mising,  on  his  part,  the  utmost  exertion  in  furnishing 
the  necessary  boats  and  a  covering  tire,  during  the 
passage  of  the  river  ;  but,  at  the  same  time,  leaving 
to  Wadsworth  (the  senior  officer  on  the  field)  entire 
liberty  to  follow  the  dictates  of  his  own  judgment 
on  the  occasion.  This  note  was  immediately  com 
municated  to  the  commandants  of  the  different  corps, 
and  their  opinions  on  the  subject  requested;  but 
without  producing  a  decision,  either  for  or  against, 
the  proposed  measure.  The  British  commander  in 
the  meantime  continued  to  manffiuvre  from  right  to 
left,  and  from  left  to  right ;  countermarching  nearly 
the  whole  length  of  the  American  line  twice,  as  if 
determined  to  count  every  man  in  the  ranks,  and  to 
make  himself  familiar  with  every  foot  of  the  position, 
before  he  hazarded  an  attack.  This  deliberation  on 
his  part  gave  time  for  renewed  councils  on  that  of 
his  adversary ;  and  a  second  consultation  being  held, 
a  determination  was  at  last  taken  to  try  the  experi 
ment  of  a  retreat,  as  recommended  by  General  Van 
Rensselaer. 

To  have  executed  successfully,  a  purpose  of  this 
kind,  in  the  face  of  an  enemy  so  much  more  formi 
dable  than  themselves,  in  numbers,  discipline  and 


NOTICES    OP    THE    WAR    OF    1812.  107 

variety  of  arms,  would  have  been  no  easy  task  for 
soldiers  the  most  practised,  and  officers  the  most 
skilful ;  but  was  perfectly  hopeless,  when  required 
from  American  levies,  who  had  seen  only  an  imper 
fect  service  of  three  or  four  months.  The  result 
was  such  as  might  have  been,  and  probably  was 
anticipated  by  the  reflecting  portion  of  the  corps  ; 
the  first  step  taken  in  retreat,  produced  a  movement 
on  the  part  of  the  enemy,  which  at  once  converted 
the  march  into  a  route  ;  and  (superadded  to  the 
fact,  that  not  a  boat  was  found  on  the  shore  ready 
to  receive  them)  made  necessary  an  immediate  and 
unconditional  surrender. 

General  Van  Rensselaer,  disgusted  with  the  con 
duct  of  the  militia,  and  perhaps  not  entirely  satisfied 
with  his  own,  withdrew  from  service,  about  the  18th 
of  October  ;  when  the  command  of  the  Niagara  or 
central  army,  as  it  was  now  called,  devolved  on 
Brigadier-General  Smyth  ;  an  officer,  from  whose 
patriotic  and  professional  pretensions,  the  multitude 
had  drawn  many  favorable  conclusions.  Nor  was 
the  estimate  made  of  his  military  character  by  the 
government,  more  correct ;  as  it  took  for  granted, 
a  temperament,  bold,  ardent  and  enterprising,  and 
requiring  only  restriction  to  render  it  useful.  In 
the  orders  given  for  the  regulation  of  his  conduct, 
he  was  accordingly  forbidden  to  make  any  new  at 
tempt  at  invasion,  with  a  force  "less  than  three 
thousand  combatants,  or  with  means  of  transporta 
tion  (across  the  Niagara)  insufficient  to  carry  over 
simultaneously  the  whole  of  that  number." 


108       NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812. 

The  interval  between  the  26th  of  October  and 
27th  of  November,  was  usefully  employed  in  getting 
together  and  preparing  the  necessary  number  of 
boats,  and  such  increase  of  physical  force,  as  would 
enable  the  new  commander  entirely  to  fulfil  the 
cautious  policy  prescribed  to  him  by  the  govern 
ment.  Having  at  the  last  of  these  dates,  sufficiently 
secured  both  objects,  as  he  believed,  he  issued  an 
order,  that  the  army  should  assemble  early  on  the 
28th,  at  Black  Rock,  for  the  purpose  of  entering  on 
the  projected  invasion.  Nor  was  there  any  thing 
in  the  state  of  the  weather,  or  of  the  river,  or  in  the 
force  and  condition  of  the  enemy,  seriously  to  ob 
struct  the  execution  of  this  design.  The  width  of 
the  Niagara  from  Black  Rock  to  the  Canada  shore, 
does  not  exceed  a  mile — a  distance  ordinarily  passed 
in  a  few  minutes  ;  the  weather  was  clear  and  cool, 
not  cold ;  the  outposts  of  the  enemy  few  and  feeble, 
and  too  remote  from  forts  Erie  and  Chippewa,  to  be 
promptly  sustained  by  the  garrison  of  either  ;  and 
of  course  offering  to  the  invading  army  an  opportu 
nity  of  breaking  down  in  succession,  any  detach 
ments  sent  to  their  support.  Such  was  not,  however, 
the  view  of  the  subject  taken  by  the  General  ;  for 
besides,  that  no  man  had  more  thoroughly  convinced 
himself  that  the  "  better  part  of  valor  is  discretion," 
he  had  on  this  occasion,  made  a  special  promise 
"  not  to  be  beaten,"  l  and  to  fulfil  this  engagement, 
determined  to  risk  only  a  night-attack,  with  two 

i  Smyth's  letter  to  Dearborn,  of  the  30th  October,  1812. 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812.  109 

small  detachments,  which,  whether  successful  or  not, 
should  terminate  the  enterprise  by  a  hasty  retreat 
to  their  own  shore. 

In  pursuance  of  this  plan,  Captain  King  of  the 
fourteenth  United  States  regiment,  with  one  hun 
dred  and  fifty  regular  infantry,  and  seventy  seamen, 
led  hy  Lieutenant  Angus,  was  despatched  about 
midnight  of  the  27th,  with  orders  to  attack  and 
carry  the  British  posts  at  the  Red  House  ;  while 
Lieutenant  -  Colonel  Boerstler,  with  two  hundred 
rank  and  file  of  the  same  regiment,  was  instructed 
to  land  near  the  mouth  of  Frenchman's  Creek ; 
assail  the  guard  posted  at  that  place,  and  destroy 
the  bridge  necessary  to  a  communication  between 
forts  Erie  and  Chippewa.  From  bad  pilotage,  or 
some  of  the  untoward  accidents  which  often  befall 
night  movements,  neither  party  succeeded  in  carry 
ing  over  its  whole  force.  Of  King's  ten  boats,  but 
four  reached  the  point  of  attack  designated  for  them. 
In  these,  were  the  seventy  seamen  and  an  equal 
number  of  infantry,  who  landed  under  a  shower  of 
grape  and  musket  shot.  The  former,  unaccus 
tomed  to  the  order  of  military  movements,  and  re 
quiring  only  to  be  told  where  the  enemy  was,  rushed 
forward  with  their  habitual  gallantry  and  appropriate 
weapons,  (pikes  and  cutlasses,)  and  after  a  short  but 
sanguinary  contest,  carried  the  position,  made  sev 
eral  prisoners,  threw  two  pieces  of  artillery  and  their 
caissons  into  the  river,  and  set  fire  to  the  building-. 

During  these  occurrences,  King  with  his  infantry 
was  not  idle.  Directing  his  march  on  the  two  exte- 

10 


110       NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812. 

rior  batteries,  which  the  enemy  yet  held,  he  gallantly 
carried  the  lower  by  storm  ;  and  on  reaching  the 
upper,  found  it  hastily  abandoned.  After  spiking 
the  cannon  and  destroying  the  carriages  of  both,  it 
but  remained  to  fulfil  the  last  injunction  of  his  orders 
— assemble  his  party,  and  recross  the  river.  But  to 
his  great  surprise,  neither  on  his  retrograde  march 
to  the  shore,  nor  on  his  arrival  there,  was  any  thing 
to  be  seen  of  Lieutenant  Angus,  the  seamen,  or  the 
boats.  All  had  disappeared,  and  he  now  found  him 
self  in  a  situation  the  most  painful  to  a  soldier — 
that  of  encountering  a  sudden  and  unavoidable  dan 
ger,  against  which  skill  and  courage  could  avail 
nothing.  An  accident,  however,  tended  to  mitigate 
the  evil ;  for  in  seeking  his  own  craft,  he  found  two 
of  the  enemy's,  in  which  he  despatched  as  many  of 
his  party  as  the  boats  would  hold,  but  refusing  to 
abandon  the  remainder,  he  and  they  were  soon  after 
made  prisoners  of  war. 

The  explanation  of  this  unfortunate  circumstance, 
offers  a  new  proof  of  the  perils  of  nig] it  movements  ; 
and  of  the  great  inexperience  of  our  best  officers,  at 
that  period  of  the  war,  in  this  branch  of  military 
service.  After  the  seamen,  as  already  stated,  had 
carried  the  first  object  of  attack,  (not  knowing  what 
direction  had  been  given  to  the  infantry  of  the 
detachment,  and  no  signal  of  retreat  having  been 
agreed  upon,)  they  hastened  to  the  shore,  with  the 
wounded  of  their  own  party,  and  the  prisoners  they 
had  made  ;  when  finding  but  four  boats  of  the  ten, 
(with  which  the  enterprise  began,)  and  these  with- 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812.  Ill 

out  a  guard,  and  ignorant  of  the  fact,  that  this 
number  only  had  made  good  their  landing,  Lieu 
tenant  Angus  concluded,  and  not  unreasonably,  that 
Captain  King  had  anticipated  him  in  the  retreat ; 
and  accordingly  embarking  his  party,  returned  to 
the  Navy-Yard,  near  Black  Rock. 

Boerstler's  adventures,  on  this  occasion,  had  in 
them  little  of  interest,  with  respect  either  to  what 
was  done,  or  what  was  suffered.  Mistaking  some 
what  the  point  of  attack,  he  effected  his  landing 
with  three  boats  out  of  seven,  and  without  the  loss 
of  a  man.  The  British  guard  being  a  small  one 
and  soon  routed,  the  pursuit  was  continued  towards 
the  bridge,  (the  destruction  of  which  formed  the 
principal  object  of  this  part  of  the  enterprise,)  but 
being  now  informed  by  a  prisoner,  that  "  Ormsby 
was  in  full  march,  and  nearly  approaching  it,"  the 
Colonel  contented  himself  with  detaching  a  Lieu 
tenant  and  a  few  men,  to  effect  its  destruction  ;  and 
retiring  with  the  mass  of  his  party  to  the  shore, 
entered  his  boats,  and  recrossed  to  Squaw  Island. 
The  return  of  both  Angus  and  Bcerstler,  in  a  total 
ignorance  of  what  had  befallen  their  comrades  of 
the  expedition,  could  not  fail  to  create  much  disqui 
etude  in  the  army  ;  and  induced  Colonel  Winder  to 
offer  himself,  with  another  small  party,  to  go  in  quest 
of  them.  But  on  approaching  the  Canada  shore, 
and  finding  the  British  batteries  re-established  and 
sustained  by  a  body  of  infantry,  he  returned  to 
Black  Rock,  with  a  loss  of  six  killed  and  twenty. 
two  wounded. 


112      NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812. 

The  result  of  the  enterprise,  though  sufficiently 
indicative  of  the  error  committed,  in  departing  from 
the  letter,  as  well  as  the  spirit  of  the  orders  given 
i>y  the  government,  had  no  tendency  to  quicken  the 
General's  appetite  for  a  second  experiment,  upon  a 
larger  and  more  efficient  scale.  He  even  now  be 
gan  to  doubt,  whether  the  force  present  and  willing 
to  co-operate  with  him,  amounted  to  the  number 
prescribed  by  his  orders  as  necessary  to  invasion; 
nor  did  he  forget  the  use,  that  in  his  present  extrem 
ity,  might  be  made  of  the  second  injunction  of  the 
government,  that  "  no  attempt  at  invasion  should 
be  hazarded,  without  the  advice  and  approbation  of 
his  principal  officers."  While,  therefore,  he  ostensi 
bly  prepared  for  a  second  attack  at  another  point, 
and  with  his  whole  force,  he  secretly  held  a  council 
of  war,  in  which,  under  different  motives,1  it  was 
agreed,  that  "  the  further  prosecution  of  the  present 
plan  of  invasion,  should  be  abandoned."  This  de 
cision  was  promptly  followed  by  a  general  order, 
putting  an  end  to  the  campaign,  and  directing  the 
army  to  be  placed  in  winter  quarters  ;  when,  to 
complete  the  gasconade,  a  flag  was  despatched  to 


i  Councils  of  war  are  famous  for  giving  bad  advice,  and  hence  the 
maxim  adopted  by  Eugene  and  Frederick,  that  the  General  who 
resorts  to  them,  seeks  only  an  apology  for  doing  nothing.  The  deci 
sion  in  this  case,  was,  however,  taken  on  a  different  principle  from  that 
assumed  in  the  preceding  maxim ;  it  arose  not  from  a  dislike  of  an 
efficient  course,  but  from  a  want  of  confidence  in  the  skill  and  vigor 
of  the  General. 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812.  113 

Fort  Erie,  requiring  an  immediate  surrender  of  that 
post,  and  its  garrison. 

The  temper  discovered  by  the  militia  and  volun 
teers,  on  this  termination  of  the  campaign,  was 
highly  insubordinate  and  disgraceful — the  General 
was  hissed  and  hunted  from  one  hiding-place  to 
another  ;  and  at  length,  compelled  to  fly  for  safety 
to  his  own  home,  in  Virginia.  In  noticing  this  cir 
cumstance  in  his  official  report,  he  says — "  It  has 
been  in  the  power  of  the  contractor's  agent  to  excite 
a  clamor  against  the  course  pursued.  He  finds  the 
contract  a  losing  one  at  this  time,  and  would  wish 
to  see  the  army  in  Canada,  that  he  might  not  be 
bound  to  supply  it."  Such  was  the  veil,  with  which 
he  endeavored  to  cover  his  own  follies  and  faults. 

During  these  occurrences,  the  main  army,  occupy 
ing  a  position  on  the  eastern  side  of  Lake  Cham- 
plain,  and  commanded  by  the  senior  Major-General 
in  person,  continued  to  slumber  on  its  arms,  though 
both  the  time,  and  the  policy  of  adopting  measures 
of  offence,  had  been  distinctly  indicated  by  his  own 
increasing  strength,1  by  the  continued  weakness  of 

i  On  the  26th  of  September,  1812,  there  were  within  district  No.  9, 
commanded  by  General  Dearborn,  13,000  men  of  all  arms.  On  the 
Niagara,  3,300  regulars,  and  3,000  volunteers  and  militia ;  at  Sacket's 
Harbor,  200  regulars,  and  2,000  militia ;  and  on  Lake  Champlain, 
3,000  regulars,  and  2,000  militia.  Throughout  the  campaign,  Pro 
vost's  regular  force,  covering  a  frontier  of  900  miles,  and  extending  from 
the  Sorel  to  Fort  St.  Josephs,  did  not  exceed  3,000  men.  See  Colonel 
Cochran's  statement,  Appendix  No.  13.  The  British  commander  was, 
of  course,  unable  to  occupy  the  Isle  aux  Noix,  during  the  campaign 
of  1812,  or  to  obstruct  the  roads  leaclino-  to  Montreal,  from  New- 

10* 


114       NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812. 

his  enemy,  and  lastly,  by  the  urgent  character  of 
the  orders  given  him, — "  not  to  lose  a  moment  in  at 
tacking  the  British  posts  in  his  front,"1 — yet  in  despite 
of  considerations  so  numerous  and  imperative,  no 
movement  of  any  kind,  in  the  direction  of  the  enemy, 
was  made,  till  the  20th  of  November  ; — and  what 
then  was  hazarded,  was  on  a  scale  so  small,  and  for 
an  object  so  unimportant,2  as  rendered  this  last  act 
of  the  campaign,  though  less  disastrous,  quite  as 
ridiculous  as  any  of  its  predecessors. 

Of  this  movement,  the  historian  of  the  war  in  the 
Canadas,  offers  the  following  details  ;  which  we  the 
more  readily  adopt,  because,  not  differing  materially 
from  those  given  by  our  own  functionaries,  they  dis 
tinctly  show  the  feeble  character  of  Provost's  out 
posts,  and  the  small  disposable  force  with  which  he 

York  and  Vermont.  Three  gun-boats  sent  out  from  England,  for  the 
defence  of  the  Sorel,  could  not  be  employed  for  want  of  seamen,  till 
June,  1813.  About  this  time,  a  small  re-enforcement  arriving  from 
New-Brunswick,  the  old  fortifications  on  the  Isle  aux  Noix,  were  re 
paired,  and  the  position  occupied  by  a  detachment  under  the  command 
of  Colonel  Taylor. — See  life  and  service  of  Sir  George  Provost,  and 
Christie's  History  of  the  War  in  the  Canadas.  At  any  time,  therefore, 
during  the  autumn  of  1812,  this  important  post,  emphatically  called 
the  key  of  Central  Canada,  might  have  been  seized  and  held  by  the 
American  General,  without  loss  or  risk  of  any  kind  ;  as  besides  abun 
dant  means,  strictly  military,  he  was  authorized,  about  the  middle  of 
October,  to  buy  and  equip  such  number  of  vessels,  as  would  secure  to 
the  United  States  a  decided  ascendency  on  Lake  Champlain  and  the 
Sorel. 

1  For  the  orders  given  to  General  Dearborn,  during  this  period,  see 
Appendix,  No.  14. 

2  This  mighty  object  was  the  destruction  of  a  blockhouse,  occupied 
by  a  small  party  of  Indians  and  Canadian  militia. 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OP    1812.  115 

was  able  to  sustain  them,  when  in  November,  1812, 
he  expected  the  attack  of  an  army  of  ten  thousand 
men. 

"  The  American  army  under  General  Dearborn," 
says  Mr.  Christie,  "  now  gradually  approached  the 
frontier  of  Lower  Canada ;  and  on  the  17th  of  No 
vember,  Major  Salaberry  (commanding  on  the  lines) 
received  information  that  this  army,  to  the  number 
of  ten  thousand  men,  were  advancing  to  Odletown. 
He  immediately  despatched  two  companies  of  Volti- 
geurs  and  three  hundred  Indians,  to  the  support  of 
Major  La  Force  ;  who,  with  two  companies  of  the 
embodied  militia,  formed  the  British  outposts  on  the 
La  Cole.  The  day  following,  Major  Salaberry  with 
the  remainder  of  the  Voltigeurs,  a  corps  of  Voyageurs, 
and  four  companies  of  Chasseurs,  advanced  to  the 
neighborhood  of  the  menaced  points.  By  this  time 
the  American  army  occupied  the  town  of  Champlain, 
two  or  three  miles  from  the  line,  and  a  serious  inva 
sion  was  now  momentarily  expected  ;  but  nothing 
of  any  consequence  occurred  till  the  20th,  when  be 
tween  three  and  four  o'clock,  A.  M.,  the  Americans 
were  discovered  fording  the  La  Cole.  The  guard 
house  was  soon  and  completely  surrounded  ;  when 
the  British  militia  and  a  few  Indians,  who  were  with 
them,  rushed  from  it,  broke  through  the  American 
line  and  escaped  unhurt.  In  the  meantime,  a  second 
party  of  the  Americans  now  advanced,  and  mistak 
ing  those  in  possession  of  the  ground  for  the  British 
picket,  a  smart  firing  between  the  two  ensued,  which 
continued  for  nearly  half  an  hour  ;  when  being  un- 


116      NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812. 

deceived,  they  united  and  hastily  retreated,  leaving 
behind  them  five  killed  and  as  many  wounded.  This 
party  consisted  of  one  thousand  five  hundred  infantry 
and  a  troop  of  dragoons,  commanded  by  Colonels 
Pike  and  Clarke  ;  and  with  the  main  body  of  the 
army,  soon  after  withdrew  to  winter  quarters."1 

REMARKS.  The  errors  which  signalize  the  close 
of  this  campaign  in  the  north,  are  numerous  and 
striking.  Those  of  Dearborn  and  Smyth  appear  to 
have  been  the  result  of  constitutional  defects — bar 
renness  or  inactivity  of  mind  in  the  one,  and  infirmity 
of  purpose  in  the  other ;  while  those  of  Van  Rens- 
selaer  were  obviously  sins  of  ignorance,  the  offspring 
of  that  deficient  knowledge,  which  every  man  must 
feel,  who  for  the  first  time,  and  without,  any  previous 
instruction,  finds  himself  at  the  head  of  an  army  and 
on  the  eve  of  a  battle.  Of  the  former,  any  new 
illustration  would  be  unnecessary,  as  they  have  been 
already  sufficiently  indicated  ;  while  of  the  latter,  a 
special  but  brief  notice  may  be  useful. 

I.  The  false  and  improbable  report  of  a  spy,  was 
made  the  groundwork  of  the  expedition.  "With 
practised  Generals,  the  credibility  of  spies  is  always 
doubtful,  and  never  confided  in,  unless  sustained  by 
some  collateral  evidence,  furnishing  a  strong  proba 
bility  in  its  favor."  In  the  present  case,  such  proof 
was  entirely  wanting ;  and  the  report  itself  expressly 
contradicted  by  the  fact,  that  the  complete  success 
of  Brock's  late  expedition  to  Detroit,  had  left  no  rea- 

1  Christie's  History  of  the  War  in  the  Canadas,  p.  90. 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812.  117 

sonable  motive  for  a  repetition  of  the  visit ;  and  the 
less  so,  as  the  hourly  augmentation  of  the  American 
army  in  his  front,  made  the  safety  of  the  British  posts 
on  the  Niagara  his  most  important  duty.  Notwith 
standing  these  obvious  considerations,  the  knowledge 
and  integrity  of  the  spy  were  taken  for  granted,  and, 
in  the  General's  opinion,  warranted  not  merely  an 
attack  on  Queenstown,  but  a  full  dispensation  from 
the  employment  of  all  military  rules  while  making  it. 

II.  "  Every  military  enterprise,  should  have  some 
useful  and  important  object."    Yet,  according  to  the 
General's  official  report,  his  views  were  limited  on 
this  occasion,  to  the  expulsion  of  a  small  British  de 
tachment  from  Queenstown,  and  the  occupation  of 
that  village  as  winter  quarters  for  his  troops — objects 
which,  if  attained,  would  have  little  if  any  influence 
on  the  progress  or  issue  of  the  war,  while  they  could 
not  fail  to  impose  upon  him  the  perils  of  defending 
throughout  the  winter,  an  open  and  unfortified  vil 
lage  ;  and  (what  would  be  worse)  the  absurdity  of 
placing  between  himself  and  his  resources,  a  wide, 
rapid,  and  unfordable  river. 

III.  The  troops  employed,  or  intended  to  be  em 
ployed,  on   this   service,   were  principally  militia  ; 
and,  therefore,  not  better  chosen  than  the  object 
itself.      Why   this  was  so,  is   a  problem,  not  yet 
satisfactorily  explained.     If  it  originated  in  an  esprit 
du  corps,  or  belief  of  militia  efficiency,  there  may  be 
some  color  of  excuse  for  the  error  ;  but,  if  as  re 
ported,  the  arrangement  was  made  to  gratify  the 
ambition  of  an  individual,  the  act  was  not  merely 


118       NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812. 

injudicious,  but  criminal.  At  the  period  in  ques 
tion,  there  were  at  the  General's  disposition,  more 
than  three  thousand  troops  of  the  line ;  from  whom 
a  corps  might  have  been  selected,  which,  if  well 
found,  equipped  and  commanded,  would  not  have 
been  either  beaten  or  baffled. 

IV.  "  If  it  be  necessary  to  pass  an  army  over  a 
large   and  rapid  river,  in  presence   of  an   enemy, 
demonstrations  should  never  be    omitted — provided 
the  extent  of  your  own  force  will  justify  detaching." 
That  General  Van  Rensselaer  had  at  this  time  a 
redundant  force,  will  be  seen  by  his  official  report ; 
yet  so  far  from  assigning  any  portion  of  it  to  this 
use,  he  was  even  careful  so  to  distribute  it  as  would 
have  completely  counteracted  this  intention,  had  it 
existed.     Colonel   Scott    and   his   artillerists,  were 
called  from  the  Falls,  and  Smyth  and  his  brigade 
from   Black   Rock — points,  where,  had   they  been 
left,  their  presence  would  have  kept  at  their  posts, 
the  garrisons  of  Erie  and  Chippewa,  and  thus  pre 
vented  their  co-operation  in  the  defence  of  Queens- 
town.  l 

V.  "  Every  officer,  charged  with  the  direction  of 
a  military  enterprise,  should,  before  commencing  it, 
assure  himself  that    the  means  necessary  for    the 
purpose,  are  provided  and  ready  for  use."     In  this 
case,  it  was  different,  as  we  have  seen,  that  neither 
boats,  oars,  nor  pilots,  had  been  assembled  in  suffi 
cient  numbers  ;  and,  (what  is  still  more  extraor- 

1  See  Appendix,  No.  12. 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812.  119 

dinary)  that  no  efficient  means  had  been  taken,  for 
ensuring  the  safety,  or  regulating  the  employment, 
of  such  of  these  articles  as  had  been  collected. 

VI.  "An  army  crossing  a  river  in  small  detach 
ments  and  consecutively,  exposes  itself  to  be  beaten 
in  detail,  by  an  enemy  much  inferior  to  itself" — 
another  and  important  maxim,  which,  on  this  occa 
sion,  was  forgotten  or  disregarded. 

VII.  The  place  selected  for  crossing  the  river, 
was  ill-judged.     "  A  sheet  of  eddies,  from  shore  to 
shore,"  as  described  by  the  General,  and  commanded 
by  two  of  the  enemy's  batteries,  could  not  fail  to 
aggravate  the  evil  of  the  preceding  error  ;  and  both 
multiply  and  increase  the  difficulties  inherent  in  the 
operation,  under  circumstances  the  most  favorable. 

VIII.  The  omission  to   ascertain,  previously  to 
the  adoption  of  the  project,  the  political  sentiments 
of  the  militia  on  the  question  of  invasion  ;  and  that 
of  not  promptly  recalling  the  advanced  corps,  after 
having  ascertained  that  point,  were  errors  of  great 
magnitude.     Both   measures  were   entirely  within 
the  General's  power,  and  had  they  been  adopted, 
would  either  have  prevented  the  enterprise,  or  have 
terminated  it  at  a  moment,  when,  by  the  death  of 
Brock,  and  the  flight  of  the  enemy,  we  should  have 
had  the  credit  of  a  victory,  instead  of  the  discredit 
of  a  defeat.     And  lastly,  nothing  could  be  more  ill- 
judged   than  the  attempt  made  to  withdraw   the 
corps,  after  it  had  lost  its  ascendency  in  the  field  ; 
and  when   the   means   necessary  for   passing   the 
river,  or  of  covering  the  retreat,  no  longer  existed. 


120  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812. 

Blunders  and  faults  like  those  we  have  been  em 
ployed  in  narrating,  could  not  fail  to  make  a  power 
ful  impression  upon  public  opinion.  With  such  of 
our  population  as  had  opposed  the  war,  they  became 
a  fruitful  source  of  ridicule,  and  augury  of  future 
and  greater  evils;  and  with  those  who  had  honestly 
and  zealously  advocated  it,  of  sorrow  and  humilia 
tion.  These  last  mentioned  feelings  were  not,  how 
ever,  unmingled  with  hopes,  that  a  second  campaign, 
under  better  auspices,  and  more  of  preparation  than 
was  permitted  to  the  first,  would  redeem  many  of 
its  errors,  and  demonstrate  that,  though  a  peace  of 
thirty  years  might  have  obscured  or  blunted  the 
knowledge  necessary  for  conducting  the  war,  it  had 
not  utterly  extinguished  that  spirit  and  aptitude  for 
military  enterprise,  which  so  eminently  characte 
rized  the  latter  stages  of  the  revolutionary  contest ; 
and  which  even  now,  began  to  display  itself  on  the 
ocean  and  the  lakes. 


NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812.       121 


CHAPTER  V. 

First  investment  of  Fort  Meigs. — Dearborn  and  Chauncey's  Expedi 
tion. — Reduction  of  York  and  Fort  George. — Chandler's  defeat  and 
capture  on  Stony  Creek. — Brerstler's  defeat. — Affair  of  Sacket's 
Harbor. 

WITH  the  exception  of  a  few  unimportant  combats 
on  the  St.  Lawrence,  between  Forsyth's  riflemen 
and  the  garrison  of  Prescott,1  the  first  military  move 
ments  of  this  year  took  place  in  the  west.  It  will 
be  remembered  that  while  Proctor,  after  defeating 
and  capturing  Winchester,  was  hastening  back  to 
Maiden,  to  escape  the  attacks  of  Harrison,2 — this 

1  On  the  6th  of  February,  Forsyth  with  two  companies  of  the  rifle 
corps  in  sleighs,  ascended  the  St.  Lawrence  from  Ogdensburg  to 
Elizabeth  on  the  Canada  shore,  surprised  the  British  guard,  made 
fifty-two  prisoners,  (among  whom  were  one  Major,  three  Captains  and 
two  Lieutenants,)  liberated  sixteen  deserters,  and  made  prize  of  one 
hundred  and  forty  muskets  and  a  considerable  quantity  of  ammunition, 
without  losing  a  man  of  his  party.     The  British  commander  at  Pres 
cott,  retaliated  this  blow  on  the  22d,  by  a  visit  to  Ogdensburg ;  drove 
Forsyth  out  of  the  place  (killing  and  wounding  about  twenty  of  his 
corps,  and  capturing  a  quantity  of  stores  and  provisions  and  six  pieces 
of  artillery)  with  the  loss  of  seven  rank  and  file  killed,  and  seven  offi 
cers  and  forty-one  privates  wounded. 

2  Proctor's  reasoning  on  this  occasion  was  sanctioned  by  military 
rules.     Could  it  be  supposed,  that  the  main  body  of  an  invading  army 
was  so  far  in  the  rear  of  its  advanced  guard,  as  to  be  unable  to  sus 
tain  it  ?     If  not,  the  circumstances  assumed  by  Proctor  were  exactly 
those,  in  which  Harrison  ought  to  have  been  found  on  the  23d  of 
January,  1813. 


122  NOTICES    OF   THE    WAR    OF    1812. 

last  mentioned  officer,  from  similar  apprehensions  of 
his  adversary,  after  setting  fire  to  his  stores,  baggage 
and  defences  at  the  Rapids,  retreated  hastily  to 
Portage  river.  The  delusion  under  which  this 
movement  was  made,  could  not  be  of  long  duration, 
and  actually  yielded  to  a  few  hours'  reflection  on 
the  many  embarrassments,  from  which  even  victory 
could  not  exempt  the  British  commander ;  severity 
of  weather,  roads  rendered  nearly  impassable  by 
snow,1  ranks  thinned  by  fatigue  and  battle,  prisoners 
to  be  guarded,  wounded  men  to  be  taken  care  of, 
and  though  last,  not  least,  the  imperative  character 
of  Indian  usages,  which  never  fail  to  demand  a 
debauch,  as  the  first  and  best  reward  of  valor  and 
victory.  Under  the  influence  of  these,  and  perhaps 
of  other  considerations  leading  to  the  same  conclu 
sion,  General  Harrison,  on  the  evening  of  the  24th 
of  January,  announced  to  the  government,  that  "  a 
few  days  would  enable  him  to  resume  and  defend 
the  position  he  had  left,  against  any  thing  Proctor 
could  bring  against  it."  Advancing,  accordingly, 
on  the  1st  of  February,  he  took  post  on  the  eastern 
bank  of  the  Miami ;  and  with  a  force  amounting 
nearly  to  two  thousand  men,  began  a  fortified  camp, 
to  cover  the  head  of  his  intended  operations.8 

Neither  these  movements,  nor  the  objects  at  which 

1  "  From  the  depth  of  the  snow,  those  on  foot  were  soon  exhausted ' 
— Harrison's  Report  of  Winchester's  defeat. 

2  The  General's  late  experience  had  taught  him  a  lesson  of  pru 
dence.    He  had  now,  also,  the  benefit  of  Colonel  Wood's  presence 
and  advice. 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812.  123 

they  aimed,  could  be  long  unknown  to  the  British 
commander ;  who,  to  defeat  the  latter,  assiduously 
employed  himself  in  organizing  a  corps  (British, 
Canadian  and  Indian)  which,  judging  from  past 
events,  would  be  competent  to  the  reduction  of  the 
American  camp,  either  by  direct  attack,  or  by  inter 
cepting  supplies,  coming  to  its  aid  and  necessary  to 
its  support.  Leaving  Maiden,  therefore,  on  the  22d 
of  April,  and  availing  himself  of  his  naval  means  to 
cross  Lake  Erie,  and  ascend  the  Miami,  he  on  the 
26th,  took  a  position  on  the  western  bank  of  that 
river,  and  there  began  the  construction  of  two  or 
more  batteries.  These  being  soon  completed  and 
mounted,  a  fire  commenced  on  the  30th,  of  sufficient 
vivacity  but  of  little  effect,  and  so  continued  until  the 
4th  of  May,  when  a  message  from  Brigadier  Clay, 
arriving  about  midnight,  announced  the  near  ap 
proach  of  twelve  hundred  Kentucky  militia,  coming 
to  the  support  of  the  garrison.  Under  this  informa 
tion,  the  American  General  immediately  determined 
to  risk  a  project  of  attack,  suggested  at  once  by 
the  dispersed  state  of  the  enemy's  force,  and  the 
incompetent  protection  given  to  his  batteries.  In 
stead,  therefore,  of  allowing  the  re-enforcement  to 
form  an  immediate  junction  with  the  garrison,  (as 
Clay  intended,)  he  directed  that  officer  to  debark 
eight  hundred  of  his  brigade  on  the  western  side  of 
the  river,  with  orders,  "  to  turn  and  take  the  two 
British  batteries  there,  spike  the  cannon,  destroy  the 
gun-carriages,  and  regain  their  boats  as  speedily  as 
possible  ;"  while,  simultaneously  with  this  move- 


124       NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812. 

ment,  "the  remainder  of  the  brigade  should  land 
on  the  opposite  shore,  fight  its  way  into  the  camp, 
and  thus  favor  a  sortie  to  be  made  by  the  garrison 
upon  the  third,  and  only  remaining  British  battery." 
This  plan,  no  doubt,  indicated  military  character, 
(combination  and  enterprise,)  and  was  only  objec 
tionable  from  the  confidence  it  reposed  in  a  militia, 
ignorant  of  the  art  of  war,  and  likely  from  personal 
habits,  to  be  as  insubordinate,  as  they  were  unskilful. 
Still,  the  first  steps  of  the  detachment  were,  if  not 
circumspect,  particularly  fortunate  ;  for  neither  its 
landing,  nor  its  approach  to  the  batteries,  was  seen 
or  suspected  by  the  enemy ;  and  so  utterly  uncov 
ered  were  their  redoubts,  that  Colonel  Dudley,  the 
officer  commanding  the  enterprise,  was  able  to  make 
himself  master  of  two  of  them,  without  losing  a 
man.  But  here,  good  fortune  and  discretion  alike 
abandoned  the  Colonel  and  his  followers  ;  for,  in 
stead  of  confining  their  attention,  as  ordered,  to  the 
destruction  of  the  enemy's  artillery,  and  the  security 
of  their  own  retreat,  they  inconsiderately  engaged 
in  a  bush-fight  with  a  few  straggling  Indians,  who 
thus  contrived  to  amuse  them,  until  Proctor  had 
time  to  interpose  a  strong  corps  between  them  and 
their  only  means  of  retreat.  The  result  was  such 
as  may  be  readily  imagined,  partaking  less  of  the 
character  of  defeat,  than  of  destruction  ;  for  of  the 
eight  hundred  combatants,  numbered  in  the  morn 
ing,  but  one  hundred  and  fifty  escaped  captivity  or 
slaughter. l  The  undetached  portion  of  Clay's  brig- 
l  Harrison's  Report,  dated  May  5th,  1813. 


NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812.       125 

ade,  (led  by  Colonel  Boswell,)  though  resisted  by 
the  savages,  effected  its  object,  with  little  of  either 
loss  or  annoyance  ;  while  a  detachment  from  the 
seventeenth  and  nineteenth  regular  regiments,  aided 
by  a  few  volunteers  and  militia,  gallantly  assaulted 
and  carried  the  battery  on  the  eastern  bank,  made 
a  number  of  British  soldiers  prisoners,  and  handled 
roughly,  such  Canadians  and  Indians  as  came  to 
its  support. 

Though,  on  the  whole,  the  fortunes  of  the  day 
were  such  as  furnished  the  enemy  with  pretensions 
to  a  victory,1  still  the  siege,  in  many  of  its  circum 
stances,  was  marked  by  facts,  which,  whether  con 
sidered  separately  or  together,  extinguished  in  the 
British  commander,  every  hope  of  eventual  success. 
No  part  of  his  calculations  had  hitherto  been  veri 
fied  ;  his  batteries  had  not  only  failed  to  make  any 
serious  impression  on  the  American  fort,  but  had 
all,  in  succession,  been  wrested  from  him  ;  and  were 
at  last,  but  partially  recovered  through  an  error  of 
his  enemy  not  likely  to  be  repeated.  His  allies, 
also,  were-  found  to  be  incompetent  to  the  service 
assigned  to  them  ;  they  neither  did,  nor  could,  so 
invest  the  American  camp,  as  to  intercept  or  even 
seriously  impede  the  junction  of  re-enforcements  ad 
vancing  to  its  aid  ;  and  at  last,  becoming  weary  of 
a  service,  little  adapted  to  their  personal  habits  and 
military  usages,  they  no  longer  disguised  their  inten 
tion  of  speedily  abandoning  it.  If  to  these  motives 


1  Provost's  letter  to  Lord  Bathurst,  14th  June,  1813. 
11* 


126  NOTICES    QF    THE    WAR    OF    1812. 

for  discontinuing  the  siege,  be  superadded  the  fact, 
that  information  of  General  Dearborn's  successful 
descent  at  York,  in  the  month  of  April,  had  already 
reached  the  British  camp,  we  cannot  wonder,  that 
Proctor  should  deem  it  prudent  to  abandon  all  fur 
ther  prosecution  of  his  designs,  and  regain,  as  quickly 
as  possible,  his  position  at  Maiden. 

But  to  this  course,  however  expedient,  physical 
impediments  had  now  arisen  :  his  artillery  being  of 
large  calibre,  could  not  be  transported  by  land  ;  and 
the  wind  blowing  strong  from  the  north,  prevented 
its  movement  by  water.  To  fill  up  the  pause  thus 
made  unavoidable  in  his  operations,  and  to  cover  at 
once  the  defeat  of  his  general  object,  the  retrograde 
movement  he  now  contemplated,  and  the  apprehen 
sion  excited  by  the  probability  of  Indian  desertion 
and  American  attack,  he  had  recourse  to  negotiation. 
The  form  given  to  this,  was  the  blustering  one  em 
ployed  against  Hull — affected  humanity,  ridiculous 
menaces,  and  insolent  demands.  Despatching  a  flag 
on  the  evening  of  the  5th,  he  required  the  immediate 
surrender  of  the  American  post  and  army,  as  "  the 
only  means  left  for  saving  the  latter  from  the  toma 
hawks  and  scalpiug-knives  of  the  savages."  Har 
rison's  answer  to  this  proposition  was  sufficiently 
manly  and  decided.  Considering  it  unworthy  of  a 
more  serious  notice,  he  but  adverted  to  its  folly,  and 
admonished  Proctor,  "not  to  repeat  it,"— thus  leav 
ing  to  his  adversary  the  choice  of  continuing  the  con 
test,  or,  failing  to  do  so,  of  virtually  acknowledging 
his  weakness  or  his  fears.  In  making  this  election, 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812.  127 

Proctor  did  not  hesitate  long  or  seriously ;  the  tone 
and  object  of  his  first  message,  were  immediately 
abandoned,  and  a  simple  proposition  for  an  exchange 
of  prisoners,  substituted  in  its  stead.  Bungling  and 
ill-disguised  as  these  expedients  were,  they  became 
to  the  enemy,  active  and  useful  auxiliaries  ;  and 
appear  to  have  effectually  concealed  his  real  pur 
poses,  until,  "  a  change  of  wind  and  a  general  move 
ment  in  his  camp,"  made  them  apparent  to  all.  But 
it  was  now  too  late  to  profit  by  the  discovery ;  at 
twelve  o'clock  the  whole  armament,  with  the  excep 
tion  of  the  Indians,  (who  had  gone  off  on  the  7th  and 
8th,)  was  found  embarking  and  rapidly  descending 
the  river. 

Harrison's  presence  on  the  Miami  being  no  longer 
necessary,  he  now  hastened  back  to  Sandusky  and 
Franklin  town,  to  organize  the  means  indicated  for 
prosecuting  his  part  of  a  new  plan  of  campaign, 
having  for  its  objects — 

1st.  The  reduction  of  Kingston  and  York  on  Lake 
Ontario,  and  of  forts  George  and  Erie  on  the  Ni 
agara  ;  and 

3d.  The  capture  of  Maiden,  and  recovery  of 
Detroit  and  the  Michigan  Territory.1 

In  prosecution  of  the  former,  two  modes  of  pro 
ceeding,  differing  as  to  time  and  means,  were 
prescribed  to  Major-General  Dearborn.  The  one, 
(founded  on  the  supposition  that  Kingston  might 
not  be  accessible  at  that  season  of  the  year  to  the 

i  See  Appendix,  No.  14. 


128       NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812. 

approaches  of  infantry  and  artillery,)  made  provision, 
that  the  movement  should  not  be  attempted  until  the 
navigation  of  the  lake  should  cease  to  be  impeded 
by  ice  ;  when,  by  a  joint  operation  of  the  fleet  and 
army,  Kingston,  York,  and  fort  George,  should  be 
attacked  in  succession,  and  in  the  order  in  which 
they  are  here  named.  The  other,  resting  on  the 
contrary  supposition,  that  no  important  impediment 
arising  from  snow  or  ice  would  obstruct  movements 
exclusively  military,  directed,  that  the  two  brigades 
wintering  on  Lake  Champlain,  and  amounting  to 
twenty-five  hundred  combatants,  should  be  placed 
in  sleighs,  and  moved  under  the  command  of  Colonel 
Pike,  by  the  most  eligible  route  and  with  the  greatest 
possible  rapidity,  to  Kingston  ;  where  (being  joined 
by  such  force  as  could  be  brought  from  Sacket's  Har 
bor)  they  should,  by  surprise  or  assault,  carry  that 
post,  destroy  the  shipping  wintering  there,  and  sub 
sequently  be  governed  by  circumstances,  in  either 
retaining  the  position  or  in  withdrawing  from  it." 

Though  neither  of  the  movements  prescribed  by 
these  views  of  the  subject  was  objected  to  on  the 
ground  of  any  great  or  unavoidable  difficulty  in  its 
execution,1  some  reports  of  the  increased  strength  of 
the  enemy,  and  of  an  intention  on  his  part  to  attack 

i  General  Dearborn's  letters  of  the  18th  and  25th  of  February.  In 
the  former  he  says,  "  Nothing  shall  be  omitted  on  my  part,  in  endeav 
oring  to  carry  into  effect  the  expedition  proposed ;"  and  in  the  latter 
he  adds,  "  Chauncey  has  not  returned  from  New- York.  I  am  satis 
fied  that  if  he  had  arrived  as  soon  as  I  had  expected  him,  we  might 
have  made  a  stroke  at  Kingston  on  the  ice ;  but  his  presence  was 
necessary  for  having  the  aid  of  the  seamen  and  marines." 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812.  129 

Sacket's  Harbor,  got  up  by  Provost  as  a  mere  ruse  to 
conceal  his  own  weakness  and  fears,1  were  unfortu 
nately  mistaken  by  both  the  Major-General  and  the 
naval  commander,  as  furnishing  sufficient  authority 
for  altogether  dispensing  with  the  movement  pro 
posed  to  be  executed  by  Pike ;  and  for  so  far  changing 
the  prescribed  order  of  proceeding  in  the  other,  as  to 
make  Kingston  the  last  object  of  attack,  instead  of 
making  it  the  first.* 

In  prosecution  of  this  inverted  plan  of  campaign, 
General  Dearborn  (embarking  sixteen  hundred  rank 
and  file  of  the  army)  sailed  from  Sacket's  Harbor  on 
the  25th  of  April,  and  on  the  27th  arrived  off  York, 


1  Provost,  alarmed  for  the  safety  of  his  western  posts,  prorogued  the 
legislature  on  the  22d  of  February,  and  set  out  hastily  for  Kingston. 
That  he  brought  no  troops  with  him,  and  even  took  from  Prescott  an 
escort  to  protect  him  in  what  remained  of  his  journey,  are  facts  well 
ascertained.     Yet  was  this,  and  other  similar  movements,  mistaken 
for  evidences  of  the  march  westward  of  large  re-enforcements.     See 
Appendix,  Nos.  16  and  17. 

2  "  To  take  or  destroy  the  armed  vessels  at  York,  will  give  us  the 
complete  command  of  the  lake.  Commodore  Chauncey  can  take  with 
him  ten  or  twelve  hundred  troops,  to  be  commanded  by  Pike ;  take 
York,  from  thence  proceed  to  Niagara  and  attack  fort  George  by 
land  and  water ;  while  the  troops  at  Buffalo  cross  over,  carry  forts 
Erie  and  Chippewa  and  join  those  at  fort  George,  and  thence,  collect 
our  whole  force  for  an  attack  on  Kingston.     After  the  most  mature 
deliberation,  the  above  was  considered  by  Commodore  Chauncey  and 
myself,  as  the  most  certain  of  ultimate  success." — General  Dearborn's 
Official  letter  to  the  War  Department.     President's  Message,  31s<  Jan 
uary,  1814.     To  this  change  of  plan  the  President  gave  his  approba 
tion,  from  a  belief,  that  "  being  on  the  spot,  the  General  and  Com 
modore  were  most  likely  to  be  possessed  of  the  information  which 
should  govern  in  the  case," 


130  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812. 

the  capital  of  Upper  Canada  and  the  headquarters 
of  General  Sheafe.  The  defences  of  the  place  were 
few  and  feeble,  composed  of  two  or  three  earthen 
redoubts,  four  hundred  regular  troops,  an  equal 
number  of  embodied  militia,  and  between  forty  and 
fifty  Indians. 

Positions  having  been  given  to  such  of  the  armed 
vessels  as  were  destined  to  cover  the  landing,  and 
take  part  in  the  attack  of  the  batteries,  the  debark 
ation  of  the  troops  began  about  8  o'clock,  A.  M. 
Forsyth  and  the  rifle  corps,  forming  the  head  of  the 
column,  were  the  first  to  make  the  experiment,  and 
after  much  effort  effected  a  landing  ;  not,  however, 
as  was  intended,  at  the  site  of  the  old  French  fort 
Toronto,  but  at  a  point,  more  than  a  mile  farther 
westward,  "thickly  covered  with  brush-wood,  and 
already  occupied  by  British  and  Indian  marksmen." 
In  the  contest  that  followed,  Forsyth  lost  some  men, 
but  no  credit ;  and  being  speedily  sustained  by  Ma 
jor  King  and  a  battalion  of  infantry,  and  soon  after 
by  the  presence  of  General  Pike  and  the  arrival  of 
the  main  body,  the  enemy  were  driven  from  one  po 
sition  to  another,  and  at  last  compelled  to  seek  shel 
ter  in  their  redoubts.  Of  these,  the  first  approached 
by  the  assailants,  made  little  resistance  ;  as  the  oc 
cupants,  perceiving  the  storm  that  awaited  them, 
made  haste  to  abandon  the  work.1  The  second, 
presented  an  aspect  of  more  firmness  ;  but  discon- 

i  The  Grenadier  company  of  the  sixteenth,  commanded  by  Captain 
Walworth,  was  proceeding  to  the  assault,  when  the  redoubt  was 
abandoned. 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812.  131 

tinuing  its  fire  suddenly  and  entirely,  Pike  concluded, 
and  not  unreasonably,  that  his  antagonist,  by  so 
acting,  sought  the  means  of  making  an  overture  of 
surrender ;  and  in  this  belief,  halted  his  troops  at 
the  distance  of  sixty  rods  from  the  battery,  when  a 
magazine  exploding,  burst  on  the  head  of  the  col 
umn,  spreading  its  mischief  far  and  wide  ;  killing 
and  wounding  more  than  two  hundred  men,  and 
creating  in  the  remainder,  much  temporary  alarm 
and  confusion.1 

Of  this  circumstance,  Sheafe,  the  British  comman 
der,  was  careful  to  avail  himself.  Collecting  what 
of  his  regular  force  remained,  arid  leaving  to  their 
own  resources  the  civil  authorities  and  embodied 
militia,  he  began  a  hasty  retreat  in  the  direction  of 
Kingston.  The  assailants,  who  in  the  meantime, 
had  re-established  their  order,  and  resumed  their 
inarch,  were  yet  in  a  condition  to  have  overtaken 
the  fugitives,  but  unfortunately,  their  gallant  leader 
had  fallen  a  victim  to  the  explosion  ;  the  General- 
in-chief,  was  yet  on  board  of  the  fleet  ;2  and  Colonel 
Pierce,  who  thus  fortuitously  became  the  command 
ing  officer,  being  wholly  uninstructed  as  to  the  orders 
or  views  of  either,  permitted  himself  to  be  amused 
by  proposals  for  a  capitulation,  forbidden  alike  by  the 

1  Sheafe  asserts,  that  the  explosion  was  the  effect  of  accident ;  and 
states  the  loss  sustained  by  the  garrison  in  consequence  of  it,  as  a 
proof  of  the  fact. 

2  Dearborn,  in  his  letter  of  the  28th  of  April,  says, — "  I  had  been 
induced  to  confide  the  command  of  the  troops  in  action  to  General 
Pike,  from  a  conviction  that  he  fully  expected  it,  and  would  be  much 
mortified  at  being  deprived  of  the  honor,  which  he  highly  appreciated." 


132       NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812. 

laws  of  war  and  the  policy  of  the  moment  ;  and 
thus  gave  time  to  Sheafe  and  his  followers,  not 
merely  to  effect  their  escape,  but  to  destroy,  as  they 
went  along1,  a  ship  of  war  on  the  stocks,  and  a  mag 
azine  of  military  and  naval  stores  in  the  harbor. 

The  defence  of  the  town  being  no  longer  practi 
cable,  a  surrender  necessarily  followed,  by  which  it 
was  stipulated,  that  the  militia  and  others  attached 
to  the  British  military  and  naval  service,  should  be 
paroled  ;  that  private  property  of  every  kind  should 
be  respected,  and  that  all  public  stores  should  be 
given  up  to  the  captors.  These  last,  according  to 
the  report  of  the  General,  consisted  of  an  "  immense 
depot  of  supplies,  military  and  naval,  and  a  sloop 
of  war  repairing  for  service."1  The  enemy's  loss  on 
this  occasion,  amounted  in  killed,  wounded  and  ta 
ken,  to  five  hundred  men ;  that  of  the  United  States, 
in  killed  and  wounded,  to  three  hundred  and  twenty. 

The  first  object  of  the  expedition  being  thus  ac 
complished,  the  troops  were  immediately  re-embark 
ed,  in  the  hope  that  they  would  be  able  to  proceed 
to  the  second  and  more  important,  without  loss 


i  Of  this  immense  dep&t,  we  hear  nothing  further  from  the  General, 
excepting  that  "  so  great  was  its  magnitude,  that  the  fleet  could  not 
carry  the  whole  away,"  a  fact  the  less  to  be  regretted,  as  what  they 
did  carry  with  them,  was  burnt  with  many  other  stores  at  Sacket's 
Harbor,  through  a  misconception  of  the  naval  officer  having  charge  of 
the  magazines.  Our  trophies  were  fewer,  but  better  taken  care  of. — 
One  regimental  standard  taken,  was,  (by  some  strange  confusion  of 
ideas,)  sent  to  the  Navy  department ;  and  one  human  scalp,  a  prize 
made,  as  we  have  understood,  by  the  Commodore,  was  offered,  but  not 
accepted,  as  a  decoration  to  the  walls  of  the  War  Office. 


NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812.       133 

of  time  ;  but  the  wind  becoming  adverse,  it  was 
not  till  the  8th  of  May,  that  they  arrived  off  fort 
George  ;  nor  until  the  27th,  that  they  were  suffi 
ciently  prepared  for  the  attack  of  that  post.1  At 
four  o'clock,  A.  M.  of  this  day,  the  batteries  on  the 
American  side  of  the  Niagara  being  ready  for  action, 
the  means  necessary  for  transportation  provided,  and 
a  considerable  re-enforcement  of  troops  drawn  from 
Sacket's  Harbor, — the  army,  (now  amounting  to 
nearly  six  thousand  combatants,)  began  their  move 
ment  in  boats,  along  the  lake  shore,  to  Two-Mile- 
Run,  the  point  designated  for  a  general  landing. 
When  abreast  of  this,  they  rested  on  their  oars,  till 
the  armed  vessels  had  severally  taken  their  covering 
positions,  and  the  signal  had  been  given  for  descent ; 
after  which,  resuming  the  movement,  they  pressed 
vigorously  forward  to  the  shore.  At  nine  o'clock, 
the  light  infantry  commanded  by  Colonel  Scott, 
effected  a  landing  ;  and  being  speedily  supported  by 
Boyd's  brigade,  and  a  well-directed  fire  from  the 
shipping,2  were  soon  enabled  to  surmount  the  bank, 


1  This  delay,  was  at  one  time  ascribed  by  the  General  to  some  sins 
of  omission,  on  the  part  of  Generals  Lewis  and  Winder, — and  at  an 
other,  to  the  late  arrival  of  the  fleet  from  York. 

2  In  Commodore  Chauncey's  report  of  this  affair,  he  says, — "  All 
the  vessels  anchored  within  musket-shot  of  the  shore,  and  in  ten  min 
utes  after  they  opened  upon  the  [water]  batteries,  they  were  com 
pletely  silenced  and  abandoned."     Again ;    "  The  enemy,  who  had 
been  concealed  in  a  ravine,  now  advanced  in  great  force,  to  the  edge 
of  the  bank,  to  charge  our  troops,  [when]  the  schooners  opened  so 
well-directed  and  tremendous  a  fire  of  grape  and  canister,  that  they 
[the  enemy]  soon  retreated  from  the  bank." 

12 


134  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812. 

break  down  the  enemy's  line  in  their  front,  and 
compel  its  scattered  parts  to  fly  in  the  direction  of 
Newark  and  fort  George. 

On  approaching"  these,  Vincent,  the  British  com 
mander,  finding  the  former  in  flames,  and  the  latter, 
nearly  if  not  altogether  untenable,  wisely  determined 
to  hazard  a  retreat  in  the  face  of  his  enemy  ;  and 
by  thus  deserting  his  post,  multiply  the  chances  of 
saving  his  garrison.  Fortunately  for  him,  a  contin 
gency  of  this  kind,  was  neither  provided  for  in  the 
original  plan  of  attack,  nor  by  any  subsequent  order 
given  on  the  field ;  and  would,  perhaps,  have  en 
tirely  escaped  notice,  had  not  Scott,  from  his  advanced 
position,  made  the  discovery,  and  deemed  it  his  duty, 
to  institute  and  continue  a  pursuit  of  five  miles ;  uoi 
merely  without  orders,  but  in  evasion  of  such  as 
were  given,  until  at  last,  a  mandate  reached  him,  of 
a  character  so  decided  and  peremptory,  as,  by  leav 
ing  nothing  to  discretion,  could  not  fail  to  recall 
him  to  fort  George. 

About  the  time  of  this  last  occurrence,  the  com 
manding  General,  who  had  now  landed  from  the 
fleet,  received  information,  that  Vincent,  re-enforced 
by  the  garrisons  of  Chippewa  and  Erie,  and  a  battal 
ion  of  the  eighth  or  King's  regiment,  had  determined 
to  risk  a  second  combat  for  the  defence  of  the  pen 
insula  ;  and  that  with  this  view,  he  had  called  in 
the  militia,  and  was  pressing  forward  to  occupy  a 
strong  mountain-pass,  called  the  Beaver  Dams. 

Though  much  of  this  information  was  unwar 
ranted,  by  any  thing  which  had  been  seen  of  the 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OP    1812.  135 

numbers,  condition,  or  order  of  the  retreating  troops, 
and  though  directly  contradicted  by  the  report  of  an 
officer  of  the  American  staff;1  still,  receiving  as  it 
did  the  entire  confidence  of  the  General,  an  order 
was  issued  "  for  renewing  the  pursuit  at  daybreak 
of  the  28th,  in  the  direction  of  the  Dams."  Of  this 
movement,  we  need  only  say,  that  it  resulted  in  dis 
appointment  and  mortification, — in  disappointment, 
because  on  approaching  its  object,  Vincent  was  not 
to  be  found;  and  in  mortification,  because  it  was 
now  evident,  that  the  report,  on  which  the  move 
ment  was  ordered,  was  a  mere  artifice  employed 
by  the  enemy,  to  put  the  army  of  the  United  States 
on  a  wrong  track,  and  thus  enable  Vincent  to 
anticipate  them  in  the  possession  of  Burlington 
heights  ;  "  a  position,"  without  which,  according  to 
his  own  statement,  "  he  could  neither  retain  the 
peninsula,  nor  make  a  safe  exit  from  it." 

Under  circumstances  thus  distinctly  indicating  the 
policy  of  the  enemy,  the  American  General  could  no 
longer  mistake  his  own.  We  accordingly  find  him 
recalling  the  army,  for  the  purpose  of  giving  to  their 
efforts  a  new  and  better  direction.  One  chance,  he 
said,  yet  remained — "  embark  the  troops  on  board 
the  fleet,  and  (should  the  winds  be  favorable)  they 
will  arrive  at  the  head  of  Burlington  Bay,  before 
the  British  can  reach  it;  and  we  shall  then  close 
the  campaign  successfully."  But  to  this  arrange- 

i  Letter  from  Major  Van  de  Venter,  A.  O.  M.  G.  to  the  War  De 
partment. 


,136       NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812. 

merit,  the  assent  of  the  naval  commander  was  not 
less  necessary  than  his  own  ;  and  though  on  the 
29th,  the  Commodore  saw  no  objection  to  the  plan, 
he  on  the  30th,  entirely  changed  his  opinion ;  and 
instead  of  lending  himself  to  a  co-operation  that 
would  in  all  probability  have  been  successful,  he  de 
cided  on  a  movement  principally  naval  in  its  object, 
and  altogether  useless  in  its  effects.1 

Deprived  as  the  General  now  was  of  the  aid  of 
the  fleet,  (which  in  his  opinion  furnished  the  last 
remaining  chance  of  excluding  Vincent  from  the 
heights  of  Burlington,)  he  was  necessarily  left  to 
choose  between  the  inaction  of  a  campaign  merely 
defensive  on  the  strait,  and  the  pursuit  and  attack  of 
the  enemy  amidst  the  mountain  gorges  and  defiles, 
iu  which  they  had  wisely  placed  their  safety.  Of 
these  alternatives^  he  on  the  1st  of  June,  adopted  the 
latter,  and  accordingly  despatched  General  Winder 
with  a  single  and  small  brigade,  amounting,  in  all 
arms,  to  somewhat  less  than  eight  hundred  com 
batants,  to  give  it  execution.  This  officer,  in  the 
progress  of  his  march,  was  not  long  in  discovering 
that  the  enemy's  force  was  more  formidable  than  had 
been  supposed  ;  and  very  properly  decided,  to  awrait 
at  Forty-Mile  Creek,  the  arrival  of  such  re-enforce 
ments  as,  on  a  representation  of  the  preceding  fact, 
the  General  might  think  proper  to  send  to  his  aid.a 

*  His  object  was  the  defence  of  his  naval  stores  and  the  new  ship  then 
on  the  stocks  at  Sacket's  Harbor— but  for  the  protection  of  neither 
did  he  arrive  in  time.     They  were  saved  by  Brown  and  the  garrison. 

*  Burns  reports  the  whole  force  (after  Chandler's  arrival)  at  one 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812.  137 

On  the  3d  of  June,  Brigadier-General  Chandler 
brought  up  a  second  brigade  ;  and  understanding 
that  Vincent  occupied  a  strong  camp,  eight  miles  in 
his  front,  which  he  was  every  hour  making  stronger, 
the  new  commander  determined  to  shorten  the  dis 
tance  between  them,  and  bring  him  to  action  as 
promptly  as  possible.  The  division  was  accordingly 
put  in  motion  in  the  direction  of  the  British  camp, 
arid  Stony  Creek  passed  by  the  American  advanced 
guard ;  between  which  and  an  out-lying  British 
picket,  a  skirmish,  of  short  duration  and  little  im 
portance,  ensued.  But  as  it  was  now  sunset,  the 
General  found  it  necessary  to  halt  for  the  night ;  and 
proceeded  accordingly  to  make  the  necessary  dispo 
sition  of  the  troops,  for  passing  it  in  safety.  Taking 
the  road  as  the  centre  of  his  line,  he  there  placed  his 
artillery,  supporting  it  on  the  right  by  the  twenty- 
fifth  regiment,  three  companies  of  light  infantry,  and 
one  of  riflemen ;  and  on  the  left,  by  the  fifth,  six 
teenth,  and  twenty-third  regiments.  Half  a  mile  in 
his  front,  was  posted  a  strong  picket,  and  similar 
guards  on  both  flanks  and  rear,  with  orders  to  send 
out  frequent  patrols.  In  addition  to  these  arrange 
ments,  the  thirteenth  and  fourteenth  regiments,  with 
Archer's  company  of  artillery,  were  stationed  near 
the  mouth  of  Stony  Creek,  (for  the  better  security 
of  the  boats  and  baggage  ascending  the  lake,)  and 

thousand  three  hundred  men ;  if,  therefore,  this  report  be  correct,  the 
force  originally  sent  did  not  exceed  eight  hundred,  nor  the  re-enforce 
ment  five  hundred. 

12* 


138       NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812. 

in  the  rear  of  the  whole,  was  posted  the  second 
regiment  of  light  dragoons.1 

While  Chandler  was  thus  employed  in  securing 
his  camp,  Vincent,  who  now  saw  that  to  retain  his 
present  position  (on  which  all  his  hopes  of  eventual 
success  depended)  another  battle  must  be  fought, 
was  deliberating  on  the  mode  most  proper  for  giving 
it  ;  and  having  found  by  a  careful  reconnoissance, 
made  early  in  the  evening,  that  his  enemy's  camp- 
guards  were  few  and  negligent ;  that  his  line  of 
encampment  was  long  and  broken  ;  that  his  artil 
lery  was  feebly  supported,  and  several  of  the  corps 
placed  too  far  in  the  rear  to  aid  in  repelling  a 
blow,  rapidly  and  vigorously  struck  at  their  front, — 
he  wisely  determined  to  hazard  a  night-attack,  in 
the  hope  of  effecting  by  surprise,  what  he  despaired 
of  being  able  to  accomplish  openly  and  directly. 

In  pursuance  of  this  plan,  the  British  column 
(seven  hundred  combatants)  began  its  march  about 
midnight ;  and  prosecuting  it  with  great  silence  and 
much  general  attention  to  order,  it  was  able  at  three 
o'clock  in  the  morning  to  surprise  and  capture  every 
man  of  the  American  picket,  without  giving  the 
slightest  alarm  to  the  main  body.  Nor  were  its 
subsequent  movements  less  judicious,  though  fortu 
nately,  much  less  successful.  Selecting  the  centre 
of  the  encampment  for  assault,  two  small  demon 
strations  (the  one,  made  on  the  extremity  of  the  right 

i  "This  corps  (the  dragoons)  lay  at  a  considerable  distance  from 
the  scene  of  active  operation,  as  you  will  perceive  by  the  enclosed  dia 
gram." — General  Lewis's  report,  l^th  of  June. 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812.  139 

flank ;  and  the  other,  on  that  of  the  rear  guard)  were 
mistaken  by  Chandler  and  Winder  for  real  attacks ; 
and  had  the  effect  of  producing  such  changes  in  the 
disposition  made  of  the  American  line,1  as  enabled 
Hervey,  at  the  head  of  the  forty-ninth  and  part  of 
the  eighth  British  regiments,  to  gain  the  rear  of  the 
artillery,  envelop  a  part  of  it,  and  make  prize  of  some 
pieces  of  ordnance,  three  tumbrils,  and  about  one 
hundred  prisoners — among  whom  were  found  the 
two  American  Generals. 

How  much  farther  the  mischief  might  have  been 
carried,  but  for  one  of  those  accidents  common  to 
night  movements,  can  only  be  conjectured.  Vincent, 
the  British  commander,  quitting  for  a  moment  the 
track  of  the  column  which  he  had  hitherto  followed, 
lost  his  way  ;  and,  as  is  not  unusual  in  similar  cases, 
every  effort  to  recover  it,  carried  him  further  from 
his  object.  It  was  not,  however,  until  after  Hervey's 
attack  had  succeeded,  that  he  was  missed;  when 
(having  been  sought  for  without  success)  it  Avas  not 
unreasonably  concluded,  that  a  fortune,  similar  to 
that  which  had  befallen  Chandler,  had  awaited  him.3 
Hervey,  finding  himself  in  this  new  and  unexpected 
situation,  prudently  determined  to  make  sure  of  the 
trophies  he  had  won  ;  and,  accordingly,  began  his 
retreat  under  cover  of  the  night,  leaving  to  his 
enemy,  the  care  of  his  wounded,  the  burial  of  his 

i  "  Hearing  a  firing  in  the  rear,  I  instantly  ordered  Colonel  Milton 
with  the  fifth, to  form  in  our  rear,  near  the  woods" — Chandler's  report. 

s  "He  was  found  the  next  day,  four  miles  from  the  scene  of  action, 
without  hat  or  horse." — Lewis's  Report. 


140  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812. 

dead,  and  one  hundred  privates  of  the  eighth  and 
forty-ninth  regiments. 

Though  at  daybreak,  the  American  army  was 
found  to  have  sustained  some  diminution  of  its  nume 
rical  force,1  still,  as  this  was  not  such  as  made  retreat 
either  necessary  or  expedient,  an  order  for  renewing 
the  pursuit  of  the  enemy,  was  both  desired  and  ex 
pected — but  as  the  capture  of  Chandler  and  Winder 
had  unfortunately  devolved  the  command  on  an 
officer  of  cavalry,  having  no  confidence  in  his  own 
capacity  for  directing  infantry  movements,2  a  coun 
cil  of  war,  to  whom  the  question  was  submitted, 
advised  "  the  immediate  retreat  of  the  army  to  Forty- 
Mile  Creek,  there  to  await  the  further  directions  of 
General  Dearborn." 

This  officer,  who,  from  ill-health  and  other  causes, 
had  uniformly  committed  the  direction  of  field-opera 
tions  to  subordinate  agents,  seeing  nothing  in  the 
circumstances  of  the  moment,  to  render  necessary  a 
departure  from  his  ordinary  practice,  satisfied  his 
sense  of  duty,  by  despatching  to  the  army,  General 
Lewis  and  the  sixth  regiment,  with  orders  to  bring 
the  enemy  to  action,  as  promptly  as  possible. 

This  new  commander  reached  his  destination  at 
five  o'clock,  P.  M.,  and  found  the  troops  encamped 

1  The  loss  of  the  American  army  in  this  action  was  small,  "  much 
less  than  that  of  the  enemy." — Report  of  Colonel  Burns. 

2  "  Had  either  of  the  Generals  remained  in  command,  or,  if  Colonel 
Burns  had  been  an  officer  of  infantry,  the  enemy  would  have  been 
pursued  and  cut  up." — Dearborn's  Report  of  June  the  Qth,  to  the  War 
Department. 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812.  141 

on  a  plain,  "  at  the  foot  of  a  perpendicular  mountain 
of  considerable  height,"  whence,  at  six  o'clock,  the 
British  fleet  was  discovered,  shaping  its  course  in 
the  direction  of  Vincent's  post; — a  circumstance, 
forbidding,  as  the  General  believed,  an  immediate 
movement  upon  that  officer,  and  making  it  proper 
that  the  American  army  should  retain  for  the  night 
its  present  position.  At  daybreak,  on  the  8th,  the 
hostile  armament  was  found  "in  a  dead  calm," 
about  a  mile  from  the  shore,  and  abreast  of  the 
camp ;  while  an  armed  schooner,  towed  forward  to 
a  station  favorable  for  the  purpose,  opened  a  fire  on 
the  American  baggage  and  boats,  drawn  up  on  the 
beach.  But  a  few  discharges  of  hot-shot,  soon  con 
vinced  the  British  commander,  that  the  experiment 
was  not  likely  to  turn  out  advantageously,  and  thus 
hastened  the  recall  of  the  schooner  to  the  fleet. 

It  was  under  these  circumstances,  by  no  means 
inauspicious  to  the  eventual  success  of  the  expedi 
tion,  that  an  order  was  received  from  General  Dear 
born,  directing  the  immediate  return  of  the  troops  to 
fort  George  ;  from  an  apprehension,  (founded  on  the 
appearance  of  two  British  schooners  apparently  em 
ployed  in  examining  the  shore,)  "  that  a  serious 
attack  on  that  post  was  meditated  by  the  enemy." 
This  ill-judged  order  was  scarcely  executed,  when 
it  was  found  that  the  "minute  examinations"  made 
by  the  British  schooners,  had  an  object  very  different 
from  that,  which  the  General  in  his  alarm,  had  as 
cribed  to  them.  Having  in  an  hour  or  two,  suf 
ficiently  ascertained,  "  that  no  American  vessels, 


142      NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812. 

remained  in  or  near  the  mouth  of  the  Niagara,' 
they  hastened  back  to  their  fleet ;  which,  after  land 
ing  the  supplies  and  re-enforcement  it  had  carried 
to  Vincent,  repaired  to  the  southern  side  of  the  lake, 
and  was  there,  (according  to  Provost's  statement  to 
Lord  Bathurst,)  "  usefully  employed  in  intercepting 
provision-boats,  going  to  fort  George."1 

The  tranquillity,  which  followed  the  preceding 
alarm  in  the  American  camp,  wras  unfortunately 
permitted  to  become  an  absolute  sleep  of  fourteen 
days;  of  which,  the  British  commander  was  careful 
to  avail  himself.  Advancing  his  main  body  (now 
re-enforced  by  a  battalion  of  the  hundred  and  fourth) 
to  Forty-Mile  Creek,  he  thence  pushed  forward  a 
party,  under  the  command  of  Colonel  Bishop,  "  to 
seize  and  fortify  such  mountain  passes,  as  would 
best  secure  his  own  position  ;  and,  at  the  same  time, 
so  circumscribe  the  range  of  the  American  troops, 
as  to  compel  them  to  live  on  their  own  resources."2 
In  pursuance  of  these  directions,  Bishop  began  by 
establishing  two  posts  on  the  lake  road,  and  one  on 
that  of  Queenstown  ;  the  garrisons  of  which,  with 
the  aid  of  preconcerted  signals,  could  be  readily 
brought  to  sustain  each  other. 

The  American  General,  awakened  at  last  by  a 
report  of  these  encroachments,  thought  it  expedient, 
on  the  23d  of  June,  to  despatch  Colonel  Bo3rstler,  at 
the  head  of  six  hundred  men  of  all  arms — dragoons, 


i  Provost's  letter  to  Lord  Bathurst,  3d  of  July,  1813. 
*  Idem. 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812.  143 

artillerists  and  infantry,  to  strike  at  the  Stone  House, 
(one  of  the  posts  established  by  Bishop,)  about  two 
miles  beyond  the  Beaver  Dams,  and  seventeen  from 
fort  George.  The  result  of  the  movement  was  such 
as  might  have  been  foreseen.  Bcerstler  was  per 
mitted  to  reach  the  Dams  without  annoyance,  but 
having  neither  reserve  to  sustain,  nor  demonstration 
to  favor  him,  he  was  surrounded  by  enemies,  to 
whom  (after  three  hours'  useless  fighting)  he  surren 
dered  himself,  and  his  party.1 

The  reader  will  recollect,  that  before  General 
Dearborn  thought  it  safe  to  attack  fort  George,  he 
withdrew  from  the  garrison  of  Sacket's  Harbor,  the 
whole  of  Chandler's  brigade,  and  six  companies  of 
Macomb's  artillerists,  serving  as  infantry — the  effect 
of  which,  with  the  absence  of  the  fleet,  left  the  post 
(important  as  it  was)  in  a  condition  decidedly  weak. 
Provost,  whose  public  duties  brought  him  to  Kings 
ton,  about  the  time  of  this  occurrence,  was  soon 
made  acquainted  with  it ;  and  believing  that  it  fur 
nished  a  favorable  occasion  for  retaliating  the  blows 
sustained  at  York  and  fort  George,  and  for  perma 
nently  settling  the  doubtful  question  of  naval  ascen 
dency  on  the  lake,  he  hastened  to  organize  an 
expedition,  having  for  its  objects,  "  the  capture  of 
the  harbor  and  naval  stores,  and  the  destruction  of 
the  new  ship  General  Pike,  then  on  the  stocks." 

Fortunately,  the  disposable  force,  under  the  direc 
tion  of  this  functionary,  was,  at  that  period,  not 

i  For  Bcerstler's  detailed  account  of  this  affair,  see  Appendix,  No.  24. 


144  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812. 

redundant ;  and  on  actual  muster,  could  be  made 
to  amount  to  but  seven  hundred,  rank  and  file.1 
With  this  small  force,  a  few  artillerists  and  two 
pieces  of  light  ordnance,  embarked  on  board  of 
small  vessels  and  convoyed  by  the  fleet,  the  British 
commander-in-chief  began  his  movement  on  the 
27th  of  May — "intending  to  reach  the  harbor  in 
the  night,  and  at  daybreak  in  the  morning,  to  as 
sault  and  cany  the  place  by  surprise."2  Retarded 
by  baffling  or  adverse  winds,  it  was  not  until  ten 
o'clock,  P,  M.  of  the  28th,  that  he  arrived  within 
striking  distance  of  his  object ;  and  then,  under  cir 
cumstances,  which  had  entirely  changed  the  rela 
tions  as  to  force,  previously  existing  between  himself 
and  his  enemy.  Unable  to  make  the  movement 
covertly,  as  he  had  expected  to  do,  some  of  even  his 
first  steps  were  discovered  by  the  younger  Chauncey; 
who,  while  hastening  back  to  his  post,  fired  signals 
of  alarm — which,  taken  up  by  the  guns  of  the  fort, 
and  thus  extended  to  the  country,  had  the  effect  of 
bringing  together  by  mid-day  of  the  28th,  six  hun 
dred  militia  in  aid  of  the  garrison ;  and  with  them, 
a  leader,  both  sagacious  and  intrepid,  who,  like 
Cincinnatus,  was  found  at  his  plough.3 

1  The  detachments  employed  in  the  attack  of  Sacket's  Harbor, 
were,  "  one  company  of  the  one  hundredth,  one  section  of  the  Royal 
Scots,  two  companies  of  the  eighth,  four  of  the  one  hundred  and  fourth, 
two  of  the  Voltigeurs,  and  one  of  Glengary  light  infantry,  with  two 
six-pounders  and  their  gunners." 

2  Bayne's  Official  Report,  May  30th,  1813,  and  "Life  and  Services 
of  Sir  George  Provost." 

3  General  Dearborn,  commanding  the  district,  Colonel  Backus, 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812.  145 

General  Brown,  the  person  of  whom  we  speak, 
having  a  perfect  knowledge  of  the  ground  on  which 
he  stood,  was  at  no  loss  to  discover  the  point  at 
which  the  enemy  would  attempt  to  disembark  ;  or 
the  route,  by  which,  after  landing,  he  would  endea 
vor  to  reach  the  forts.  His  dispositions  were  made 
accordingly;  to  the  volunteers  and  militia  forming 
the  first  line,  was  assigned  the  duty  of  meeting  and 
repelling  the  descent  of  the  enemy  from  his  boats  ; 
while  midway  between  the  shore  and  the  village, 
and  on  ground  made  difficult  of  approach  by  an  ab- 
batis,  was  placed  the  second  line,  composed  of 
regular  troops,1  amounting  to  four  hundred  com 
batants,  commanded  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Backus. 
Still  further  in  the  rear,  were  a  few  artillerists, 
charged  with  the  custody  of  the  forts,  which,  in 
the  General's  plan  of  defence,  formed  his  dernier 
resource. 

Such  was  the  disposition  made  of  the  small  Amer 
ican  force,  when  at  daybreak  of  the  29th,  the  enemy's 
fleet  was  seen  in  line,  between  Stony  Point  and 
Horse  Island ;  and  his  troops,  in  small  craft,  covered 
by  gun-boats,  making  for  the  southern  side  of  a 
sandy  ridge,  thrown  up  by  adverse  currents,  and 
occasionally  forming  a  causeway  between  the  island 

senior  officer  of  the  United  States  troops  at  the  Harbor,  and  Major 
Swan,  acting  Adjutant-General,  had  previously  united  in  urging 
General  Brown,  a  militia  officer  residing  in  the  neighborhood,  to  take 
the  command,  in  the  event  of  an  attack  on  the  post. 

i  Detachments  from  the  first  dragoons,  ninth  and  twenty-third 
infantry,  and  a  few  ai  tillerists. 

13 


146      NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812. 

and  the  main  land.  To  meet  this  movement,1  the 
volunteer  regiment  stationed  on  Horse  Island,  was 
promptly  withdrawn,  and  made  to  take  a  position 
on  the  shore,  adjacent  to  that  occupied  by  the  mi 
litia  ;  when  orders  were  given  to  both  corps,  "  to 
conceal  themselves  as  much  as  possible  ;  to  reserve 
their  fire  until  the  enemy's  approach  should  enable 
them  to  count  his  coat-buttons  ;  and,  if  driven  from 
their  ground,  to  rally  in  the  adjoining  wood,  attack 
the  enemy's  flank,  and,  if  unable  to  stop  him,  to 
retire  on  the  left  and  rear  of  Colonel  Backus's  posi 
tion,  and  there  await  further  orders."  Unfortunately, 
no  part  of  these  directions  was  complied  with.  A 
fire,  much  at  random  and  given  prematurely,  was 
followed  by  a  flight,  nearly  general,  of  both  parts  of 
the  first  line,  and  with  such  determination  to  avoid 
new  dangers,  that  every  attempt  at  rallying  either, 
proved  unsuccessful.2 

For  this  unmanly  and  unexpected  conduct  on 
the  part  of  the  militia  and  volunteers,  the  General 
found  himself  greatly  consoled  by  the  coolness  and 
courage  of  the  regular  troops,  who,  though  compelled 
to  abandon  their  first  position,  hastened  to  occupy 

1  "  It  was  my  intention  to  have  landed  in  the  cove,  formed  by  Horse 
Island  ;  but  on  approaching,  we  discovered  that  the  enemy  were  fully 
prepared,  with  a  very  heavy  fire  of  musketry,  supported  by  a  field- 
piece.     I  therefore  directed  the  boats  to  pull  round  to  the  other  side  of 
the  island,  where  a  landing  was  effected  in  good  order,  and  with 
little  loss."— Eayne>s  Report,  May  30th,  1813. 

2  General  Brown's  official  letter,  of  June  1st,  1813.     The  only  ex 
ception  to  this  conduct  in  the  militia  and  volunteers,  was  found  in  the 
parties  headed  by  Captains  McNitt  and  Collins. 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812.  147 

another,  which,  in  their  hands  became  impregnable; 
and  soon  brought  the  British  commander  to  the  con 
clusion,  that  "  the  reputation  and  interest  of  his 
Majesty's  arms,  would  be  best  promoted  by  an  im 
mediate  retreat."1  This  was  accordingly  ordered 
and  executed  ;  leaving,  as  was  his  custom,  his  killed 
and  wounded  on  the  field  of  battle,  as  new  subjects 
for  the  exercise  of  the  humanity  of  his  antagonist. 
On  this  fortunate  issue  of  a  business,  involving  so 
many  high  interests,  and  so  little  promising  in  the 
outset,  we  find  but  one  drawback — the  burning  of 
the  naval  stores,  storehouses  and  barracks — an  effect 
of  false  information,  imprudently  given  and  too  has 
tily  believed,  by  the  officer  charged  with  the  custody 
of  these  buildings. 

The  affair  of  Sacket's  Harbor  was  followed  by  an 
attack  of  similar  character  and  fortune,  on  Black 
Rock;  and  which,  though  having  little,  if  any  bear 
ing  on  the  progress  or  issue  of  the  war,  may,  not 
withstanding,  be  entitled  to  a  brief  notice.  Colonel 
Bishop,  commanding  the  elite  of  General  Vincent's 
division,  encouraged  as  well  by  the  diminished 
strength,  as  the  uniform  inaction  of  the  American 
army,  pushed  his  enterprise  onward  to  the  Niagara, 


i  "  At  this  point,  the  further  energies  of  the  troops  became  unavail 
ing  ;  the  block-house  and  stockaded  battery  could  not  be  carried  by 
assault,  nor  reduced  by  field- pieces,  had  we  been  provided  with  them. 
Seeing  no  object  within  our  reach,  that  could  compensate  for  the  loss 
we  were  momently  sustaining,  I  directed  the  troops  to  form  on  the 
crest  of  the  hill ;  and  from  this  position,  we  were  ordered  to  re-embark," 
— BayneJ  Report. 


148       NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812. 

and  finding  fort  Erie  without  a  garrison,  hastened 
to  re-establish  himself  in  that  post.  Being  now 
within  sight  of  Black  Rock,  and  informed  that  it 
was  the  depository  of  a  considerable  quantity  of 
public  stores,  he  determined  to  make  it  a  visit ;  and 
on  the  llth  of  June,  crossed  the  river  at  the  head 
of  two  hundred  and  fifty  men,  of  the  eighth,  forty- 
first,  and  forty-ninth  regiments.  The  militia  in 
charge  of  the  place,  and  nearly  as  numerous  as  the 
enemy,  being  non-combatants,1  withdrew  at  his  ap 
proach,  and  permitted  him  to  execute  his  purposes 
without  hindrance  or  molestation.  Having  at  last 
accomplished  his  objects,  spiked  the  heavy  cannon, 
carried  off  the  light  ones,  loaded  his  boats  with  flour 
and  salt,  and  burned  to  the  ground,  both  barracks 
and  block-houses,  he  withdrew  to  the  shore,  with 
the  intention  of  embarking  himself  and  his  party, 
when  he  discovered,  that  he  had  yet,  like  Caesar  at 
Munda,  to  fight  for  his  life. 

A  report  of  the  predatory  character  of  the  expe 
dition,  spreading  rapidly  through  the  country,  had 
the  effect  of  assembling  at  Buffalo,  about  one  hun 
dred  and  fifty  United  States  infantry,  as  many  militia 
and  a  few  Indians,  who  immediately  set  out  to  re 
capture  the  public  stores,  and  punish  the  invaders 
of  the  soil.  For  the  first  of  these  purposes,  their 
arrival  was  too  late — the  plunder  having  been  al- 


1  An  effect  of  the  eastern  doctrine  (on  the  causes  and  character  of 
the  war)  industriously  circulated  in  the  northern  and  western  frontiers 
of  New- York. 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812  149 

ready  secured ;  but  for  the  last,  it  was  yet  in  good 
time,  and  after  a  contest  made  as  brief  by  the  fall 
of  Bishop,  as  it  had  been  vigorous  while  he  lived, 
the  British  party  was  compelled  to  fly  to  their  oars 
and  recross  the  river;  leaving  behind  them  nine  of 
their  number  killed  and  fifteen  wounded.  At  ether 
points,  the  enemy  pursued  his  purposes  with  better 
effect ;  and  at  last,  virtually  reduced  fort  George 
from  a  fortress,  into  a  prison,  with  limits,  little,  if  at 
all  exceeding  the  range  of  its  cannon. 

To  account  for  a  state  of  things  so  unexpected, 
and  falling  so  far  short  of  the  promises  held  out  by 
the  General  and  the  naval  commander,  when  they 
began  the  expedition,  we  subjoin  the  following  ex 
tract  from  an  official  despatch  of  the  former,  of  the 
20th  of  June.  "  From  resignations,  sickness,  and 
other  causes,  the  number  of  regimental  officers  pres 
ent  and  fit  for  duty,  is  far  below  what  the  service  re 
quires.  A  considerable  portion  of  the  army  being  new 
recruits,  and  the  weather  very  unfavorable  to  health, 
the  sick  have  become  so  numerous,  in  addition  to 
the  wounded,  as  to  reduce  the  effective  force  far 
below  what  could  have  been  contemplated.  The 
enemy  have  been  re-enforced  with  about  five  hun 
dred  men  of  the  one  hundred  and  fourth  regiment ; 
whence  I  conclude,  that  he  will  endeavor  to  keep 
up  such  a  plan,  at,  and  near  the  head  of  the  lake, 
as  will  prevent  any  part  of  our  force  in  this  quarter 
from  joining,  or  proceeding  to  Sacket's  Harbor,  for 
the  purpose  of  attacking  Kingston  ;  and  such  is  the 
state  of  the  roads  in  this  flat  country,  in  consequence 
13* 


150      NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812. 

of  continual  rains,  as  to  render  any  operations  against 
the  enemy  extremely  difficult,  without  the  aid  of  a 
fleet,  for  the  transportation  of  provisions,  ammunition 
and  other  necessary  supplies.  The  enemy  would 
probably  retreat  on  our  approach  and  keep  out  of 
our  reach,  being  covered  by  one  or  more  armed 
vessels.  The  whole  of  these  embarrassments  have 
resulted  from  a  temporary  loss  of  the  command  of 
the  lake."  l 

The  accounts  of  the  General's  health,  were  not 
more  encouraging  than  that  given  of  the  condition 
of  the  army.  In  a  letter  of  the  4th  of  June,  he  says, 
— "  I  am  still  very  feeble,  and  gain  strength  very 
slowly."  June  the  6th,  "  I  never  so  severely  felt 
the  want  of  health  as  at  present ;  a  time  when  my 
services  might  perhaps  be  most  useful."  June  the 
8th,  "My  ill  state  of  health  renders  it  extremely  pain 
ful  to  attend  to  current  duties,  and  unless  it  improves 
soon,  I  fear  I  shall  be  compelled  to  retire  to  some 
place  where  my  mind  may  be  more  at  ease."  June 
the  14th,  "General  Dearborn,  from  indisposition,  has 
resigned  the  command, — not  only  of  the  Niagara 
army,  but  of  the  district.  I  have  doubts  whether  he 
will  ever  again  be  fit  for  service."2  "As  the  Gen 
eral  is  unable  to  write,  1  am  directed  to  inform  you, 
that  in  addition  to  the  debility  and  fever  he  has  been 
afflicted  with,  he  has,  within  the  last  twenty-four 
hours,  experienced  a  violent  spasmodic  attack  on  his 

1  General  Dearborn's  letter  to  the  War  Department,  of  the  20th  of 
June,  1813. 

2  General  Lewis's  letter  of  the  14th  of  June,  to  the  Secretary  of  War. 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812.  151 

breast,  which  has  obliged  him  to  relinquish  business 
altogether."1 

It  cannot  be  thought  extraordinary,  that  under 
circumstances  so  alarming,  as  well  in  relation  to  the 
General  as  to  the  troops,  an  order  should  have  issued 
on  the  6th  of  July,  recalling  the  former  from  the 
command  of  the  district  ;2  and  enjoining  on  his  suc 
cessor,  "  not  to  prosecute  any  offensive  operation, 
until  our  ascendency  on  the  lake  was  re-established." 

REMARKS.  We  have  seen  that,  by  the  plan  of 
campaign  prescribed  to  General  Dearborn,  Kingston 
was  made  the  first  object  of  attack  ;  after  which  (if 
successful)  the  army  should  proceed  to  the  reduction 
of  York,  fort  George  and  fort  Erie.  This  arrange 
ment,  so  far  as  regarded  the  order  of  attack,  was 
recommended  by  considerations  the  most  decisive  ; 
inasmuch,  as  the  capture  of  the  first  named  of  these 
posts,  would  have  involved  that  of  the  British  fleet, 
(then  frozen  up  in  its  harbor;)  the  entire  separation 
of  Lower  from  Upper  Canada  ;  the  necessary  fall  of 
all  military  and  naval  armaments  within  the  latter, 

1  Letter  from  Colonel  Connor,  Aid-decamp  of  General  Dearborn, 
of  June  the  12th,  to  the  Secretary  of  War. 

2  This  act  of  the  Executive  authority,  originated  with  that  portion 
of  the  House  of  Representatives  most  active  and  influential  in  support 
ing  the  war  ;  who,  believing  that  habitual  ill-health  on  the  part  of  the 
General,  disqualified  him  from  such  a  discharge  of  his  duty  as  the 
exigencies  of  the  service  required,  deputed  Messrs.  Clay  and  Ingersoll 
to  represent  their  views  on  the  subject  to  the  President     Mr.  Monroe 
became  the  medium  of  communication  between  these  gentlemen,  and 
Mr.  Madison,  coinciding  in  their  opinion,  soon  after  directed  the  Gen 
eral's  recall. 


152  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812. 

and  a  speedy  termination  of  the  Indian  war  in  the 
west — advantages  not  to  be  expected  from  the  most 
successful  operations  against  York,  fort  George,  or 
fort  Erie. 

Nor  will  it  appear  that  on  receiving  this  order,  the 
General  put  a  different  estimate  on  the  practicability 
of  the  project,  or  on  the  value  and  importance  of  the 
objects  it  presented.  In  his  letter  of  the  18th  of 
February,  he  says — "Nothing  shall  be  omitted  on 
my  part,  in  endeavoring  to  carry  into  effect  the  ex 
pedition  proposed ;"  and  in  that  of  the  25th  lie  adds, 
"Chauncey  has  not  yet  returned  from  New- York  ; 
if  he  had  arrived  as  soon  as  I  expected  him,  we 
might  have  made  a  stroke  at  Kingston  on  the  ice  ; 
but  his  presence  was  necessary  for  having  the  aid 
of  the  marines  and  seamen."1  Unfortunately,  this 
coincidence  of  views  between  the  government  and 
the  General  was  of  short  duration.  On  the  3d  of 
March,  be  became  "  satisfied,  on  information,  (as  he 
declared,)  entitled  to  full  credit,  that  a  force  had  been 
collected  from  Quebec,  Montreal  and  Upper  Canada, 
of  from  six  to  eight  thousand  men,  at  Kingston;  and 
that  an  attack  would  be  made  on  Sacket's  Harbor 
within  forty-eight  hours,  perhaps  sooner."  Again, 
on  the  9th,  (though  then  -entertaining  doubts  whether 

1  What  an  extraordinary  reason  to  be  given  by  the  commanding 
General  of  an  army  and  district,  (of  which  Sacket's  Harbor  made 
a  part,)  for  omitting  to  execute  an  order  directly  emanating  from  the 
President  of  the  United  States !  Did  Mr.  Chauncey  leave  the  fleet 
without  a  commander  de  facto  ?  And  if  not,  what  rendered  his  au 
thority  over  seamen  and  marines  less  efficient  than  that  of  the  Com 
modore. 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812.  153 

Provost  would  hazard  an  attack,)  he  announces  to 
the  government,  that  "this  unexpected  movement 
of  the  enemy,  would  effectually  oppose  the  measures 
contemplated  on  our  part."  And  in  conformity  with 
this  desponding  view  of  the  subject,  a  council  of  war, 
held  on  the  15th  of  March,  decided,  that  "no  attempt 
upon  Kingston  should  be  made  before  the  naval  force 
could  act ;"  or,  in  other  words,  before  the  lake  was 
navigable  ; — a  decision,  which,  besides  putting  an 
end  to  Pike's  expedition  on  the  ice,  gave  to  Provost 
all  he  wanted — an  entire  month  to  strengthen  his  de 
fences,  and  a  thaw,  to  restore  Yeo  and  his  fleet  to  their 
ordinary  activity  and  usefulness.  After  thus  demol 
ishing  the  most  important  part  of  the  plan  of  cam 
paign,  it  was  not  to  be  expected  that  what  remained 
of  it  would  be  treated  with  more  ceremony.  "  To 
take,"  says  the  General,  "or  destroy  the  armed  ves 
sels  at  York,  will  give  us  the  complete  command  of 
the  lake.  Commodore  Chauncey  can  take  with  him 
ten  or  twelve  hundred  troops,  to  be  commanded  by 
Pike  ;  take  York,  from  thence  proceed  to  Niagara 
and  attack  fort  George  by  land  and  water,  while  the 
troops  at  Buffalo  cross  over  and  carry  forts  Erie  and 
Chippewa  and  join  those  at  fort  George,  and  then 
collect  our  whole  force  for  an  attack  on  Kingston. 
After  the  most  mature  deliberation,  the  above  was 
considered  by  Commodore  Chauncey  and  myself  as 
the  most  certain  of  ultimate  success."1 

i  Of  this  plan,  we  have  the  following  estimate  by  General  Pike 
and  others.  "  The  opinion  of  General  Pike,  founded  on  a  knowledge 
of  General  Dearborn's  intended  movements,  is,  that  our  country  Ls 


154      NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812. 

It  will  not  be  easy,  perhaps  impossible,  to  give  any 
sufficient  reason  for  the  course  thus  recommended, 
and  eventually  adopted,  by  the  two  commanders.  If 
they  continued  to  believe,  that  Provost  had  assem 
bled  from  "six  to  eight  thousand  men  at  Kingston, 
for  the  express  purpose  of  attacking  and  destroying 
Sacket's  Harbor,"  as  stated  by  the  General  in  his 
despatch  of  the  3d  of  March — what  could  justify  a 
project  on  their  part,  which  would  necessarily  ab 
stract  a  large  portion  of  the  military  and  the  whole 
of  the  naval  force,  from  this  menaced  point  1  If,  on 
the  other  hand,  they  had  ceased  to  give  credit  to  a 
fable  so  absurd,  (which  is  most  probable,)  and  had 
returned  to  the  opinion,  that  "  the  garrison  of  Kings 
ton  was  weak,"1  why  not  return  also  to  the  intention 
of  carrying  the  attack  on  that  important  post,  and 
thus  have  fulfilled  the  original  plan  of  campaign  1 

It  now  but  remains  for  us  to  show,  that  the  infor 
mation  taken  by  the  General  as  the  guide  of  his 
opinions  and  conduct  on  this  occasion,  was  wholly 
unfounded.  Our  proofs  on  this  head  are,  I.  "That 
Provost,  on  arriving  at  Prescott,  borrowed  from  that 
post  an  escort  of  soldiers,  to  prevent  his  being  kid 
napped  on  his  way  to  Kingston"2 — a  fact,  utterly  in- 

again  doomed  to  defeat,  if  the  operations  now  meditated  by  the  Gen 
eral  are  attempted  to  be  accomplished.  The  opinion  is  also  prevalent 
with  the  best  officers,  that  no  conquest  of  character  will  be  made,  if 
your  plans  of  invasion  be  subject  to  the  continual  wavering  of  the 
commanding  General." — Letter  from  Major  Van  de  Venter,  D.  Q.M.  G., 
of  the  3lst  March,  1813,  to  the  Secretary  of  War. 

1  General  Dearborn's  letter  of  the  14th  of  February,  1813. 

2  Christie's  History  of  the  War  in  the  Canadas,  p.  J01. 


NOTICES   OF    THE   WAR   OF    1812.  155 

consistent  with  the  story  of  his  having  brought  with 
him,  large  detachments  from  Quebec  and  Montreal  j1 
2d,  that  Proctor,  Barclay,  Vincent,  and  Sheafe,  so  far 
from  being  in  a  condition  to  yield  any  aid  to  the 
supposed  project  of  an  attack  on  Sacket's  Harbor, 
were  themselves  in  great  want  of  re-enforcements — 
the  former,  postponing  on  that  account,  an  attack 
which  he  had  been  ordered  to  make  on  Perry's  fleet, 
while  fitting  out  at  Presque  Isle  ;2  3d,  that  when  late 
in  the  month  of  May,  the  British  commander-in-chief 
(induced  by  the  continued  absence  of  the  American 
fleet  and  army  at  the  head  of  the  lake)  made  an 
attack  on  Sacket's  Harbor,  he  was  unable  to  bring 
against  that  post,  more  than  seven  hundred  combatants, 
— a  conduct,  utterly  unaccountable  in  an  old  soldier, 
having  at  his  disposition  a  corps  of  either  six  or  eight 
thousand  men  ;  4th,  that  the  maximum  of  the  British 
regular  force  at  Kingston,  in  1813,  was  one  thousand 
men — a  fact  ascertained  by  the  late  Major-GeneraJ 
Brown  during  the  war,  and  subsequently,  on  a  visit  to 
that  place.3  And  lastly,  that  Sheafe 's  papers,  taken 
at  York  and  examined  by  the  late  Colonel  Connor, 
Aid-decamp  to  General  Dearborn,  "  showed  satisfac 
torily,  that  the  garrison  of  Kingston,  during  the  winter 
and  spring  of  1813,  was  weak,  and  much  below  the 
force  necessary  to  its  defence."* 

1  Christie's  History  of  the  War  in  the  Canadas,  p.  101. 

2  Letters   of  Prevost  and  De  Rottenburg  to  Proctor  and  Barclay, 
Appendix,  No.  19. 

3  Appendix,  No.  16. 

4  Appendix,  No.  17. 


156  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812. 

II.  The  error  next  in  date,  as  well  as  in  magni 
tude,  was  that  of  omitting  to  make  any  competent 
provision  for  preventing  the  escape  of  the  two  British 
garrisons,  the  one  from  York,  the  other  from  fort 
George  ;  an  object,  which,  had  it  been  accomplished, 
would  have  given  us  a  complete  command  of  the 
peninsula,  and  necessarily  prevented  those  blunders 
and  misfortunes,  the  occurrence  of  which,  so  com 
pletely  verified  the  prediction  of  the  much  and  justly 
lamented  Pike. 

Had  the  commander-in-chief  in  the  first  of  the 
above  mentioned  cases,  been  on  the  field  of  battle  or 
near  it,  or  had  he  made  Colonel  Pierce  acquainted 
with  the  orders  given  to  Pike,  (as  he  ought  to  have 
done,)  the  unnecessary  delay  made  in  the  pursuit  of 
the  enemy  would  not  have  occurred  ;  and  in  this 
case,  Sheafe  and  his  followers  would,  in  all  proba 
bility,  have  been  overtaken  and  captured.  Again, 
in  the  other  case,  if,  instead  of  concentrating  his 
whole  force,  naval  and  military,  on  the  water-side 
of  the  enemy's  defences,  he  had  divided  the  attack, 
and  made  Chandler's  brigade,  Macomb's  regiment, 
and  Burns's  cavalry,  with  a  few  pieces  of  artillery, 
cross  the  Niagara  below  Lewistown,  and  advance 
on  fort  George  by  the  Queenstown  road,  the  invest 
ment  of  that  place  would  have  been  complete,  and 
a  retreat  of  the  garrison  impracticable.  That  this 
important  duty  should  have  escaped  the  General's 
notice  is  the  more  extraordinary,  as  the  Secretary  of 
War,  in  a  letter  of  the  15th  of  May,  1813,  had  suf 
ficiently  apprised  him  of  what  would  be  the  obvious 


NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812.       157 

policy,  and  probable  conduct  of  his  adversary,  should 
he  find  himself  compelled  to  choose,  between  giving 
up  his  fortress,  or  saving  his  garrison.1 

III.  To  correct   the  preceding  error,  the   army 
was  ordered  to  march  on  the  28th,  to  the  Beaver 
Dams,  in  the  belief  that  Vincent,  after  calling  in  his 
outposts,  would  make  a  stand  at  that  point ;  but, 
unfortunately,   though  the   pursuit  was  right,   the 
direction  given  to  it  was  wrong.     Of  the  two  routes 
in  the  General's  choice,  that  known  by  the  name  of 
the  Lake-road,  would  have  placed  him  two  miles  in 
Vincent's  front ;  and  would  of  course,  have  compelled 
that  officer  (had  he  committed  the  blunder  ascribed 
to  him)  to  fight  a  battle,  with  a  force  greatly  supe 
rior  to  his  own,  when,  on  the  contrary,  if  approached 
by  the  Queenstown  route,  a  direct  and  uninterrupted 
retreat  would  have  been  left  open  to  him. 

IV.  The  effect  of  this   false   movement,  besides 
unnecessarily  trying  the  strength  and  patience  of  the 
troops,  was  the  loss  of  two  entire  days  to  the  pur 
suit.     Two   others  (the   army  being  now  recalled 
to  fort  George)  were  given  to  the  consideration  of 
some  expedient,  which  should  best  indemnify  us  for 
the  time  and  labor  thus  thrown  away.     The  Gene 
ral's  own  wish,  was  to  avail  himself  of  the  fleet,  to 
carry  the   army  to  Burlington  Bay  ;  but  the  high 
destiny  of  that  arm,  on  this,  as  on  a  later  occasion, 
gave  it  a  different  and  less  useful  direction.     Left, 
therefore,  without  a  choice  of  measures,  he  at  last 
adopted  one,  (a  march  on  the  enemy  by  the  Lake- 

i  Appendix,  No.  18. 
14 


158  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812. 

road,)  which  ought  to  have  been  taken  at  daybreak 
of  the  28th.  But  here,  the  General  defeated  the 
wisdom  of  his  own  decision  by  the  means  employed 
to  execute  it ;  for,  instead  of  sending  a  force  com 
petent  to  the  service  required,  he  on  the  1st  of  June, 
under  some  extraordinary  delusion,  despatched  only 
a  single  and  small  brigade  to  combat  a  force,  which, 
according  to  his  own  estimate  on  the  28th  of  May, 
required  the  presence  and  co-operation  of  nearly  the 
whole  army. 

V.  Doubting,  at  last,  the  sufficiency  of  Winder's 
brigade,  the  General  on  the  3d  of  June,  despatched 
a  second,  which,  with  its  precursor,  reached  Stony 
Creek  in  the  evening  of  the  5th,  when  it  was  de 
cided  that  the  army  should  halt  for  the  night. 
Chandler,  who  was  now  the  leader  of  the  enter 
prise,  finding  himself  but  six  miles  from  the  enemy, 
concluded,  and  not  unreasonably,  that  if  Vincent 
intended  to  give  battle,  he  would  make  the  attempt 
during  the  ensuing  night;  and  under  this  impres 
sion,  hastened  to  call  into  exercise  all  his  general 
ship  to  meet  that  contingency.  Pickets  were  ac 
cordingly  placed  in  front,  and  rear,  and  on  both 
flanks  ;  while  a  chain  of  sentinels  encircled  the 
camp.  Yet,  with  all  these  precautions,  the  camp 
was  surprised,  a  portion  of  its  artillery  taken,  and 
one  hundred  prisoners  made,  among  whom,  were 
the  two  Brigadiers.  A  misfortune  like  this,  mus* 
have  had  a  cause,  or  causes,  worth  inquiring  into  , 
with  regard  to  which,  we  offer  the  following  sug 
gestions  : — • 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812.  159 

1st.  "  If  a  General  take  a  position  in  the  neigh 
borhood  of  an  enemy,  from  whom  a  night-attack 
may  be  expected,  his  first  care  ought  to  be,  to  keep 
his  force  together,  and  so  placed,  that  its  several 
parts  may  be  promptly  brought  to  sustain  each 
other."  This  maxim  does  not  appear  to  have  been 
sufficiently  attended  to.  The  thirteenth  and  four 
teenth  regiments,  composing  the  boat  and  baggage 
guard,  were  stationed  three  miles  from  the  encamp 
ment;  and  the  cavalry  so  placed  as  to  be  unable  to 
act.1  Why  the  position  given  to  the  boat-guard, 
had  not  been  taken  as  the  ground  of  encampment 
for  the  whole  detachment,  is  not  very  apparent ;  for 
here,  besides  the  advantages  of  concentration,  the 
General  would  have  found  himself  three  miles  nearer 
his  object  ;  on  the  very  route,  by  which  he  intended 
moving  in  the  morning;  and  with  flanks  and  rear, 
well  secured  by  the  lake  and  the  creek,  against  the 
night-attack  he  expected. ? 

2d.  "  It  is  not  enough  that  patrols  and  pickets 
be  established  against,  night-attacks.  These  parties 
should  be  frequently  visited  by  the  General  himself, 
or  by  some  one-  of  his  staff,  who  will  be  careful  to 
enforce  the  orders  already  given,  or  issue  new  ones 
accommodated  to  such  change  of  circumstances  as 
may  have  arisen  in  the  ease."  Had  such  a  super 
vision  been  exercised  on  the  present  occasion,  it  is 
quite  impossible,  that  an  entire  picket  would  have 


1  Burns's  Report  to  General  Dearborn. 

9  Chandler's  Report  to  General  Dearborn,  of  the  18th  of  June. 


160       NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812. 

been  caught  asleep  on  its  post;  or  that  fires,  ordered 
to  be  extinguished  in  the  evening,  should  have  been 
found  burning  at  daybreak.1 

3d.  "  In  night  operations,  when  the  eye  can  do 
little,  false  attacks  may  be  mistaken  for  real  ones — 
but  even  in  this  case,  the  ear  of  a  practised  soldier 
cannot  long  be  deceived — for  if  the  onset  be  neither 
vigorous  nor  extended,  it  may  at  once  be  considered 
as  false."  Vincent's  demonstrations  were  of  this 
kind,  few  and  feeble  ;  and  making  no  serious  im 
pression  but  upon  the  two  Generals — who,  mistaking 
them  for  the  main  attack,  drew  off  the  fifth  regi 
ment  from  the  centre  of  the  line,  and  thus  left  the 
artillery  unsupported. 

4th.  The  next  blunder  in  this  comedy  of  errors, 
must  be  ascribed  to  Burns,  on  whom  the  command 
of  the  army  had  devolved,  in  consequence  of  the 
capture  of  Chandler  and  Winder.  When,  at  day 
break,  this  officer  was  called  to  exercise  his  new 
functions,  he  found,  as  he  tells  us  in  his  official 
report,  that  "  all  the  views  of  the  enemy  had  been 
completely  frustrated  ;  himself  obliged  to  fly,  leaving 
the  field  of  battle  covered  with  his  dead  and  wounded, 
and  more  than  seventy  men,  principally  of  the  forty- 
ninth,  made  prisoners  :"  while,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  troops  of  the  United  States  had  suffered  little 
loss,  were  in  perfect  order,  and  entirely  in  condition, 
had  not  both  Generals  been  taken,  to  have  pressed 
Vincent  to  a  second  combat,  the  issue  of  which, 

i  Chandler's  Report  to  General  Dearborn,  of  the  18th  of  June. 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812.  161 

would  not  have  been  doubtful.  Yet,  in  despite  of 
all  these  discoveries,  our  modest  cavalier  (from  sheer 
diffidence  in  his  own  capacity  to  direct  infantry 
movements)  refused  to  avail  himself  of  the  advan 
tages  he  possessed,  and,  instead  of  longer  pursuing 
the  objects  of  the  expedition,  turned  his  back  at 
once  on  Vincent  and  victory,  and  hastily  retired  to 
Forty-Mile  Creek ;  thus  practically  contradicting 
his  own  official  statements,  and  giving  to  the  affair 
of  Stony  Creek,  the  new  and  unmerited  character  of 
a  positive  defeat  on  our  part. 

5th.  But  little  more  mismanagement  was  now 
wanting,  to  make  the  campaign  of  1813,  as  much  a 
subject  of  ridicule  at  home,  and  contempt  abroad, 
as  that  of  the  preceding  year.  Nor  had  we  long  to 
wait  for  such  new  instances  of  misconduct,  as  could 
not  fail  to  produce  this  degrading  effect.  On  the 
6th  of  June — the  day  on  which  Burns  was  flying, 
when  none  pursued — an  order  was  received  from 
the  commander-in-chief,  recalling  without  loss  of 
time,  the  whole  army  to  fort  George,  and  virtually 
abandoning  all  the  objects  of  the  campaign.  Nor 
was  even  this  ill-judged  movement  executed,  with 
out  a  disorder  which  entailed  upon  it,  the  loss  of 
"  twelve  boats,  principally  laden  with  the  baggage 
of  the  army."1 

These  events  were  soon  known  and  justly  appre 
ciated  by  the  British  commander,  who,  advancing 
as  we  retreated,  was  willing  on  the  20th  of  the 


i  General  Lewis's  Letter  of  the  14th  of  June,  1813. 
14* 


162       NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812. 

month,  to  hazard  the  elite  of  his  army  (about  five 
hundred  combatants)  within  stroke  of  his  adver 
sary.1  Every  just  view  of  this  circumstance,  indi 
cated  the  wisdom  of  immediately  assailing  this  corps ; 
the  capture,  or  destruction  of  which,  would  have 
effectually  defeated  the  present  views  and  future 
operations  of  Vincent.  But  unfortunately,  though 
the  General  adopted  this  opinion,  he  altogether 
failed,  as  in  other  cases,  in  the  employment  of 
means,  proper  for  giving  to  the  experiment  a  suc 
cessful  issue.  Instead  of  placing,  as  he  ought  to 
have  done,y3cott  and  Miller  at  the  head  of  fifteen 
hundred  men  each,2  and  moving  them  by  a  night- 
march  and  the  shortest  route  on  De  Coos's  station, 
he  despatched  Bcsrstler  (an  officer  not  distinguished 
by  any  prior  service)  with  five  hundred  and  forty 
effectives  only,  by  the  Queenstown  road,  in  open 
day,  without  reserve  or  demonstration  of  anv  kind, 
either  to  sustain  the  attack,  or  cover  the  retreat  !3 

1  The  Stone  House,  called  De  Coos's  station,  was  seventeen  miles 
from  fort  George. 

2  The  effective  strength  of  General  Dearborn's  army,  amounted  at 
this  time,  to  three  thousand  five  hundred  combatants. 


NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812.       163 


CHAPTER   VI. 

Second  investment  of  Fort  Meigs.— Gallant  defence  of  Fort  Stephen- 
son. — Defeat  of  the  British  fleet  on  Lake  Erie. — Capture  of  Am- 
herstberg. — Recapture  of  Detroit  and  the  Michigan  Territory. — Har 
rison's  pursuit  and  defeat  of  Proctor. — Arrival  of  a  part  of  the 
\Vestern  Army  on  the  Niagara. 

ALARMED  by  the  reports  in  circulation  of  Perry's 
progress  in  building  and  equipping  armed  vessels  at 
Presque  Isle,  Proctor  and  Barclay,  early  in  the  spring, 
projected  an  attack  on  that  post ;  but  for  this  pur 
pose,  an  augmentation  of  their  several  means  was 
deemed  indispensable.  The  General,  accordingly, 
called  for  a  re-enforcement  of  regular  infantry,  and 
the  Commodore,  for  an  additional  number  of  practised 
seamen ;  but  though  the  enterprise  was  promptly  ap 
proved  by  Provost,  and  entirely  conformed  to  views 
previously  given  by  him,  so  weak  at  the  moment 
was  the  British  central  division  on  Lake  Ontario, 
that  an  immediate  compliance  with  either  branch 
of  the  requisition  was  impracticable  ;  nor  was  it  till 
about  the  10th  of  July,  that  "sixty  seamen  and  four 
hundred  infantry"  could  be  sent  to  the  division  of 
the  west.1 

In  the  meantime,  to  avoid  a  state  of  inaction,  and 
i  See  letters  of  Provost  and  De  Rottenburg,  Appendix,  No.  20. 


164       NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OP  1812. 

to  give  employment,  in  particular,  to  a  great  mass 
of  restless  Indians,  which  had  been  assembled  at 
Maiden  in  March  and  April,  Proctor  began  the  cam 
paign  with  a  demonstration  on  fort  Meigs,from  which 
he  expected  the  following  results;  1st,  That  Clay, 
and  his  garrison,  made  up  of  insubordinate  militia, 
might  be  provoked  or  seduced  to  quit  their  intrench- 
ments,  and  take  the  risk  of  a  field-fight  with  him  and 
Tecumseh  ;  and  2d,  that  by  seriously  alarming  Har 
rison  (then  at  Lower  Sandusky)  for  the  safety  of 
his  outpost  and  stores  on  the  Miami,  that  officer 
would  be  induced  to  march  to  their  defence  ;  and 
thus  losing  the  power  of  sustaining  fort  Stephenson, 
Cleveland  and  Presque  Isle,  render  certain  and  easy 
the  capture  of  those  places.1 

With  these  views,  the  British  commander  began 
his  movement  at  the  head  of  a  force,  regular,  militia 
and  Indian,  amounting  to  four  thousand  combat 
ants  ;2  with  which,  on  the  22d  of  May,  he  appeared 
before  fort  Meigs.  But  perceiving  early,  that  his 
stratagem  in  relation  to  that  place,  was  not  likely  to 
succeed,  and  that  what  remained  of  his  plan  might 
be  jeoparded  by  delay,  he  on  the  28th,  raised  his 
camp;  sent  back  a  part  of  his  allies  to  Maiden,  de 
tached  another  and  larger  portion  to  watch  and  way 
lay  Harrison,  and  with  the  residue  of  his  force,  white 
and  red,  hastened  to  the  attack  of  Lower  Sandusky. 
Nor  could  circumstances  more  propitious  be  imag 
ined,  than  those  under  which  he  found  this  nominal 

1  See  letters  of  Provost  and  De  Rottenburg,  Appendix,  No.  19. 
3  Christie's  History  of  the  War  in  the  Canadas,  p.  117, 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812.  165 

fortress, — injudiciously  placed  and  badly  constructed, 
neither  finished  nor  furnished,  and  even  stripped  of  a 
part  of  its  ordinary  armament, — with  a  small  garrison 
not  exceeding  one  hundred  and  fifty  men,  under 
orders  to  retreat,  "should  the  enemy  approach  in 
force  and  with  cannon,  provided  a  retreat  should  then 
be  practicable" 

Fortunately  for  the  credit  of  the  American  arms, 
the  first  step  taken  by  Proctor  was  that  of  isolating 
the  fort  by  a  cordon  of  Indians;  thus  rendering  the 
retreat  of  the  garrison  highly  perilous,  if  not  imprac 
ticable,  and  leaving  to  the  commander  a  choice  only 
between  submission  and  resistance.  In  making  this 
selection,  the  young  and  gallant  Croghari  did  not 
hesitate  ;  and  to  the  demand  of  a  surrender,  enforced 
by  the  usual  menace  of  indiscriminate  slaughter  in 
case  of  refusal,  he  answered  substantially, — that  the 
defence  of  his  post  was  a  point  of  honor,  which  could 
only  be  satisfied  by  an  actual  experiment  of  the  rela 
tive  force  and  fortune  of  his  antagonist  and  himself. 

While  this  negotiation  was  in  progress,  Proctor 
was  employed  in  landing  his  artillery  and  giving  it 
a  position  in  aid  of  his  gun-boats  ;  from  which,  on 
the  delivery  of  Croghan's  answer,  a  heavy  fire  was 
opened  and  continued  on  the  fort,  with  little  if  any 
intermission  during  the  night.  At  daybreak,  a  second 
battery  of  three  six-pounders  was  established  within 
two  hundred  and  fifty  yards  of  the  pickets ;  and  about 
four  o'clock,  P.  M.,  it  was  found  that  the  whole  fire 
of  the  British  cannon,  was  concentrated  on  the  north 
west  corner  of  the  fort — a  circumstance,  sufficiently 


166       NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812. 

indicating  the  point  and  species  of  attack  meditated 
upon  it.  Major  Croghan,  accordingly,  hastened  to 
employ  such  means  as  he  possessed  to  strengthen 
the  menaced  angle,1  and  had  barely  executed  his 
purpose,  when  the  enemy  (covering  himself  with 
smoke)  was  seen  rapidly  advancing,  and  but  a  few 
paces  distant  from  the  pickets.  A  general  and  well- 
directed  fire  of  musketry  from  the  garrison,  which 
immediately  followed  this  discovery,  had  the  effect 
of  checking  his  progress  and  considerably  disturbing 
his  order  ;  but  the  latter  being  speedily  restored,  the 
movement  was  resumed,  and  the  ditch  reached  and 
occupied  by  the  head  of  the  column.  It  was  at  this 
critical  moment,  that  Croghan's  single  piece  of  artil 
lery,  charged  with  grape-shot  and  so  placed  as  to 
enfilade  the  assailants,  opened  its  fire  and  with  such 
effect,  that  in  a  few  minutes,  the  combat  was  virtu 
ally  ended  and  the  battle  won.8  Most  of  the  enemy 
who  had  entered  the  ditch,  were  killed  or  wounded  ; 
and  such  of  them  as  were  less  advanced  and  able  to 
fly,  sought  safety  in  the  neighboring  woods — carry 
ing  with  them  no  disposition  to  renew  the  attack, 
and  strongly  impressing  their  Indian  allies  with  their 
own  panic.  Proctor  now  saw,  that  all  attempts  to 
rally  the  fugitives  were  hopeless  ;  and  that  to  avoid 
a  greater  calamity,8  his  most  prudent  course  would 

1  Bags  of  flour  and  sand. 

2  The  cannonade  and  bombardment  lasted  thirty-six  hours, 

3  A  fear  that  Harrison  would  quit  his  camp  at  Seneca,  and  pounce 
upon  him  m  his  then  crippled  state.     It  is  worthy  of  notice,  that  of 
these  two  commanders,  (always  the  terror  of  each  other,)  one,  was 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812.  167 

be,  to  re-embark  what  could  be  collected  of  his  force, 
red  and  white,  and  return  immediately  to  Maiden. 
His  retreat  began  accordingly  at  three  o'clock  in 
the  morning,  leaving  behind  him  a  note,  recom 
mending  to  American  humanity  the  burial  of  his 
dead  and  the  care  of  his  wounded. 

The  enemy's  movements  not  immediately  requir 
ing  further  attention  from  General  Harrison,  he  now 
became  actively  and  exclusively  occupied,  in  bring 
ing  together  such  militia,  in  aid  of  the  regular  troops 
assigned  to  his  command,  as  was  deemed  competent 
to  the  objects  of  the  campaign.  To  this  service,  the 
popular  and  patriotic  Governors  of  Kentucky  and 
Ohio  lent  themselves  freely  and  successfully  ;  and 
by  the  15th  of  September,  the  army  collected  on  the 
southern  shore  of  Lake  Erie,  and  destined  to  a  new 
invasion  of  Canada,  amounted  to  more  than  seven 
thousand  men. 

Nor  was  the  naval  and  auxiliary  armament  con 
structed  at  Erie,  more  tardy  in  its  movements.  On 
the  3d  of  August,  the  vessels  were  brought  over  the 
bar;  and  on  the  5th,  were  in  condition  to  offer  battle 
to  the  enemy's  fleet.  This  challenge  being  declined, 
a  second  experiment,  made  with  the  same  view  on 
the  7th,  had  a  similar  result.  It  was,  however,  soon 
found,  that  Barclay's  hesitancy  had  not  arisen  from 
any  settled  purpose  of  avoiding  a  combat,  but  merely 
to  supply  a  defect  in  the  necessary  preparation  of  his 

now  actually  flying  from  his  supposed  pursuer ;  while  the  other,  waited 
only  the  arrival  of  Cro^lian  at  Seneca,  to  begin  a  camp-conflagration, 
and  flight  to  Upper  Saudusky. 


168  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812. 

ehips.  At  sunrise  of  the  10th  of  September,  he  was 
seen  bearing  down  from  Maiden  in  the  direction  of 
Put-in  Bay,  whither  Perry  hastened  to  follow  and  to 
fight  him. 

The  relative  force  of  the  two  fleets,  was  not  widely 
different — that  of  the  British,  was  composed  of  two 
ships,  two  schooners,  one  brig,  and  one  sloop,  car 
rying  sixty-three  guns  (twelve,  eighteen  and  twenty- 
four-pounders)  with  five  hundred  and  eleven  seamen 
and  marines  ;  while  that  of  the  United  States,  con 
sisted  of  three  brigs,  two  schooners,  and  four  sloops, 
mounting  fifty-four  carronades,  and  manned  by  four 
hundred  seamen  and  marines.1  In  command  of 
the  former,  was  a  distinguished  veteran  of  the  Nel 
son  school,  to  whom  all  the  secrets,  real  and  pre 
tended,  of  naval  tactics,  must  have  been  intimately 
known  ;  while,  at  the  head  of  the  latter,  was  a 
youth  "whose  home  had  long  been  en  the  deep" — 
glowing  with  patriotism  and  courage,  but  having 
no  experimental  knowledge  of  battles  fought  in 
squadron. 

As  if  in  some  degree,  to  compensate  this  and 
other  points  of  disparity,  the  wind,  which  early  in 
the  morning  blew  from  the  south-west,  shifted  to 
the  south-east,  and  gave  to  the  American  fleet  the 
weather-gage.  Availing  himself  of  this  advantage, 
perhaps  with  too  little  attention  to  the  sailing  qual 
ities  of  his  smaller  vessels,  Perry,  at  a  quarter  before 
twelve,  placed  the  Lawrence  in  a  position  to  begin 

i  McASee's  History. 


NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812.       169 

an  action,  which,  for  pertinacity  and  effect,  will 
rank  high  in  the  annals  of  naval  warfare.  Finding, 
after  an  experiment  of  ten  minutes,  that  the  distance 
he  had  taken  was  better  adapted  to  his  enemy's 
guns  than  to  his  own,  he  made  sail  ahead  ;  soon 
after  which,  to  his  great  mortification,  "the  brig 
became  unmanageable — every  brace  and  bowline 
being,  in  the  meantime,  shot  away."  Yet  in  this 
crippled  condition,  she  gallantly  "  sustained  the 
con  lest  for  more  than  two  hours,"  ai  canister  dis 
tance  ;  when  "  every  gun  she  had,  being  rendered 
useless,  and  a  large  portion  of  her  crew  killed  or 
wounded,"1  her  commander  transferred  himself  and 
his  flag  on  board  the  Niagara,  which,  at  this  critical 
moment,  a  gust  of  wind  had  brought  to  his  aid.  A 
movement  was  now  wanting  that  should  give  to 
the  conflict  a  decided  character  and  favorable  issue; 
and  this,  Perry  hastened  to  employ.  At  forty-five 
minutes  past  two,  the  smaller  vessels  having  got 
into  line,  the  signal  for  close  action  was  made  ; 
when  the  Niagara,  bearing  up  and  passing  the 
Detroit,  Queen  Charlotte  and  Lady  Provost,  at  half 
pistol-shot  distance,  poured  into  them  a  most  de 
structive  fire  from  her  starboard  guns  ;  and  from  her 
larboard  battery  another  of  equal  execution,  on  the 
Chippewa  and  Little  Belt.  What  yet  remained  to 
be  done,  was  soon  accomplished  by  the  gun-boats, 
under  the  skilful  direction  of  Captain  Elliot  ;2  the 


1  Perry's  official  letter,  dated  September  13th,  1813. 
3  Idem. 


170       NOTICES  OP  THE  WAR  OF  1812. 

flags  of  the  Detroit,  Queen  Charlotte,  and  Lady 
Provost,  were  struck  in  quick  succession  ;  those  of 
the  brig  Hunter  and  schooner  Chippewa,  were  not 
slow  in  following  the  example  ;  and  the  Little  Belt, 
which  now  attempted  to  escape,  was  promptly  pur 
sued  and  soon  captured.  Such  was  the  termination 
of  this  well-fought  and  decisive  battle — brilliant  in 
itself,  having  the  most  important  bearing  on  the 
issue  of  the  campaign,  and  requiring  nothing  to 
complete  its  glory,  but  the  humble  and  pious  grati 
tude  with  which  it  was  announced. 

The  road  to  Maiden  being  no  longer  obstructed 
by  the  enemy,  the  commanding  General  now  has 
tened  to  avail  himself  of  the  first  impression  made 
on  Proctor  by  this  naval  victory.  Embarking  the 
army  on  the  27th,  he  on  that  day  sailed  under  con 
voy  of  the  fleet  for  the  Canada  shore  ;  which,  from 
the  favorable  state  of  the  wind  and  weather,  he 
was  enabled  to  reach  at  three  o'clock,  P.  M.  No 
enemy  appearing  to  interrupt  the  debai cation,  it  was 
safely  and  promptly  made,  and  the  march  continued 
to  Amherstburg,  where  the  troops  bivouacked  for 
the  night. 

It  was  here,  that  General  Harrison  first  learned, 
that  Proctor,  after  dismantling  Maiden,  burning  the 
barracks  and  navy-yard,  and  stripping  the  adjacent 
country  of  horses  and  cattle,  had  early  on  the  26th, 
began  his  retreat  into  the  interior  of  the  province. 
Though  no  time  was  lost  in  resuming  the  pursuit  in 
the  morning,  still,  reasoning  from  the  urgency  of 
Proctor's  motives  for  a  speedy  flight,  and  the  ample 


NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812.       171 

means  he  possessed  for  executing  it  successfully,  the 
movement  was  made  without  the  smallest  hope  that 
the  American  army  could,  by  any  effort,  be  able  to 
overtake  him.1  This  desponding  view  of  the  busi 
ness,  which,  had  it  continued  longer,  would  no  doubt 
have  verified  itself,  was  fortunately  much  dimin 
ished,  if  riot  entirely  removed,  (soon  after  the  arrival 
of  the  army  at  Sandwich,)  by  finding,  that  the  want 
of  horses,  which,  in  the  General's  opinion,  rendered 
the  pursuit  hopeless,  would  be  well  and  abundantly 
supplied  by  Johnson's  mounted  regiment,  which 
was  now  seen  winding  its  way  along  the  opposite 
bank  of  the  Detroit.2 

Two  days  were  now  employed  in  re-establishing 
the  civil  government  of  the  Michigan  Territory,  and 
assigning  to  it  a  defensive  corps  ;  in  organizing  a 
portion  of  the  army  for  rapid  movement,  and  in 
giving  to  the  whole  of  it  an  order  of  march  and 
battle.  It  was  not,  therefore,  until  the  2d  of  Octo 
ber,  that  the  pursuit  was  resumed,  nor  until  the  5th, 
that  the  enemy  was  overtaken.  On  this  day,  he 
was  discovered  in  a  position  skilfully  chosen,  in 
relation  as  well  to  local  circumstances,  as  to  the 
character  of  his  troops.  A  narrow  strip  of  dry 

1  General  Harrison's  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  dated  Septem 
ber  27th,  1813.     In  this  letter,  the  General  says— "I  will  pursue  the 
enemy  to-rnorrow,  although  there  is  no  probability  of  overtaking  him ; 
as  he  has  upwards  of  one  thousand  horses,  and  we  have  not  one  in 
the  army." 

2  This  corps  had  been  organized  by  direction  of  the  War  Depart 
ment,  for  frontier  defence,  in  the  spring  of  1813,  under  the  command 
of  Colonel  R.  M.  Johnson. 


172       NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812. 

ground,  flanked  by  the  Thames  on  the  left,  and  by 
a  swamp  on  the  right,  was  occupied  by  his  regular 
infantry,  amounting  to  eight  hundred  bayonets,  sus 
tained  by  artillery :  while  on  the  right  flank,  lay 
Tecumseh  and  his  followers,  on  the  eastern  margin 
of  the  swamp.  After  satisfying  himself  of  these 
facts,  General  Harrison  hastened  to  make  such  dis 
position  of  his  force,  as,  in  his  opinion,  was  best 
accommodated  to  the  case.  To  Trotter's  brigade  of 
Kentucky  volunteers,  was  assigned  the  front  line, 
extending  from  the  swamp  to  the  road  near  the 
bank  of  the  river.  One  hundred  and  fifty  yards  in 
the  rear  of  Trotter,  King's  brigade  formed  a  second 
line,  of  similar  extent;  and  in  the  rear  of  King, 
Child's  brigade  was  held  in  reserve.  On  the  left 
of  Trotter  and  covering  his  flank,  Desha's  division, 
composed  of  two  brigades,  was  posted  in  crotchet 
or  en  potence — while  to  the  mounted  gun-men,  was 
assigned  the  duty  of  turning  the  right  flank  of  the 
Indian  position. 

This  arrangement  was  scarcely  announced,  when 
two  important  circumstances,  which  had  either  not 
been  attended  to  at  all,  or  very  negligently,  were 
now  fully  ascertained  ;  the  one,  that  the  service 
assigned  to  the  mounted  regiment,  was  impractica 
ble,  from  the  miry  character  of  the  soil,  and  the 
number  and  closeness  of  the  thickets  which  cov 
ered  it ;  the  other,  that  Proctor  had  neglected  to 
strengthen  the  front  of  his  position  with  either  ditch 
or  abbatis  ;  and  had  besides,  committed  the  greater 
fault,  of  giving  to  his  regular  infantry  a  formation 


NOTICES    OP    THE    WAR    OF    1812.  173 

of  open  order.  Acting  on  this  state  of  things,  which 
left  no  doubt  of  the  true  point  of  attack,  or  of  the 
means  most  proper  to  be  employed  in  making  it, 
the  mounted  corps  was  now  ordered  to  form  in  close 
column  in  front  of  the  volunteers  ;  to  advance  ob 
liquely  in  the  direction  of  the  British  infantry,  and 
after  receiving  their  fire,  to  charge  them  at  full 
speed.  On  examining  the  ground  directed  by  the 
preceding  order  to  be  taken,  the  space  was  found 
to  be  too  narrow  for  a  useful  employment  of  the 
whole  regiment ;  when  Colonel  Johnson,  in  the 
exercise  of  a  discretion  wisely  left  to  him,  separated 
the  two  battalions  of  which  it  was  composed  ;  giv 
ing  to  the  one,  the  execution  of  the  projected  charge 
on  the  British  infantry,  and  to  the  other,  a  simul 
taneous  attack  on  the  Indian  line.  Of  the  two 
corps,  the  second  battalion,  "in  four  columns  of 
double  files,"  had  advanced  but  a  short  distance, 
when  it  received  the  enemy's  fire  ;  which,  as  might 
have  been  expected  from  men  and  horses  unpractised 
in  war,  and  brought  for  the  first  time  into  actual  com 
bat,  produced  a  recoil  in  the  heads  of  the  columns. 
The  disorder  was,  however,  soon  and  completely 
retrieved,  and  a  second  fire  sustained,  with  the  sang 
froid  of  veterans  ;  when  the  charge,  as  directed, 
was  promptly  and  vigorously  made,  and  with  a  suc 
cess,  seldom  equalled  and  never  surpassed.  In  "  the 
single  minute  of  time"  which  it  occupied,1  the  vic 
tory  of  the  day  was  essentially  won,  and  nearly  the 


i  Harrison's  Official  Report  of  the  action. 
15* 


174  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812. 

whole  of  the  regular  force  of  the  enemy  killed, 
wounded,  or  taken.  The  contest  between  the  first 
battalion  and  the  savages,  was,  like  the  preceding, 
sharp  but  short;  its  duration  not  exceeding  six  or 
seven  minutes.  In  this,  the  gallant  Colonel  John 
son  was  thrice  severely  wounded  ;  and  his  not  less 
gallant  adversary,  Tecumseh,  the  head  and  heart 
of  the  Indian  line,  killed  on  the  spot  he  defended. 
Proctor,  who  had  saved  himself  and  part  of  his  suite, 
by  a  base  desertion  of  his  troops,  was  now  strenu 
ously  but  unsuccessfully  pursued.  The  chase  was 
not, however,  altogether  barren;  fifty  additional  pris 
oners  and  six  pieces  of  brass  artillery  were  captured 
and  secured. 

Thus  fortunately  terminated  an  expedition,  the 
results  of  which  were  of  high  importance  to  the 
United  States  ;  a  naval  ascendency  gained  on  Lakes 
Erie  and  Superior  ;  Maiden  destroyed,  Detroit  re 
covered,  Proctor  defeated,  the  alliance  between  Great 
Britain  and.  the  savages  dissolved,  and  peace  and 
industry  restored  to  our  widely  extended  and  much 
exposed  western  frontier.  With  the  proud  satisfac 
tion  of  having  contributed  to  these  important  events, 
the  Kentucky  volunteers  began  their  homeward 
march,  under  the  direction  of  their  gallant  and  ven 
erable  leader,  the  late  Governor  Shelby. 

The  attention  of  General  Harrison  and  Commo 
dore  Perry,  on  getting  back  to  Sandwich,  was  for 
a  moment,  attracted  to  measures  necessary  to  the 
reduction  of  Michilimackinac  ;  but  the  weather  be 
coming  stormy,  and  the  navigation  of  Lake  Superior 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812.  175 

dangerous,  the  project  was  abandoned,  and  another 
and  better  substituted  in  its  stead.  Leaving  to 
General  Cass  and  his  brigade  the  defence  of  Detroit, 
the  residue  of  the  regular  troops,  amounting  to  thir 
teen  hundred  men,  were  promptly  embarked  and 
brought  down  to  Buffalo,  where  they  arrived  on  the 
24th  of  October.  In  taking  this  step,  the  General 
had  anticipated  the  wishes  of  the  Secretary  of  War, 
who,  in  a  despatch  of  the  22d  of  October,  suggested 
as  an  ulterior  operation  for  the  army  of  the  west,  a 
movement  to  the  Niagara,  and  an  attack  of  the 
right  and  rear  of  De  Rotlenburg's  position  ;  while 
McClure's  militia  and  Porter's  volunteers  should 
assail  it  in  front — a  measure,  the  execution  of 
which  was  only  prevented  by  the  slowness  with 
which  both  corps  assembled  for  the  purpose  ;  by 
the  reported  movement  of  the  enemy  from  the 
peninsula  to  Kingston  ;  and  by  the  risk  arising  from 
any  great  accumulation  of  force  at  that  post,  to 
our  naval  depot  at  Sacket's  Harbor,  in  the  absence 
of  the  army,  which  was  now  moving  in  another 
direction.1 

The  better  to  obviate  this  cause  of  alarm,  the 
Secretary  of  War  directed,  that  McArthur's  brigade 
should  be  removed,  as  promptly  as  might  be  conve 
nient,  to  the  harbor  ;  intending  by  the  limitation 
thus  given  to  the  order,  that  Smith's  battalion  of 
riflemen  should  be  left  to  make  part  of  the  garrison 

i  Sec  Appendix,  No.  24 


176  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812. 

of  fort  George,  and  the  defence  of  the  Niagara  fron 
tier  ;  instead  of  which,  both  corps  were  brought 
down  the  lake  by  the  General,  who,  hastening  his 
return  to  the  west,  soon  after  closed  his  military 
career  by  a  resignation  of  his  commission. 

REMARKS.  This  third  and  last  campaign  of  Gen 
eral  Harrison,  though  in  its  issue  highly  important 
to  the  nation  and  honorable  to  its  arms,  would,  in 
all  probability,  have  had  a  termination  as  disas 
trous  as  its  immediate  predecessor,  had  the  General 
been  indulged,  as  formerly,  with  a  carte  blanche  in 
the  mode  of  conducting  it. 

It  will  be  remembered,  that  in  prosecuting  the 
war  in  the  west,  the  cabinet  of  1812,  limited  the 
exercise  of  its  authority  to  a  mere  designation  of 
objects;  leaving  to  the  knowledge  and  judgment  of 
the  commanding  General,  the  selection  of  means, 
time  and  manner  of  pursuing  them.  The  frequent 
and  unexpected  misfortunes,  which  in  this  and  part 
of  the  succeeding  year,  befel  the  American  arms  in 
district  No.  8,  could  not  fail  to  suggest  a  change  of 
this  system,  in  two  essential  points — the  exclusively 
military  character  of  the  armament :  and  the  latitude, 
given  to  the  General  with  respect  to  the  number  and 
kind  of  troops  to  be  employed,  and  the  time  and  mode 
of  employing  them.  A  plan  of  campaign  conformed 
to  these  general  views,  was  accordingly  prescribed, 
limiting  the  army  to  seven  thousand  combatants ;  des 
ignating  Maiden  as  the  object  of  attack ;  adding 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812.  177 

to  the  military,  a  naval  force;1  and  directing  a  move 
ment  of  the  former  by  water,  instead  of  a  land-march 
of  "nearly  two  hundred  miles"  through  a  swampy  desert; 
in  which,  besides  the  ordinary  impediments  arising 
from  roads  and  weather,  it  would,  at  every  step, 
have  been  liable  to  the  attacks,  open  and  covered, 
of  four  thousand  savages.* 

1  No  efficient  measures  were  taken  by  the  government  to  obtain  a 
command  of  the  lakes,  until  October,  1812.     A  letter,  written  about 
this  time,  by  General  Armstrong  to  Mr.  Gallatin,  was  probably  the 
means  of  recalling  the  attention  of  the  cabinet  to  this  important  sub 
ject.     In  this  letter,  the  General  stated  the  following  facts — "  that  he 
was  informed  by  Captain  Chauncey,  that  as  early  as  the  1st  of  July, 
Captain  Woolsey  had  requested  twenty  six-pounders,  of  which,  there 
were  more  than  one  hundred  in  the  navy-yard  unemployed  ;  that  the 
intention  of  Woolsey  was  to  arm  such  vessels  of  commerce,  as  could 
be  found  on  the  lake,  and  at  Sacket's  Harbor,  with  the  aid  of  which 
he  would  be  able  to  get  a  complete  command  of  the  water,  and  that 
he  (Captain  Chauncey)  not  believing  himself  authorized  to  do  more, 
had  but  referred  the  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  from  whom 
no  answer  had  been  received."     On  these  facts,  the  General  subjoined 
the  following  opinions,  that  "  it  was  not  yet  too  late  to  accomplish 
Mr.  Woolsey's  object;  and  that  the  object  in  itself  was  of  the  highest 
importance  ;  that  besides  giving  us  the  advantage  of  an  exclusive  and 
uninterrupted  use  of  the  Lakes  for  public  purposes,  it  would  effectually 
separate  Upper  from  Lower  Canada,  cut  asunder  the  enemy's  line  of 
communication,  and  prevent  Brock  and  Provost  /rom  succoring  each 
other."     Soon  after  the  receipt  of  this  letter,  Commodore  Chauncey 
received  authority  to  build  and  equip,  armed  vessels  on  Lake  On 
tario  ;  and  General  Dearborn  a  similar  authority,  to  arm  and  otherwise 
fit  out  for  public  service,  such  commercial  craft  as  might  be  useful  on 
Lake  Champlain.     For  another  communication,  involving  this  and 
other  subjects,  see  Appendix,  No.  22. 

2  McAffje  and  Christie.     The  latter,  residing  in  Canada,  and  hav 
ing  access  to  public  functionaries,  must  be  considered  good  authority 
with  respect  to  the  numbers  with  which  the  expedition  began. 


178       NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812. 

To  a  strategic  movement  of  this  kind,  expressly 
calculated  to  gain  an  ascendency  on  the  Lake,  and 
thus  to  neutralize  the  Indian  part  of  the  enemy's 
force,  and  secure  to  the  American  army  a  direct 
approach  to  its  object,  without  expense,  fatigue,  or 
peril — no  opposition,  on  the  part  of  the  General, 
was  anticipated  ;  and  the  more  so,  as  in  December 
or  January  preceding,  he  had  officially  announced, 
that  "  if  the  government  would  employ  naval  means, 
all  their  objects  could  be  accomplished,  in  the  short 
space  of  two  months  in  the  spring"1  Yet,  so  vacil 
lating  was  his  judgment  on  this  subject,  that  in 
March,  1813,  he  substantially  revoked  this  advice, 
and  did  what  he  could,  to  obtain  permission  to  con 
duct  the  campaign  by  the  old  route,  and  in  the  old 
way.*  Fortunately,  time,  and  the  experience  it 
brought  with  it,  had  lessened  the  weight  of  the 
General's  opinions  at  Washington  ;  his  suggestions 
on  the  present  occasion,  were,  therefore,  promptly 
and  decidedly  discarded,  and  a  new  order  issued, 
for  prosecuting  the  campaign  on  the  plan  given  in 
March,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  terminated  success 
fully  in  August. 

Mr.  Harrison's  next  error  was  of  a  character  even 
more  menacing  than  the  preceding  ;  and  but  for  the 
counteraction  given  to  it  by  Major  Croghan,  must 
have  been  followed  by  disaster  and  disgrace — a  con- 

1  General  Harrison's  letter  to  the  War  Department,  of  the  12th 
December,  1812. 

2  Harrison's  official  letter,  of  the  17th  of  March,  and  answer  of  the 
Secretary  of  War,  Appendix,  No.  23. 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF     1812.  179 

elusion,  abundantly  established  by  the  following 
facts.  On  the  21st  of  April,  after  inspecting  the 
defences  at  Lower  Sandusky,  the  General,  in  a  letter 
to  the  War  Department,  denounced  that  post  as 
worthless  in  itself,  and  "  impossible  to  save,"  and, 
therefore,  "  to  be  immediately  stripped  of  its  stores, 
and  promptly  abandoned  on  the  approach  of  the  enemy."1 
Yet,  on  the  26th  or  27th  of  July,  though  apprised 
of  Proctor's  coming,  at  the  head  of  a  force,  esti 
mated  at  five  thousand  combatants  ;  though  having 
done  nothing  to  render  the  place  more  defensible, 
and  somewhat  to  make  it  less  so  ;  though  neither 
promising,  nor  intending  to  sustain  it,  should  it  be 
attacked;  and  though  actually  withdrawing  himself 
and  the  army  to  Seneca,  nine  miles  distant  from  it 
— yet,  in  despite  of  all  these  circumstances  of  inhi 
bition,  he  placed  in  fort  Stephenson  a  detachment 
of  one  hundred  and  sixty  United  States  infantry, 
with  "  a  single  and  small  piece  of  artillery,  and 
seven  rounds  of  cannon  cartridges,"  under  orders  to 
retreat,  if  "  the  enemy  landed  in  force  and  with 
cannon,  provided  retreat  should  then  be  practicable." 

We  need  hardly  remark,  that  an  order  of  this 
kind,  which  put  to  hazard  a  detachment  of  this 
magnitude,  in  an  untenable  post,  with  few  of  the 
means  necessary  for  meeting  either  siege  or  assault, 
and  which  forbade  a  retreat,  while  this  could  have 
been  made  with  certainty  and  safety ;  and  for  a 
purpose  altogether  unnecessary,  as  he  had  already 

i  Harrison's  letter  of  the  21st  of  April,  1813. 


180  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812. 

concluded — that  "  coming  by  water,  Proctor  had  not 
neglected  to  bring  with  him  artillery"1 — was,  in  its 
whole  bearing,  a  direct  violation  of  every  military 
rule  applicable  to  the  case.  Nor  was  the  General's 
subsequent  conduct  better  conformed  to  their  in 
junctions. 

Having  on  the  29th,  sufficiently  assured  himself 
with  regard  to  the  number  and  equipment  of  Proc 
tor's  force,  and  suspecting  that  this  formidable  array 
might  be  directed  against  his  own  intrenched  camp 
at  Seneca;  he  at  once  determined,  "to  collect  and 
destroy  his  surplus  stores,  abandon  his  present  posi 
tion  and  make  good  a  retreat  to  Upper  Sandusky" 
— leaving  to  the  fate  that  might  await  them,  the 
settlements  on  the  southern  shore  of  the  Lake  ;  the 
boats  built  and  stores  collected  at  Cleveland  ;  and 
Perry's  fleet,  then  fitting  out  and  nearly  ready  for 
service,  at  Presque  Isle.2  But  though  willing  and 
prepared  to  make  these  sacrifices,  he  could  not  but 
perceive  that  a  mere  presumption  of  danger  to  his 
own  camp,  would  not  justify  the  abandonment  of 
Croghan's  detachment,  without  some  effort  on  his 
part,  to  extend  to  it  the  eventual  security  he  sought 
for  himself.  On  this  point,  however,  the  General's 


1  "  As  the  enemy,  coming  by  water,  could  bring  with  facility  any 
quantity  of  battering  cannon  against  it,  it  must  inevitably  fall" — a  fact 
assumed  by  the  General,  in  the  council  of  war,  held  on  the  evening 
of  the  23th.— McAfee's  History,  p.  322. 

2  That  this  was  the  great  object  of  the  expedition  will  be  seen  by 
Provost's  letter  to  Proctor,  of  the  llth  of  July,  and  De  Rottenburg's  to 
Barclay,  of  the  same  month,  Appendix,  No.  19. 


NOTICES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812.       181 

sense  of  duty  was  soon  satisfied  ;  forgetting  alike 
the  admonition  contained  in  his  first  order  to  Crog- 
han,  "  not  to  hazard  a  retreat  in  the  face  of  an  Indian 
investment"  and  the  fact,  now  perfectly  known  to 
himself,  that  such  investment  did  exist  j1  he  des 
patched  to  that  officer  a  second  order,  for  "an  imme 
diate  retreat"  at  all  hazards;  indicating  the  route  by 
which  he  was  to  make  it,  but  taking  no  step  to  cover, 
or  otherwise  sustain  the  movement.  And,  as  if  the 
task  thus  imposed,  was  not  in  itself  sufficiently  peril 
ous,  he  farther  prescribed — that  the  garrison,  instead 
of  employing  all  possible  means  to  mask  the  opera 
tion,  should  begin  "by  setting  fire  to  their  stores  and 
barracks"  and  thus  virtually  announce  their  inten 
tion  to  the  surrounding  enemy.2 

Fortunately,  the  great  disposer  of  the  events  of  this 
world,  not  unfrequently  converts  evil  into  good,  and 
folly  into  wisdom.  On  the  present  occasion,  we 
have  seen,  that  by  the  first  order  given  to  Croghan, 
he  was  assigned  to  the  defence  of  a  post,  which,  in 
the  General's  opinion,  "  could  not  be  saved"  and  at 
the  same  time,  forbidden  to  retreat,  in  the  face  of  an 
Indian  investment ;  and  that  by  a  second,  he  was  or 
dered  to  abandon  this  untenable  post,  and  make  good  a 
retreat  of  nine  miles,  through  a  continuous  forest  filled 
with  savages,  without  aid  or  support  of  any  kind.  Left, 

1  In  Harrison's  official  letter  of  the  4th  of  August,  he  says — "  Hav 
ing  heard  the  firing  [at  the  fort]  I  made  many  attempts  to  ascertain  the 
force  of  the  enemy ;  but  our  scouts  were  unable  to  get  near  the  fort,  from 
the  Indians  who  surrounded  it" 

2  Second  order  given  to  Croghan,  Appendix,  No.  21. 

16 


182  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812. 

therefore,  to  choose  between  taking  the  risk  of  a 
British  assault,  or  an  Indian  massacre,  this  officer 
did  not  hesitate,  and  was  thus  compelled  to  disobey 
an  order,  which  directly  defeated  its  own  object. 
Yet,  under  circumstances  so  unpromising,  whether 
separately  or  collectively  considered,  results  of  the 
most  benign  character  followed — the  defeat  of  the 
enemy's  objects,  present  and  prospective,  and  the  pres 
ervation  of  our  own  army,  from  the  disgrace  of  a  waste 
ful  and  unnecessary  flight.1 

A  word  or  two,  at  parting,  on  the  charge  made 
by  a  battalion  of  Johnson's  mounted  regiment,  (un 
equipped  with  either  swords  or  lances,)  on  a  corps 
of  veteran  infantry,  well  armed  with  muskets  and 
bayonets,  sustained  by  cannon,  and  numerically 
stronger  than  their  assailants.  That  the  charge 
was  gallantly  made,  and  eminently  successful,  (win 
ning  the  battle,  as  acknowledged  by  the  General 
himself,  "  in  a  single  minute")  cannot  be  doubted ; 
but  to  bestow  on  it,  the  additional  praise  of  deserv 
ing  its  good  fortune,  must  depend  on  a  single  fact, 
whether  the  measure  was,  or  was  not,  adopted  under  a 
sense  of  the  advantage  furnished  to  the  assailant,  by 
this  error  of  his  enemy  ?  If  this  question  can  be 
answered  affirmatively,  the  merit  of  the  charge  will  be 
greatly  enhanced  and  fully  established.  The  affair  will 
no  longer  be  subject  to  be  classed  with  victories  merely 

i  Extract  from  Governor  Duncan's  report  of  the  defence  of  San- 
dusky,  by  Major  Croghan,  made  to  Mr.  Mercer,  chairman  of  the 
Military  Committee  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  in  1834,  Ap 
pendix,  No.  20. 


NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812.  183 

fortuitous  ;  but  take  its  place  with  those  inspirations1 
(as  they  have  been  called)  of  Turenne  and  Bonaparte, 
which,  founded  on  the  error  of  an  enemy.,  and  seen  at 
a  glance  of  the  eye,  could  justify  the  most  palpable  de 
viation  from  ordinary  rules. 

Another  and  last  question  on  this  subject — On 
whose  suggestion  was  the  charge  under  consideration, 
made  ?  Did  the  General,  as  he  insinuates,  "  find  the 
daisy  all  himself?"  or,  was  the  conception  of  the 
project,  the  legitimate  property  of  Colonel  R.  M.  John 
son  ?  Non  nostrum  tantas  componere  lites.2 

Proctor's  situation  at  Maiden  (after  Barclay's  de 
feat)  made  necessary  on  his  part,  a  prompt  retreat  to 
Vincent,  unencumbered  with  baggage  ;  or,  a  vigorous 
defence  of  the  post  committed  to  his  custody.  By 
adopting  the  former,  he  would  have  saved  seven  hun 
dred  veteran  soldiers  and  a  train  of  artillery,  for  the 
future  service  of  his  sovereign ;  by  adopting  the  latter, 
he  would  have  retained  the  whole  of  his  Indian  allies 
(three  thousand  combatants) ;  given  time  for  the  militia 
of  the  interior  to  come  to  his  aid  ;  had  the  full  advan 
tage  of  his  fortress  and  its  munitions — and  a  chance, 
at  least,  of  eventual  success,  with  a  certainty  of  keep 
ing  inviolate  his  own  self-respect,  and  the  confidence 
of  his  followers.  Taking  a  middle  course  between 

1  The  affair  more  particularly  alluded  to  in  this  passage,  is  the 
attack  and  capture   made  of  the  Spanish  batteries,  planted  on  the 
crest  and  covering  the  ascent  of  the   Sommo-Sierra,  by  the  lancers 
of  the   Imperial  guard,  in  1808.     See  Napier's  Peninsular  War, 
Vol.  I,  p.  402. 

2  Appendix,  No.  21. 


184  NOTICES    OF    THE    WAR    OF    1812. 

these  extremes,  he  lost  the  advantages  that  would 
have  resulted  from  either.  His  retreat  began  too  late — 
was  much  encumbered  with  women,  children,  and  bag 
gage,  and  at  no  time  urged  with  sufficient  vigor,  or 
protected  with  sufficient  care.  Bridges  and  roads, 
ferries  and  boats,  were  left  behind  him,  neither  de 
stroyed  nor  obstructed;  and  when,  at  last,  he  was 
overtaken  and  obliged  to  fight,  he  gave  to  his  veterans 
a  formation,  which  enabled  a  corps  of  four  hundred 
mounted  infantry,  armed  with  rifles,  hatchets,  and 
butcher-knives,  to  win  the  battle  "  in  a  single  minute." 
Conduct  like  this,  deserved  all  the  opprobrium  and 
punishment  it  received,  and  justly  led  to  General  Har 
rison's  conclusion — that  "his  antagonist  had  lost  his 


APPENDIX. 


APPENDIX. 


[No.  1.] 

THE  ministry  of  the  elder  Adams  in  England,  began 
on  the  10th  of  June,  1785.  In  a  letter  to  the  American 
Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs,  on  the  19th  of  July  follow 
ing,  he  says — "  The  popular  pulse  seems  to  beat  high 
against  America ;  the  people  are  deceived  by  numberless 
falsehoods  circulated  by  the  gazettes,  &c.,  so  that  there 
is  too  much  reason  to  believe,  that  if  the  nation  had  an 
other  hundred  million  to  spend,  they  would  soon  force 
the  ministry  into  a  war  against  us.  Their  present  sys 
tem,  as  far  as  I  can  penetrate  it,  is  to  maintain  a  de 
termined  peace  with  all  Europe,  in  order  that  they  may 
war  singly  against  America,  if  they  should  think  it  neces 
sary."  In  a  second  letter  of  the  30th  of  August  following, 
he  says — "In  short,  sir,  America  has  no  party  at  present 
in  her  favor — all  parties,  on  the  contrary,  have  committed 
themselves  against  us — even  Shelburne  and  Buckingham. 
I  had  almost  said,  the  friends  of  America  are  reduced  to 
Dr.  Price  and  Dr.  Jebb."  Again,  on  the  15th  of  Octo 
ber,  1785,  he  informs  the  American  Secretary — "  that 
though  it  is  manifestly  as  much  the  interest  of  Great 
Britain  to  be  well  with  us,  as  for  us  to  be  well  with  them, 
yet  this  is  not  the  judgment  of  the  English  nation  ;  it  is 


188  APPENDIX. 

not  the  judgment  of  Lord  North  and  his  party ;  it  is  not 
the  judgment  of  the  Duke  of  Portland  and  his  friends, 
and  it  does  not  appear  to  be  the  judgment  of  Mr.  Pitt 
and  the  present  set.  In  short,  it  does  not  at  present 
appear  to  be  the  sentiment  of  any  body ;  and  I  am  much 
inclined  to  believe,  they  will  try  the  issue  of  importance 
with  us."  In  his  two  last  letters,  the  one  dated  in  No 
vember,  the  other  in  December,  1787,  we  find  the  fol 
lowing  passages — "  If  she  [England]  can  bind  Holland 
in  her  shackles,  and  France  from  internal  dissension  is 
unable  to  interfere,  she  will  make  war  immediately  against 
us.  No  answer  is  made  to  any  of  my  memorials,  or 
letters  to  the  ministry,  nor  do  I  expect  that  any  will  be 
done  while  I  stay." 


[No.  2.] 

Letters  from  Colonel  McKee  (British  Superintendent 
of  Indian  affairs)  to  Colonel  England,  dated  5th  of  July, 
and  13th  and  30th  of  August,  1794,  found  among  Proc 
tor's  papers,  captured  in  1813. — "I  send  this  by  a  party 
of  Saganas,  who  returned  yesterday  from  fort  Recovery, 
where  the  whole  body  of  Indians,  except  the  Delawares, 
who  had  gone  another  route,  imprudently  attacked  the 
fort  on  Monday,  the  30th  of  last  month,  and  lost  sixteen 
or  seventeen  men,  besides  a  good  many  wounded. 

"  Every  thing  had  been  settled  prior  to  their  leaving 
the  Fallen  Timber,  and  it  had  been  agreed  upon,  to  con 
fine  themselves  to  taking  convoys  and  attacking  at  a  dis- 


APPENDIX.  189 

tance  from  the  forts,  if  they  should  have  the  address  to 
entice  the  enemy  out ;  but  the  impetuosity  of  the  Macki 
naw  Indians,  and  their  eagerness  to  begin  with  the  nearest, 
prevailed  with  the  others  to  alter  their  system  ;  the  con 
sequences  of  which,  from  the  present  appearance  of  things, 
may  most  materially  injure  the  interests  of  these  people  ; 
both  the  Mackinaw  and  Lake  Indians  seeming  resolved 
on  going  home  again,  having  completed  the  belts  they 
carried  with  scalps  and  prisoners,  and  having  no  provision 
there,  or  at  the  Glaze,  to  subsist  upon ;  so  that  his  ma 
jesty's  post  will  derive  no  security  from  the  late  great 
influx  of  Indians  into  this  part  of  the  country,  should  they 
persist  in  their  resolution  of  returning  so  soon. 

"  Captain  Elliot  writes,  that  they  [the  British  agents] 
are  immediately  to  hold  a  council  at  the  Glaze,  in  order 
to  try  if  they  can  prevail  on  the  Lake  Indians  to  remain ; 
but  without  provisions,  ammunition,  &c.,  being  sent  to 
that  place,  I  conceive  it  will  be  extremely  difficult  to  keep 
them  together. 

"  I  was  honored  last  night  with  your  letter  of  the  llth, 
and  am  extremely  glad  to  find  you  are  making  such  exer 
tions  to  supply  the  Indians  with  provisions.  Captain 
Elliot  arrived  yesterday;  what  he  has  brought  will  greatly 
relieve  us,  having  been  obliged  yesterday  to  take  all  the 
corn  and  flour  which  the  traders  had  here.  Scouts  are 
sent  up  to  view  the  situation  of  the  [American]  army,  and 
we  now  muster  one  thousand  Indians.  All  the  Lake 
Indians,  from  Sagana  downwards,  should  not  lose  one 
moment  in  joining  their  brethren,  as  every  accession  of 
strength  is  an  addition  to  their  spirits. 

"  I  have  been  employed  several  days  in  endeavoring  to 
fix  the  Indians  (who  have  been  driven  from  their  villages 


190  APPENDIX. 

and  cornfields)  between  the  fort  and  the  bay.  Swan  Creek 
is  generally  agreed  upon,  and  will  be  a  very  convenient 
place  for  the  delivery  of  provisions,  Sac.  The  last  accounts 
from  General  Wayne's  army  were  brought  me  last  night 
by  an  Indian,  who  says,  the  army  would  not  be  able  to 
reach  the  Glaze,  before  yesterday  evening;  it  is  supposed 
on  account  of  the  sick  and  wounded,  many  of  whom  they 
bury  every  day." 


[No.  3.] 

Letter  from  President  Washington  to  Mr.  Jay,  dated 
30th  August,  1794. — "  As  you  will  receive  letters  from 
the  Secretary  of  State's  Office,  giving  an  official  account 
of  the  public  occurrences  as  they  have  arisen  and  ad 
vanced,  it  is  unnecessary  for  me  to  retouch  any  of  them  ; 
and  yet,  I  cannot  restrain  myself  from  making  some  obser 
vations  on  the  most  recent  of  them,  the  communication  of 
which,  was  received  this  morning  only.  I  mean  the  pro 
test  of  the  Governor  of  Upper  Canada,  delivered  by  Lieu 
tenant  Sheafe,  against  our  occupying  lands  far  from  any 
of  the  posts,  which,  long  ago,  they  ought  to  have  surren 
dered,  and  far  within  the  known,  and  until  now,  the 
acknowledged  limits  of  the  United  States. 

"  On  this  irregular  and  high-handed  proceeding  of  Mr. 
Simcoe,  which  is  no  longer  masked,  I  would  rather  hear 
what  the  ministry  of  Great  Britain  will  say,  than  pronounce 
my  own  sentiments  thereon.  But  can  that  government, 
or  will  it  attempt,  after  this  official  act  of  one  of  their 


APPENDIX.  191 

governors,  to  hold  out  ideas  of  friendly  intentions  towards 
the  United  States,  and  suffer  such  conduct  to  pass  with 
impunity  ? 

"  This  may  be  considered  as  the  most  open  and  daring 
act  of  the  British  agents  in  America,  though  it  is  not  the 
most  hostile  and  cruel ;  for  there  does  not  remain  a  doubt 
in  the  mind  of  any  well-informed  person  in  this  country, 
not  shut  against  conviction,  that  all  the  difficulties  we  en 
counter  with  the  Indians,  their  hostilities,  the  murders  of 
helpless  women  and  children  along  our  frontiers,  result  from 
the  conduct  of  the  agents  of  Great  Britain  in  this  country. 
In  vain  is  it  then  for  its  administration  in  Britain,  to  dis 
avow  having  given  orders  which  will  warrant  such  conduct, 
whilst  their  agents  go  unpunished ;  whilst  we  have  a 
thousand  corroborating  circumstances,  and  indeed  as  many 
evidences,  some  of  which  cannot  be  brought  forward,  to 
prove,  that  they  are  seducing  from  our  alliances,  and 
endeavoring  to  remove  over  the  line,  tribes  that  have  hith 
erto  been  kept  in  peace  and  friendship  with  us  at  a  heavy 
expense,  and  who  have  no  causes  of  complaint,  except 
pretended  ones  of  their  creating ;  whilst  they  keep  in  a 
state  of  irritation  the  tribes  who  are  hostile  to  us,  and  are 
instigating  those  who  know  little  of  us,  or  we  of  them,  to 
unite  in  the  war  against  us  ;  and  whilst  it  is  an  undeniable 
fact,  that  they  are  furnishing  the  whole  with  arms,  ammuni 
tion,  clothing,  and  even  provisions  to  carry  on  the  war.  I 
might  go  farther,  and,  if  they  are  not  much  belied,  add, 
men  aho  in  disguise. 

"  Can  it  be  expected,  I  ask,  so  long  as  these  things  are 
known  in  the  United  States,  or  at  least,  firmly  believed, 
and  suffered  with  impunity  by  Great  Britain,  that  there 
ever  will  or  can  be  any  cordiality  between  the  two  coun- 


192  APPENDIX. 

tries?  I  answer — No.  And  I  will  undertake,  withoiu 
the  gift  of  prophecy  to  predict,  that  it  will  be  impossible 
to  keep  this  country  in  a  state  of  amity  with  Great  Britain 
long,  if  these  posts  are  not  surrendered.  A  knowledge 
of  these  being  my  sentiments  would  have  little  weight,  I 
am  persuaded,  with  the  British  administration,  or  perhaps 
with  the  nation,  in  effecting  the  measure,  but  both  may 
rest  satisfied,  that  if  they  want  to  be  at  peace  with  this 
country,  and  to  enjoy  the  benefits  of  its  trade,  to  give  up 
the  posts  is  the  only  road  to  it.  Withholding  them,  and 
the  consequences  we  feel  at  present  continuing,  war  will 
be  inevitable." 


[No.  4.] 

Letter  of  credence  given  by  the  Governor-General  of 
the  Canadas  to  John  Henry.  "  The  bearer,  Mr.  John 
Henry,  is  employed  by  me,  and  full  confidence  may  be 
placed  in  him  for  communications  which  any  person  may 
wish  to  make  to  me  in  the  business  committed  to  him. 
In  faith  of  which,  I  have  given  him  this,  under  my  hand 
and  seal,  at  Quebec,  the  6th  of  February,  1809. 

(Signed.)  J.  H.  CRAIG." 

Extract  from  the  letter  of  instructions  to  Mr.  Henry. 
[Most  secret  and  confidential.] 

"  Quebec,  6th  February,  1809. 

"  It  has  been  supposed,  that  if  the  federalists  of  the 
eastern  states  should  be  successful  in  obtaining  that  de 
cided  influence,  which  may  enable  them  to  direct  the  public 


APPENDIX.  193 

opinion,  it  is  not  improbable,  that  rather  than  submit  to  a 
continuance  of  the  difficulties  and  distress  to  which  they 
are  now  subject,  they  will  exert  that  influence  to  bring 
about  a  separation  from  the  general  Union.  The  earliest 
information  on  this  subject,  may  be  of  great  consequence 
to  our  government,  as  it  may  also  be,  that  it  should  be 
informed,  how  far,  in  such  an  event,  they  would  look  to 
England  for  assistance,  or  be  disposed  to  enter  into  a  con 
nexion  with  us  ?" 

Report  made  to  Sir  James  Craig,  under  the  preceding 
instruction,  and  dated  Boston,  March  7th,  1809.  "  Sir,  I 
have  now  ascertained,  with  as  much  accuracy  as  possible, 
the  course  intended  to  be  pursued  by  the  measures  and 
politics  of  the  general  government.  I  have  already  given 
a  decided  opinion,  that  a  declaration  of  war  is  not  to  be 
expected ;  but,  contrary  to  all  reasonable  calculation, 
should  the  Congress  possess  spirit  and  independence 
enough  to  place  their  popularity  in  jeopardy  by  so  strong  a 
measure,  the  legislature  of  Massachusetts  will  give  the  tone 
to  the  neighboring  states;  will  declare  itself  permanent,  until 
a  new  election  of  members  ;  invite  a  Congress,  to  be  composed 
of  delegates  from  the  federal  slates,  and  erect  a  separate  gov 
ernment  for  their  common  defence  and  common  interest." 

Time,  that  great  betrayer  of  political  secrets,  has  pro 
duced  a  curious  illustration  of  the  opinion  given  by  Henry 
in  the  preceding  report.  Mr.  Adams,  ci-devant  President 
of  the  United  States,  in  a  late  publication  admits,  that  in 
1808,  "he  earnestly  recommended  to  the  friends  of  the 
administration  of  that  day,  the  substitution  of  the  non- 
intercourse  for  the  embargo ;  and  in  giving  his  reasons  for 
that  preference,  was  necessarily  led  to  enlarge  upon  the 
views  and  purposes  of  certain  leaders  of  the  party,  which 
17 


194  APPENDIX. 

had  the  management  of  the  state  legislature  in  their  hands. 
He  urged,  that  a  continuance  of  the  embargo  much  longer, 
would  certainly  be  met  by  forcible  resistance,  supported  by  the 
legislature,  and  probably,  by  the  judiciary  of  the  state ;  that 
to  quell  that  resistance,  (if  force  should  be  resorted  to  by 
the  government,)  would  produce  a  civil  war ;  and  that  in 
that  event,  he  had  no  doubt  the  leaders  of  the  party  would 
secure  the  co-operation  with  them  of  Great  Britain.  That 
their  object  was,  and  had  been  for  several  years,  a  dissolution 
of  the  Union,  and  the  establishment  of  a  separate  confedera 
tion,  he  knew  from  unequivocal  evidence,  although  not  prone- 
able  in  a  court  of  law  ;  and  that  in  the  case  of  a  civil  war,  the 
aid  of  Great  Britain  to  effect  that  purpose,  would  be  as  surely 
resorted  to,  as  it  would  be  indispensably  necessary  to  the 
design."  It  would  be  unjust  to  the  party,  thus  accused  by 
Mr.  Adams,  were  we  not  to  add,  that  the  expositions  sub 
sequently  made  on  this  subject,  do  not  sustain  the  opinions 
given  by  that  gentleman. 


[No.  5.J 

As  a  specimen  of  the  temper  of  the  opposition  of  that 
day,  we  subjoin  the  following  resolution  of  the  Senate  of 
Massachusetts,  passed  on  the  15th  of  June,  1813,  in  con 
sequence  of  the  capture  of  his  His  Britannic  Majesty's 
ship  Peacock,  by  the  American  ship  Hornet. 

"  Resolved,  As  the  sense  of  the  Senate  of  Massachusetts, 
that  in  a  war  like  the  present,  waged  without  justifiable 
cause,  and  prosecuted  in  a  manner  which  indicates  that 


APPENDIX.  195 

conquest  and  ambition  are  its  real  motives  ;  it  is  not  be 
coming  a  moral  and  religious  people,  to  express  any 
approbation  of  military  or  naval  exploits,  which  are  not 
immediately  connected  with  the  defence  of  our  seacoast 
and  soil.'5 

A  further  exposition  of  this  temper  will  be  found  in 
an  act  of  the  legislature  of  Connecticut,  declaring  the  law 
of  the  United  States  (authorizing  the  enlistment  of  minors) 
unconstitutional,  and  providing,  that  all  persons  acting 
under  it  within  the  state,  should  be  punished  by  fine  and 
imprisonment.  The  penal  clause  was,  however,  qualified 
at  the  instance  of  the  Speaker  of  the  House,  and  the 
punishment  by  imprisonment  given  up.  About  the  same 
time,  all  troops  of  the  United  States  were,  by  an  act  of 
the  Corporation  of  Hartford,  excluded  from  the  city.^ 
Major  (now  General]  Jessup's  Report  to  the  Department  of 
State. 


[No.  6.] 

Our  authority  for  making  this  statement  will  be  found 
in  the  following  extract  from  a  letter  of  the  28th  of  Sep 
tember,  1834,  written  by  Major-General  Jessup,  of  the 
army  of  the  United  States. 

"  As  to  the  particular  fact  in  relation  to  which  you  desire 
information,  (the  franking  of  the  letters  from  which  the 
enemy  derived  his  knowledge  of  the  declaration  of  war,) 
it  rests  on  general  report  and  Mr.  Gallatin's  admission, 
(made  to  General  Findley,  in  1812,)  that  he  had  franked 


196  APPENDIX. 

letters  addressed  to  persons  in  the  enemy1  s  territory.79  Of 
letters,  so  franked  and  addressed,  three  have  been  noticed ; 
one  sent  to  the  west,  (probably  to  St.  Joseph,)  furnished 
the  first  authentic  evidence  of  the  declaration  of  war  re 
ceived  there ;  and  with  it  a  good  and  sufficient  reason, 
for  attacking  and  capturing  Michilimackinac  and  its  gar 
rison.  Such  was  the  substance  of  a  report  made  by 
Lieutenant  Hanks  to  General  Hull,  and  the  officer  then 
serving  as  his  Adjutant- General.  A  second,  sent  to  Mai 
den,  (according  to  information  given  to  General  Jessup 
and  the  late  Major  Dugan,  while  at  that  place,)  was  re 
ceived  by  the  British  commanding  officer,  on  the  28th  of 
June  ;  and,  no  doubt,  caused  the  attack  and  capture  of 
the  Cayahoga  packet,  carrying  the  sick  and  convalescent 
of  Hull's  army,  with  his  and  their  baggage.  A  third, 
reached  Detroit,  "•  was  there  retained  and  seen  by  many 
persons,  among  whom,  was  General  James  Taylor,  of 
Kentucky."  Whatever  may  have  been  Hie  motive  of  the 
letter  writer,  the  injury  done  to  the  United  States  cannot 
be  denied — as  its  direct,  if  not  obvious  effect,  was  to  take 
from  them  and  give  to  the  enemy,  the  power  of  striking 
the  first  blow — an  advantage,  which  often  decides  the  fate, 
of  a  campaign,  and  not  unfrequently,  that  of  a,  waj. 


[No.  7.] 

Memorandum  of  statements  made  by  General  Win 
chester  and  Major  Madison  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  on 
their  return  from  captivity. 


APPENDIX.  197 

"  To  avoid  embarrassing  the  service  with  a  personal 
controversy,  and  at  the  request  of  General  Harrison, 
though  the  elder  Brigadier,  I  continued  in  the  command 
of  the  advanced  corps,  then  on  the  Au  Glaize,  under  a 
promise  on  his  part,  that '  I  should  be  soon  re-enforced 
and  sufficiently  supplied.'  Early  in  December,  I  received 
orders  to  advance  to  the  Rapids  ;  a  point,  selected  by  the 
General,  for  establishing  a  magazine  for  the  supply  of  the 
expedition.  From  the  freezing  up  of  the  rivers,  which 
prevented  the  use  of  boats,  and  from  not  being  provided 
with  teams  or  pack-horses  for  transporting  the  baggage 
and  provisions,  and  being  consequently  obliged  to  drag 
both  by  hand,  over  roads  then  deeply  covered  with  snow, 
it  was  the  10th  of  January  before  we  arrived  at  that  post. 
When  two  days  on  the  march,  I  received  a  letter  from 
General  Harrison,  advising  me  to  send  back  within  con 
tract  limits,  two  of  the  regiments  composing  the  brigade, 
which  was  now  reduced  by  sickness  and  fatigue  to  less 
than  nine  hundred  effectives.  This  advice  I  declined 
following,  for  the  subjoined  reasons — The  post  assigned 
to  us  had  become  highly  important,  from  its  being  the 
site  of  our  magazine,  and  from  the  fact,  that  it  was  con 
siderably  nearer  to  the  enemy's  main  body  than  to  our 
own ;  that  the  roads  between  Maiden  and  the  Rapids, 
were  more  easily  travelled  than  those  between  the  Rapids 
and  General  Harrison's  head-quarters  ;  that  having  no 
intermediate  post  to  observe  or  interrupt  a  movement 
against  us,  if  made  by  the  enemy,  they  might  come  on 
secretly  and  invest  and  carry  the  position,  without  giving 
us  the  power  of  even  making  known  our  condition  to  the 
other  parts  of  the  army ;  and  lastly,  that  being  thus  ex 
posed  to  attack  and  out  of  sustaining  distance,  the  post 


198  APPENDIX. 

had  not  the  ordinary  means  of  defence ;  having  neither 
cannon  nor  fortification,  nor  intrenching  or  other  tools, 
necessary  for  making  the  latter ;  nor  even  an  order  for  so 
using  them,  if  they  had  been  provided — the  only  instruc 
tion  given  me  being  that <  of  clearing  my  front  of  an  Indian 
party,  supposed  to  have  established  itself  on  Swan  Creek, 
and  making  huts  for  covering  the  provisions  and  baggage.' 
Had  I  taken  the  General's  advice,  my  effective  force  on 
my  arrival  at  the  Rapids,  would  not  have  exceeded  four 
hundred  effectives,  left  to  defend  themselves  and  the 
magazines,  with  muskets  and  rifles  only,  against  the  at 
tacks  of  a  British  and  Indian  force,  which  General  Har 
rison  did  not  estimate  at  less  ihtmfour  thousand  combatants. 
Having  promptly  fulfilled  the  order  above  mentioned,  of 
driving  off  the  Indian  party,  we  proceeded  to  make  a  large 
and  strong  house ;  which  besides  covering  our  supplies, 
would  be  useful  as  a  place  of  defence  against  the  attacks 
of  the  enemy.  Of  our  arrival  and  situation  the  General 
was  informed,  by  the  best  means  I  had — a  party  returning 
to  Me  Arthur's  block-house  ;  by  whom  I  also  requested  a 
fulfilment  of  his  promise  of  a  speedy  re-enforcement.  In 
this  state  of  things,  three  expresses,  bringing  letters  from 
Mr.  Day  of  Frenchtown,  arrived  in  my  camp  in  quick 
succession,  with  information,  that  a  British  and  Indian 
force  had  arrived  there  (about  three  hundred  in  number) 
with  orders  to  seize  and  send  to  Maiden,  all  inhabitants 
attached  to  the  United  States  government,  or  suspected 
of  being  so  attached,  and  with  them,  all  horses  and  cattle, 
sleds,  carioles,  and  provisions  of  every  kind,  and  con 
demning  at  once  the  whole  settlement  to  starvation,  im 
prisonment  or  slaughter,  in  case  of  refusal  or  resistance. 
The  information  was  forthwith  communicated  to  a  council 


APPENDIX. 


199 


of  war,  who,  after  full  discussion,  unanimously  agreed, 
that  a  detachment  should  be  immediately  marched  against 
the  British  and  Indian  marauders.  A  detachment  of  six 
hundred  men  was  accordingly  sent  under  Colonel  Lewis, 
of  whose  success  on  the  18th,  General  Harrison  was  im 
mediately  apprised,  and  a  request  made  on  General  Per 
kins  (whose  post  was  nearest  to  me)  for  another  battalion 
or  regiment,  and  some  artillery  if  practicable.  Suspecting 
that  Proctor  would  make  an  attempt  to  revenge  this  stroke, 
and  knowing  that  our  wounded  men  could  not  be  removed, 
I  hastened  to  re-enforce  Colonel  Lewis  with  Wells's  regi 
ment,  (two  hundred  and  fifty  men,)  and  set  out  myself  to  join 
him,  and  arrived  on  the  morning  of  the  20th.  The  town, 
lying  on  the  north  side  of  the  river,  was  picketed  on  three 
sides — the  longest,  facing  the  north  and  making  the  front. 
Within  these  pickets,  Colonel  Lewis's  corps  was  found. 
Not  thinking  the  position  elegible,  nor  the  pickets  a  suf 
ficient  defence  against  artillery,  I  would  have  retreated, 
but  for  the  wounded,  of  whom  there  were  fifty-five  ;  but 
having  no  sufficient  means  for  transporting  these,  and 
equally  destitute  of  those  necessary  for  fortifying  strongly, 
I  issued  an  order  for  putting  the  placo  in  the  best  condition 
for  defence  that  might  be  practicable  ;  intending  to  con 
struct  some  new  works,  as  soon  as  the  means  for  getting 
out  timber  might  be  had.  On  the  evening  of  the  20th, 
Wells  arrived,  and  was  directed  to  encamp  on  the  right, 
in  an  open  field,  immediately  without  the  picketing.  On 
the  21st,  a  patrole  as  far  as  Brownstown  was  sent  out,  and 
returned  without-  seeing  any  thing  of  an  enemy  ;  on  the 
same  day,  a  man  from  Maiden  came  in,  who  reported, 
that  the  enemy  were  preparing  to  attack  us,  but  knowing 
nothing  of  the  kind  or  extent  of  the  preparation  made  or 


200  APPENDIX. 

making,  what  he  brought  was  thought  to  be  only  conjee 
ture,  and  such  as  led  to  a  belief,  that  it  would  be  some 
days  before  Proctor  would  be  ready  to  do  any  thing. 
The  troops  were  now  in  high  spirits,  expecting  the  arrival 
of  General  Harrison  with  re-enforcements  from  the 
Rapids,  where  he  had  got  on  the  20th ;  despatching  his 
Inspector- General  on  the  same  day  with  orders  to  me, 
'  to  hold  the  ground  we  had  got  at  any  rate,'  implying  as 
we  believed,  an  engagement  on  his  part,  to  be  soon  with 
us  and  in  force.  Neither  night-patrole,  nor  night-pickets 
were  ordered  by  me,  from  a  belief,  that  both  were  matters 
of  routine  and  in  constant  use.  Our  force  now  amounted 
to  seven  hundred  and  fifty  men,  stationed  as  before  men 
tioned  ;  the  volunteers  within,  and  Wells's  regiment  with 
out  the  pickets.  Not  to  discommode  the  wounded  men, 
who,  with  Colonel  Lewis's  corps,  occupied  the  houses  on 
the  north  side  of  the  river,  I  at  some  increased  personal 
risk,  took  quarters  for  myself  and  suite,  in  a  house  on 
the  southern  bank,  directly  fronting  the  troops  and  only 
separated  from  them  by  the  river,  then  firmly  frozen,  and 
but  between  eighty  and  one  hundred  yards  wide.  While 
the  reveille  was  beating  on  the  morning  of  the  22d,  the 
alarm  was  given,  and  was  soon  followed  by  an  attack  of 
the  British  on  the  front,  and  by  that  of  the  Indians  on 
both  flanks.  I  was  with  the  troops  in  a  few  minutes,  and 
found  every  man  at  his  post.  Finding  the  left  of  the  line 
on  the  outside  of  the  pickets  somewhat  galled  by  the 
enemy's  fire,  (in  pursuance  of  a  plan  previously  laid  in 
case  of  attack,)  I  requested  Colonel  Allen  to  draw  them 
forward,  and  bring  them  within  the  picketing.  When  this 
order  had  been  nearly  executed,  and  the  head  of  the  line 
was  within  a  few  steps  of  the  entrance,  where  I  stood, 


APPENDIX.  201 

some  of  the  soldiers  mistaking  the  movement  for  a  retreat, 
sounded  the  alarm  and  began  to  fly,  when  the  whole 
broke  and  rushed  towards  the  river.  I  instantly  ordered 
them  to  be  reformed  under  the  bank ;  but  though  great 
efforts  were  made  by  Colonels  Lewis  and  Allen,  and 
others,  to  effect  this  object,  they  failed ;  the  panic  of  the 
men  overcoming  all  authority.  Parts  of  two  companies 
from  the  picketing,  brought  out  to  aid  in  restoring  order, 
were  carried  off  by  the  current ;  and  a  daring  Indian 
attack  from  both  flanks  being  now  commenced  on  the  fugi 
tives,  all  further  resistance  was  overwhelmed.  Colonel 
Allen  fell,  and  Colonel  Lewis  and  myself  were  captured. 
My  farther  agency  was  only  that  of  an  adviser.  No 
longer  hoping  any  thing  from  the  intervention  of  General 
Harrison,  and  seeing  one  half  of  our  force  already  cap 
tured  or  dispersed,  I  anticipated  only  the  slaughter  of 
those  within  the  pickets  who  yet  bravely  held  out ;  and 
assured  by  Proctor,  that  on  a  surrender,  he  would  give 
honorable  terms,  I  advised  to  that  measure.  Not  being 
permitted  to  communicate  with  Majors  Graves  or  Madi 
son  in  person,  my  opinion  was  probably  misunderstood, 
and  certainly  misrepresented,  as  after  my  own  capture,  I 
had  no  idea  that  I  could  legally  exercise  authority  over 
them.  I  will  not,  however,  pretend  that  I  am  able  now 
to  recollect  the  terms  I  used  on  the  occasion,  but  the 
present  is  a  true  statement  of  what  I  intended," 

JVfq/or  Madison's  statement, 

"  Our  force,  on  the  22d  of  January,  was  between  seven 
hundred  and  fifty  and  eight  hundred  men.  The  original 
detachment  under  Colonel  Lewis  was  diminished  by  the 
action  of  the  18th  with  Reynolds,  upwards  of  seventy-five 


202  APPENDIX. 

men — fifty-five  of  whom  were  wounded — and  increased 
two  hundred  and  fifty,  by  Wells's  regiment,  brought  on 
by  General  Winchester.  Proctor's  force  did  not  much, 
if  at  all,  exceed  one  thousand  men,  three  hundred  regu 
lars,  the  remainder  Canadian  militia  and  Indians.  On 
the  first  (the  regulars)  Proctor's  principal  dependance 
was  placed,  but  from  the  coldness  of  the  weather  and  the 
depth  of  the  snow,  his  artillery  became  unmanageable  ; 
and  his  infantry  after  doing  its  best,  and  losing  one-fourth 
of  its  number,  was  not  in  either  condition  or  disposition 
to  renew  its  attack  on  the  picketed  part  of  our  position. 

"  Our  camp-police  was,  perhaps,  not  what  it  ought  to 
have  been ;  but  I  am  not  here  the  accuser  or  excuser.  of 
any  one,  though  thoroughly  convinced  that  the  principal 
error  of  the  campaign,  and  that  which  brought  all  other 
evils  upon  us,  was  the  great  distance  at  which  the  other 
parts  of  the  army  were  kept.  Had  the  disposition  been 
different,  had  the  main  body  been  located  within  sustain 
ing  distance  of  the  advanced  corps,  or  had  this  corps  been 
re-enforced  by  even  a  single  battalion  of  five  hundred 
men,  ours  would  have  been  a  victory  instead  of  a  defeat. 
As  it  was,  so  firmly  did  the  few  men  holding  the  town 
believe  in  their  power  of  defending  it,  even  after  General 
Winchester's  capture,  that  it  was  with  great  reluctance 
they  gave  it  up  ;  and  principally  from  a  want  of  ammuni 
tion  to  continue  the  contest,  and  not  from  Proctor's  threats 
of  smoking  or  burning  us  out,  which  we  knew  to  be  ridicu 
lous.  A  sight  of  the  enemy's  condition,  which  could  not 
be  prevented  after  our  surrender,  satisfied  me  that  if  we 
could  have  been  supplied  with  ammunition,  we  might 
have  held  out,  for  no  one  could  show  more  impatience  to 
begin  and  continue  a  retreat  than  Proctor,  embarrassed 


APPENDIX.  203 

as  he  was  with  wounded  and  dying  men,  with  the  pris 
oners  he  had  made,  and  expecting  to  be  attacked  every 
moment  by  Harrison,  of  whose  arrival  at  the  Rapids  he 
had  been  informed  by  an  Indian  runner,  while  the  attack 
was  going  on." 


[No.  8.] 

Major  Eve's  testimony. 

"  A  few  days  after  General  Winchester  had  assumed 
the  command  at  fort  Wayne,  we  were  met  at  the  St. 
Mary's  by  General  Harrison,  who  called  together  all 
the  field-officers  who  were  at  that  place,  with  the  Hon. 
Samuel  McKee.  General  Harrison  then  stated  that  the 
army  was  in  a  deplorable  situation — that  he  had  relin 
quished  the  command  to  General  Winchester ;  but  from 
a  letter  which  had  met  him  at  St.  Mary's,  he  was  at  a 
loss  to  understand  whether  the  Secretary  of  War  intended 
that  he  (Harrison)  or  Winchester  should  have  the  com 
mand — that  the  troops  at  fort  Wayne  were  much  dissatis 
fied  at  being  commanded  by  General  Winchester,  and 
that  he  had  to  take  some  pains  to  satisfy  them.  He  then 
requested  the  officers  present  to  say,  who  they,  and  the 
troops  under  their  respective  commands,  would  rather  be 
commanded  by.  The  answer  to  a  man  was,  that  they 
had  rather  be  commanded  by  General  Harrison.  He 
then  requested  the  officers  to  make  that  expression  in 
writing,  and  called  on  Mr.  McKee  to  draw  up  a  written 
statement  to  that  effect,  observing  at  the  same  time,  that 


204  APPENDIX. 

he  would  send  it  to  the  officers  at  fort  Wayne,  and  if*  it  was 
the  wish  of  the  army  generally,  that  he  should  command,  he 
would  take  it,  and  risk  the  consequences  wilh  the  government. 
But  upon  reflection,  (after  General  Harrison  had  retired,) 
it  was  thought  improper  by  the  officers  to  sign  the  statement 
drawn  up  by  Mr.  McKee.  General  Harrison  was,  in  a 
few  days  afterwards,  invested  with  the  command  by  the 
Secretary  of  War,  which  made  any  further  call  on  the 
officers  unnecessary.  I  have  only  to  state  facts,  without 
intending  to  eulogize  General  Winchester,  or  to  injure 
General  Harrison.  With  the  former,  I  have  very  little 
acquaintance ;  but  have  no  hesitation  in  saying,  that  I 
believe  his  conduct  \vhilst  in  the  army  has  been  much 
misrepresented  to  his  prejudice," 


[No.  9.] 

Extracts  from  affidavits  in  relation  to  the  affair  at 
Frenchtown,  of  the  22d  of  January,  1813,  made  by  the 
late  Governor  Madison  of  Kentucky,  Colonel  William 
Lewis,  and  Major  S.  Garrard. 

"  Sometime  between  the  8th  and  12th  of  January,  we 
arrived  at  the  Rapids  of  the  Miami,  where  a  co-operation 
was  expected  with  General  Tupper — but  in  that  we  were 
disappointed.  In  a  few  days  after  our  arrival  at  the 
Rapids,  I  understood  that  General  Winchester  had  re 
ceived  communications  from  the  inhabitants  of  the  Au 
Raisin  settlement,  making  application  to  him  for  assist 
ance  and  protection — which  was  repeated,  with  statements 


APPENDIX.  205 

that  the  enemy  were  plundering  them  of  their  property.  A 
council  of  the  officers  was  then  called  and  their  opinions 
taken.  To  the  best  of  my  recollections,  they  were  unani 
mously  of  opinion,  that  a  detachment  ought  to  be  sent  to 
the  relief  of  the  inhabitants  at  Raisin,  as  soon  as  prac 
ticable.  I  cannot  say  whether  or  no  General  Winchester 
had  any  right  to  expect  re-enforcements  from  General 
Tupper  and  Perkins,  but  it  was  generally  believed  that 
we  would  receive  troops  from  them.  I  am  well  per 
suaded,  that  could  we  have  been  re-enforced  with  five  hundred 
additional  men,  a  victory  on  the  22d  of  January,  1813,  would 
have  been  the  result  instead  of  a  defeat." 

Extract  from  the  statement  of  Colonel  W.  Lewis. 

"  /  think,  had  the  General's  force  at  Frenchtown  been  five 
hundred  greater  than  it  was,  he  would  not  have  experienced  a 
defeat.  I  was  immediately  with  General  Winchester, 
during  great  part  of  the  action,  and  can  bear  testimony  to 
his  coolness  and  bravery. 

Extract  from  the  affidavit  of  Major  S.  Garrard,  Inspector 
of  Brigadier-General  Payne'' s  brigade  of  Kentucky  vol 
unteers,  made  a  prisoner  at  Frenchtown. 

"On  my  return  from  Canada,  I  passed  the  Rapids, 
where  General  Harrison  informed  me  that  General  Winches 
ter  had  every  reason  to  expect  re-enforcements  on  the  2lst ; 
and  further,  that  they  were  delayed  in  consequence  of 
having,  in  the  first  instance,  attempted  an  advance  on  the 
ice,  which  they  were  compelled  to  abandon,  return  back, 
and  take  Hull's  road." 

18 


206  APPENDIX. 


[No.  10.] 

Orders  given  to  General  Dearborn  by  the  Secretary  of 
War  in  relation  to  the  Niagara  frontier. 

June  26th,  1812. — "  Your  preparations  fat  Albany]  it  is 
presumed,  will  be  made  to  move  in  a  direction  for  Niagara, 
Kingston,  and  Montreal.'1  July  15th. — "On  your  arrival 
at,  Albany,  your  attention  will  be  directed  to  the  security 
of  the  northern  frontier  by  the  lakes."  July  2Qth. — "  You 
will  make  such  arrangements  with  Governor  Tompkins, 
as  will  place  the  militia,  detached  by  him  for  the  Niagara 
and  other  posts  on  the  lake,  under  your  control."  July  29th. 
— "  Should  it  be  advisable  to  make  any  other  disposition 
of  these  restless  people,  [the  warriors  of  the  Seneca  tribe 
of  Indians,]  you  will  give  orders  to  JWr.  Granger  and  the 
commanding  officer  at  Niagara."  August  \st. — "  You 
will  make  a  diversion  in  favor  of  him  [General  Hull]  at 
Niagara  and  Kingston,  as  soon  as  may  be  practicable." 
How,  we  ask,  was  it  possible  for  the  General,  with  these 
orders  in  his  portfolio,  to  believe,  that  the  Niagara  fron 
tier  had  not  been  within  the  limits  of  his  command  ?  And 
if  he  did  so  believe,  by  what  authority  did  he  extend  the 
armistice  (entered  into  between  him  and  Provost)  to  that 
frontier  ?  As,  however,  the  inaction  which  enabled  Brock 
to  leave  his  posts  on  the  Niagara  undisturbed  and  un- 
menaced,  and  even  to  carry  with  him  a  part  of  his  force 
to  Detroit,  and  there  to  capture  Hull,  his  army  and  terri 
tory,  was  not  noticed  by  any  kind  of  disapprobation  on 
the  part  of  the  government,  the  inference  is  fair,  that  it 
(the  government)  was  willing  to  take  the  responsibility 
on  itself. 


* 


APPENDIX.  207 


[No.  11.] 

Extract  of  a  letter  from  Sir   George  Provost  to   General 

Brock,  dated  30M  of  August,  1812. 
44 1  consider  it  most  fortunate,  that  I  have  been  able  to 
prosecute  this  object  of  the  government  (the  armistice) 
without  interfering  with  your  operations  on  the  Detroit. 
I  have  sent  you  men,  money  and  stores  of  all  kinds." — 
See  Life  and  Services  of  Sir  George  Provost. 


[No.  12.] 

"  Albany,  February  22d,  1813. 

"SiR, — In  obedience  to  orders  of  the  8th  instant,  requir 
ing  from  me  *  a  particular  statement  in  relation  to  the  affair 
at  Queenstown,'  I  have  the  honor  to  transmit  a  journal  of 
the  incidents  connected  with  that  affair  which  fell  under 
my  observation. 

44  On  the  10th  of  October,  1812, 1  waited  on  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Fenwick,  commanding  at  fort  Niagara,  to  report 
my  arrival  on  the  evening  of  the  9th  instant,  with  a  detach 
ment  of  nearly  four  hundred  of  the  thirteenth,  at  the  Four- 
Mile  Creek,  in  charge  of  military  stores,  and  thirty-nine 
boats  capable  of  carrying  conveniently  each  thirty  men. 
He  informed  me  of  an  intended  attack  that  night  at 
Queenstown,  and  I  requested  orders  to  join  the  corps 
designated  for  it.  Such  orders  he  was  not  authorized  to 


208  APPENDIX. 

give,  but  sent  off  an  express  that  evening  to  General  Yan 
Rensselaer  to  procure  them.  They  arrived  (I  have  since 
learned)  at  Niagara  about  nine  at  night,  but  I  was  pre 
vented  by  an  accident  from  receiving  them ;  and  my  detach 
ment  was  saved  a  night's  march  in  a  storm,  and  exposure 
and  march  the  next  day,  by  which  all  the  other  regulars  in 
that  quarter  were  very  considerably  harassed  ;  as,  being 
without  tents  or  camp  equipage,  they  were  obliged  to 
keep  on  foot  until  they  returned  to  their  quarters.  This 
intended  attack,  in  which  my  detachment  was  not  origin 
ally  included,  was  to  have  been  conducted  by  Colonel 
Van  Rensselaer  and  Captain  Machesney  at  the  head  of  a 
party  of  regulars,  but  was  defeated  by  some  mistake  or 
treachery  of  a  man  in  charge  of  the  boats. 

"  On  the  llth,  (the  storm  still  continuing  with  unabated 
violence,  and  the  road  still  covered  with  stragglers  from 
the  different  detachments  of  regulars,  which  had  marched 
the  night  before  from  fort  Niagara  and  its  vicinity  to 
Lewistown,  on  the  proposed  expedition,)  I  rode  to  General 
Van  Renssalaer's  encampment  in  order  to  report  more 
particularly  the  detachment  under  my  command,  and  to 
request  a  place  in  the  next  attempt ;  mentioning  that  I 
should  like  forty-eight  hours  for  preparation,  being  myself 
an  entire  stranger  to  the  country,  and  the  detachment 
being  just  off  a  long  march  expedition  from  Oswego,  re 
quiring  some  time  for  the  issue  of  several  articles  of  petit 
equipment,  and  for  putting  themselves  in  the  best  condi 
tion.  It  was  intimated  to  me  that  I  should  have  a  part  in 
the  first  attack,  and  that  it  would  take  place  in  a  few 
days.  On  the  12th,  about  twelve  o'clock,  Colonel  Van 
Rensselaer  rode  into  my  camp  and  informed  me  that  I 
must  march  immediately  to  Lewistown — that  he  intended 


APPENDIX.  209 

to  attack  at  Queenstown  that  night.  The  weather  had 
cleared  away  early,  and  at  this  time  my  tents  were  struck, 
every  musket  and  lock  taken  to  pieces,  and  every  thing 
in  the  camp  going  through  the  process  of  police  usual  on 
such  occasions  ;  I  was  also  informed  that  the  provisions 
for  that  day  had  not  yet  been  received  from  fort  Niagara 
and  could  not  be  before  evening.  Colonel  Van  Rens- 
selaer  stated,  however,  that  we  should  be  able  to  reach 
Lewistown  early,  and  that  he  would  have  rations  ready 
for  them  there.  We  conversed  about  my  waiving  rank 
with  him,  which  I  told  him  was  impossible ;  but  as  it  was 
equally  impossible  for  me  to  command  in  a  night-attack 
on  a  place  I  had  never  seen — as  I  was  informed  it  was  a 
critical  moment  which  must  be  used — and  as  I  was  not 
disinclined  to  yield  as  much  as  possible  to  an  officer  of 
established  reputation,  and  as  I  was,  and  knew  my  whole 
detachment  to  be  anxious  for  an  opportunity  of  seeing 
some  actual  service  on  any  terms,  I  consented  to  take  a 
part  without  interfering  with  his  arrangements  for  it,  and 
requested  for  myself  only  good  guides,  and  a  landing  in 
good  order  at  the  proper  point.  The  detachment  ac 
cordingly  moved  a  little  before  five  o'clock  in  the  after 
noon,  and  marched  or  rather  waded  to  Lewistown,  where 
we  arrived  sometime  before  ten ;  and  most  of  the  men 
and  some  of  the  officers  had  then  their  first  meal  for  that 
day.  i 

October  13th. — At  half-past  three,  Colonel  Van  Rens- 
selaer  woke  me  and  informed  me  it  was  time  to  move. 
I  formed  the  detachment,  read  to  the  officers  General 
Van  Rensselaer's  orders  for  the  battle,  and  conducted 
partly  by  a  guide  and  by  Colonel  Van  Rensselaer,  marched 
to  the  river.  On  the  way,  Colonel  Van  Rensselaer  in- 
18* 


210  APPENDIX. 

troduced  my  guide  for  the  battle  to  me.  Between  four 
and  five  o'clock  we  embarked  our  first  parties.  The 
number  of  boats  was  eleven  or  twelve,  I  understood,  aver 
aging  about  twenty-five  men  each,  being  calculated  to 
carry  just  half  of  our  respective  detachments  at  a  time. 
The  boats  assigned  to  the  detachment  under  my  orders 
were  on  the  right,  i.  e.  down  the  stream.  Having  em 
barked  the  first  party,  and  given  orders  to  Captain 
Ogilvie  to  take  charge  of  the  embarcation  of  the  next  on 
the  return  of  the  boats,  I  chose  the  boat  in  which  was  my 
principal  guide,  one  Hopkins,  and  a  party  selected  agree 
ably  to  General  Van  Rensselaer's  orders,  for  the  advanced 
guard  of  my  detachment  in  the  attack.  The  first  that 
reached  the  Canada  shore  was  the  boat  in  which  Captain 
Armstrong  commanded,  Captain  Malcolm  and  Lieutenant 
Hugunen  being  also  on  board  ;  and  the  pilot  being  skil 
ful,  returned  immediately  and  gave  Captain  Ogilvie  an 
opportunity  of  executing  his  orders  in  part.  The  boat  to 
which  I  had  committed  myself,  (if  the  circumstances 
under  which  I  embarked  are  appreciated,  that  phrase  will 
not  be  deemed  improper,)  unhappily  lost  a  row-lock  on 
the  right,  which  gave  it  a  direction  down  the  stream  ;  and 
although  an  officer,  Lieutenant  Fink,  remedied  that  evil 
in  a  great  measure,  so  far  as  the  oar  was  concerned,  by 
holding  it,  the  pilot  wanted  skill  or  presence  of  mind  to 
alter  his  course ;  and  no  one  else  knowing  any  thing  of 
the  stream  or  point  of  landing,  and  it  being  perfectly  dark, 
we  were  obliged  to  confide  in  him.  Having  in  this  man 
ner  gone  farther  down  the  stream  than  across  it,  we  soon 
fell  below  the  others,  and  the  fire  of  the  left  of  the  village 
was  directed  against  this  boat.  The  pilot,  panic-struck, 
turned  about,  but  being  ordered  with  severity  to  make  the 


APPENDIX. 

Canada  shore  at  any  point,  he  made  another  effort  literally 
groaning  with  fear.  Hopkins,  who  was  called  on  to  assist 
him,  was  useless.  The  situation  of  a  boat  thus  managed 
on  a  rapid  stream  when  descending,  not  only  subjected  to 
the  severest  fire  on  the  boats  which  was  decidedly  from 
the  left  of  the  village,  (where  they  seemed  prepared  for 
accidents  of  this  kind,  or  perhaps  expected  the  principal 
debarkation  below,)  but  also  separated  from  the  corps, 
may  easily  be  imagined.  It  became  necessary  to  take 
the  steering-oar  from  the  boatman,  and  return  to  the 
American  shore.  Here  my  guide,  Hopkins,  disappeared. 
Being  several  hundred  yards  below  the  point  of  embarka 
tion,  I  returned  on  foot  by  the  edge  of  the  river,  thinking 
I  could  more  immediately  procure  a  proper  pilot,  and 
cross  from  that  place.  In  the  meantime  the  troops 
landed  and  formed  immediately  on  the  bank,  about  twenty 
paces  or  less  from  the  river,  under  Colonel  Van  Rens- 
selaer.  Here  a  severe  fire  continued  for  a  few  minutes  ; 
but  having  himself  received  several  wounds,  and  no  other 
person  being  acquainted  with  the  force  or  defences  of  the 
enemy,  or  the  topography  of  the  village  and  its  environs, 
he  ordered  the  troops  to  fall  below  the  bank  by  which 
they  were  in  a  great  degree  covered.  In  this  scene, 
Lieutenant  Valleau  and  Ensign  Morris  of  the  thirteenth, 
both  men  of  the  most  estimable  character,  the  latter  quite 
a  youth  and  of  extraordinary  promise,  were  killed  ;  Lieu 
tenant  Rathbone  of  the  first  artillery,  severely  wounded, 
(since  dead ;)  Captains  Armstrong  and  Malcolm  of  the  thir 
teenth,  and  Ensign  Lent  of  the  thirteenth,  severely  wound 
ed,  and  Captain  Wool  of  the  thirteenth,  also  wounded. 

On  my  return  to  the  upper  ferry,  I  found  there  a  scene 
of  confusion  hardly  to  be  described.     The  enemy  concen- 


APPENDIX. 

trated  their  fire  upon  our  embarking  place  :  no  person  be 
ing  charged  with  directing  the  boats  and  embarkation,  or 
with  the  government  of  the  boatmen,  they  forsook  their 
duty.  Persons  unacquainted  with  the  river  (which  was 
indeed  the  case  with  most  of  the  militia  who  had  been  en 
camped  at  Lewiston  several  weeks,  whereas  all  the  regu 
lars  had  been,  marched  there  that  night,)  would  occasionally 
hurry  into  a  boat  as  they  could  find  one,  cross,  and  leave 
it  on  the  shore,  perhaps  to  go  adrift,  or  else  to  be  brought 
back  by  the  wounded  and  their  attendants,  and  others  re 
turning  without  order  or  permission;  and  these  would  land 
where  they  found  it  convenient,  and  leave  the  boat  where 
they  landed.  During  this  state  of  things  (the  day  just  be 
ginning  to  break)  Lieutenant  Colonel  Fenwick  arrived  with 
a  party  consisting  of  Major  Mullany's  detachments  of  the 
13th  and  23d,  and  Capt.  Machesney's  of  the  6th.  He  found 
me  at  the  river's  side,  anxiously  endeavoring  to  procure 
boatmen,  and  was  himself  bitterly  disappointed  by  the  im 
possibility  of  crossing  his  detachment.  Deeming  it  impro 
per  to  expose  his  troops  in  such  a  situation  without  use,  he 
countermarched  in  the  best  order  possible,  but  not  without 
some  confusion,  owing  to  the  narrowness  of  the  ravine 
which  led  down,  to  the  river,  and  the  severe  fire  of  grape, 
cannister,  and  shells,  which  was  directed  on  it.  It  was 
about  this  period,  and  from  this  fire,  that  Captain  Nelson 
of  the  6th,  a  gentleman  equally  respected  and  esteemed  in 
his  official  character  and  private  life,  was  mortally  wounded. 
While  things  were  in  this  state  on  the  American  shore, 
and  partial,  and  generally  unsuccessful  and  ruinous  at 
tempts  to  cross  were  made  by  different  officers,  the  troops 
that  had  crossed  ascended,  by  order  of  Colonel  Van  R., 
the  east  side  of  the  hill  of  Queenstown.  Captain  Ogilvie 
has  the  merit  with  his  companions  of  having  led  on  this 


APPENDIX.  213 

occasion.  It  was  a  few  minutes  after  day-break  when 
this  movement,  which  was  altogether  unobserved  by  the 
enemy,  was  made.  Finding  no  work,  nor  even  a  sentinel 
on  the  hill,  they  marched  to  the  north  side,  half  way 
down  which  wus  a  one  gun  battery  open  in  rear.  Near 
it  were  paraded  their  principal  force,  which  our  best  intel 
ligence  makes  to  consist  of  the  two  flank  companies  of  the 
49th,  commanded  by  Captains  Williams  and  Dennis. 
These  fled  on  a  single  fire  from  the  party  in  their  rear  on 
the  height,  but  soon  rallied,  and  did  not  finally  retreat  un 
til  they  had  made  two  unsuccessful  attempts  to  get  posses 
sion  of  the  hill.  In  this  affair  Captain  Wool  of  the  13th, 
a  gallant  officer,  commanded,  and  displayed  a  firmness 
and  activity  in  the  highest  degree  honorable  to  him.  Capt. 
Ogilvie  and  1st  Lieutenant  Kearney  of  the  13th,  2d 
Lieutenants  Randolph  of  the  Light  Artillery,  and  Can-  and 
Hugunin  of  the  13th,  and  Ensign  Reib,  were  also  highly 
distinguished.  On  the  part  of  the  British,  General  Brock, 
and  his  aid,  Colonel  M'Donald,  fell  ;  both  of  the  officers 
commanding  the  companies  of  the  49th  were  wounded,  and 
they  lost  about  twenty  or  thirty  taken  prisoners,  most  of 
them  wounded.  This  affair  ended  in  a  few  minutes  after 
sunrise  ;  and  of  the  American  party,  few  men  and  not  an 
officer  was  killed  or  wounded. 

But  it  is  necessary  to  state  further  particulars  of  the 
disasters  attending  the  embarkation  and  crossing  of  the  re 
gulars  at  this  period,  as  they  were  the  great  cause  of  the 
destruction  and  confusion  of  the  regulars  that  day,  and  of 
so  small  a  number  of  them  being  engaged  in  the  subse 
quent  scenes. 

It  appears,  then,  that  of  four  regular  officers  commanding 
corps,  \\ho  actually  attempted  to  cross  before  this  affair  of 
the  morning,  (all  of  them  in  different  boats,)  not  one  sue- 


214  APPENDIX. 

ceeded.  They  were  Lieutenant-Colonel  Fenwick,  Major 
Mullany,  Captain  Machesney,  and  myself. 

It  appears,  also,  that  five  regular  officers  were  taken 
prisoners  immediately  on  landing  on  the  left  of  the  village, 
their  parties  being  almost  entirely  cut  to  pieces  in  their 
boats.  These  were,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Fenwick,  Lieu 
tenants  Phelps  (13th)  and  Clark,  (23d)  which  three  were 
severely  wounded,  and  Lieutenants  Bailey  (3d  Artillery) 
and  Turner  (13th  Infantry). 

The  names  of  several  other  officers  might  be  mentioned 
who  were  defeated  in  their  attempts  to  land  at  the  proper 
point,  and  were  obliged  to  return. 

Our  best  intelligence  on  this  subject  authorises  me  to 
state,  that  at  least  one  hundred  regulars  were  killed,  wound 
ed,  and  taken  prisoners  on  the  left  of  the  village  before  or 
about  sunrise. 

About  seven,  or  a  few  minutes  past  seven  o'clock,  I 
crossed;  having  for  some  time  previous,  as  soon  as  the 
crossing  became  practicable,  collected  different  detach 
ments  and  sent  them  over.  I  found  the  senior  officer 
there  to  be  Captain  Machesney  of  the  6th,  who  had,  how 
ever,  crossed  but  a  few  minutes  before  under  my  orders. 
Being  in  expectation  of  an  immediate  attack  of  the  enemy 
in  force,  I  employed  myself  in  disposing  of  the  prisoners 
which  were  still  brought  in ;  checking  the  disorders  to 
which  some  of  the  troops  seemed  inclined  ;  and  arranging 
the  fragments  of  the  different  detachments  of  regulars  in 
their  proper  order.  The  gun,  in  the  battery  which  has 
been  mentioned,  I  found  had  been  spiked  by  one  of  our 
own  artillerists.  In  the  course  of  an  hour,  in  which  I  was 
momently  expecting  the  approach  of  our  main  force  with 
its  artillery,  and  equipage,  and  supplies,  a  dragoon  who,  1 
suspect,  threw  himself  into  our  hands,  was  brought  to  me 


APPENDIX.  215 

with  a  dispatch  addressed  to  the  commanding  officer  at 
Fort  George.  It  was  from  the  commanding  officer  at 
Chippeway,  stating  that  the  corps  (Colonel  Scott's)  which 
had  laid  opposite  the  day  preceding,  had  moved  ;  that  every 
thing  was  quiet  there,  and  that  he  was  ready  to  move. 
After  interrogating  the  bearer,  I  sent  him,  in  charge  of  an 
officer,  with  the  dispatch  to  General  Van  Rensselaer.  He 
was  a  native  of  the  United  States,  personally  known  to  one 
of  our  officers,  and  stated  with  great  readiness  and  even 
interest,  that  the  enemy  were  already  in  motion  from  that 
quarter,  consisting  of  regulars  and  Indians,  principally  the 
latter.  This  gave  a  favorable  occasion  for  a  movement 
in  the  direction  of  Chippeway,  and  attacking  this  party  on 
their  march,  and  preventing  their  junction  with  the  main 
force  from  Fort  George.  But  at  Queenstown  every  thing 
was  stagnant.  No  considerable  or  regular  embarkation 
appeared  to  be  making  on  the  opposite  shore.  A  large 
stone  house  on  the  left  of  the  village  remained  still  in  pos 
session  of  the  enemy,  with  two  light  pieces  of  artillery  ;  and 
as  not  a  piece  of  artillery  had  yet  been  brought  over,  it  ap 
peared  impossible  to  attack  it  advantageously.  After  some 
time  General  Wadsworth  appeared  on  the  hill,  thinking,  as 
he  told  me,  that  his  example  might  have  a  better  effect  than 
his  orders  in  making  the  militia  cross.  He  had  seen  the 
dispatch  above  mentioned,  and  was  aware  of  the  state  of 
things  on  the  hill.  After  some  consultation  he  agfeed  that 
I  should  recross  and  represent  it  to  General  Van  Rensse 
laer  :  this  I  did  on  meeting  the  General  on  the  road  about 
half  a  mile  from  the  river.  He  informed  me  that  he  had 
ordered  Colonel  Scott  across,  and  that  he  would  himself 
cross  in  a  short  time.  He  ordered  Captain  Totten  of  the 
engineers  to  repair  to  the  opposite  bank,  and  lay  out  a  for 
tified  encampment,  and  caused  the  intrenching  tools  to  be 


216  APPENDIX. 

brought  down  with  a  view  to  be  sent  after,  which,  however, 
was  neglected  to  be  done.  In  the  course  of  an  hour, 
while  the  General  was  giving  his  directions  to  his  staff  and 
preparing  for  the  passage  of  the  river,  a  small  and  distant 
fire  of  musketry  was  heard.  It  was  evident  that  this  at 
tack  was  from  the  forces  from  Chippeway,  and  that  it  was 
in  fact  the  commencement  of  an  action  which  must  perhaps 
decide  the  fate  of  the  campaign  in  that  quarter.  At  least 
half  of  the  boats  we  had  in  the  morning  were  lost  or  da 
maged  ;•  not  half  the  troops  had  crossed,  although  it  was 
by  this  time  about  eleven  o'clock  in  the  morning ;  Lieute 
nant-Colonel  Scott  had  not  received  orders  to  take  his  ar 
tillery  across  ;  Captain  Gibson  had  taken  but  one  piece — 
a  circumstance  attributable  to  the  small  size  of  the  only 
boat  calculated  for  that  service  ;  and  on  reaching  the  em 
barking  place,  we  found  there  a  company  of  men,  very 
handsomely  equipped,  which  was  just  on  the  point  of 
entering  the  boats  when  this  firing  was  heard,  but  had 
thereupon  halted,  and  now  absolutely  refused  to  cross  ; 
regarding  neither  the  orders,  nor  threats,  nor  remonstrances 
of  the  General.  Finding  it  useless  to  urge  them  further, 
he  crossed,  Major  Mullany  joining  us  just  as  we  went  on 
board  the  boat.  The  instant  we  ascended  the  hill,  seeing 
the  regulars  engaged  three  or  four  hundred  yards  from  the 
river,  near  a  wood,  I  hastened  to  that  point,  and  urging  my 
way  directly  to  the  front,  found  there  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Scott,  with  a  gallantry  I  cannot  too  much  extol,  leading  and 
animating  the  troops.  This  officer  had  a  few  minutes  be 
fore  checked  the  first  charge  of  the  Indians,  and  saved  his 
troops  from  the  disorder  they  had  nearly  been  thrown  into 
by  the  precipitate  retreat  of  a  party  of  militia.  We  soon 
reached  the  wood  and  penetrated  some  distance  into  it ; 
but  after  some  time  it  was  represented  to  Colonel  Scott 


APPENDIX. 

that  the  Indians  here  presented  no  object  for  a  charge  ; 
that  while  their  fire  was  bloody,  ours  produced  a  compa 
ratively  small  effect;  that  the  wood  wtis  not  so  desirable  a 
position  as  one  abour  two  hundred  yards  nearer  the  river ; 
and  the  intervening  space  being  cleared,  the  attacks  of  the 
Indians  must  be  made  in  the  open  Held,  and  would,  of  course, 
be  easily  repelled  ;  and  we  might  take  the  order  and  position 
intended  in  the  expected  engagement.  This  change  of 
position  being  approved  by  him,  was  made  gradually  and 
with  care  ;  small  detachments  being  ordered  to  move  to  dif 
ferent  points  in  rear,  as  with  a  view  to  meet  other  attacks, 
Colonel  Scott  and  myself  remaining  with  the  last.  After 
this  movement  had  been  accomplished,  the  fire  of  the 
Indians  was  of  course  less  general  and  fatal,  but  it  was 
never  intermitted  during  the  remainder  of  the  day.  About 
the  time  of  this  movement  the  first  detachments  of  the  Bri 
tish  army  were  seen  at  a  great  distance  on  the  plain  on 
their  march  from  Fort  George.  Meanwhile  our  numbers 
instead  of  increasing  were  diminishing.  The  boat  in  which 
General  Van  Renssalaer  came  over,  returned  immediately 
full  of  men,  who  had  concealed  themselves  under  the  bank 
for  the  purpose  of  seizing  opportunities  to  recross,  and  had 
embarked  in  his  presence ;  and  I  understand  they  even 
crowded  into  the  very  boat  in  which  he  afterwards  return 
ed,  with  a  view  to  bring  over  his  principal  force  which  was 
still  on  the  American  shore.  At  about  a  quarter  of  an 
hour  after  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  the  Biilish  troops 
paraded  in  front  of  us,  we  being  formed  on  the  edge  of  the 
hill — the  village  in  our  rear,  the  river  on  cur  left,  and  a 
bush  cantonment  on  our  right.  In  this  were  disposed  a 
number  of  regulars  and  a  small  party  of  volunteer  riflemen, 
commanded  by  Lieutenant  Smith  of  the  militia,  who  was 
highly  distinguished  by  his  activity  and  courage.  These 
19 


218  APPENDIX. 

served  to  keep  the  Indians  in  check,  although  they  still 
maintained  a  galling  fire  on  the  right  flank.  My  opinion 
of  the  British  force,  founded  on  my  own  observation  and 
subsequent  information  is,  that  they  had  from  four  to  five 
hundred  regulars,  with  four  pieces  of  artillery,  from  five  to 
six  hundred  militia,  and  three  hundred  Indians.  Our  whole 
force  under  arms  at  this  time  was  less  than  three  hundred, 
with  but  one  piece  of  artillery,  and  not  a  dozen  rounds  for 
it ;  yet  I  am  well  persuaded  a  retreat,  much  less  a  surren 
der,  was  not  thought  of;  and  that  the  troops  were  in  fact  in 
as  high  spirits  as  if  we  had  been  superior.  Such  was  the 
state  of  things  when  a  note  from  General  Van  Rensselaer 
to  General  Wadsworth  arrived,  commanding  him  to  save 
his  troops,  informing  him  that  not  a  regiment  or  company 
would  move  to  reinforce  us  ;  that  he  had  himself  seen  the 
movements  of  the  enemy,  and  knew  that  we  were  overpow 
ered  ;  and  that  he  would  endeavor  to  furnish  boats  and 
cover  our  retreat.  He  added  in  a  postcript,  that  General 
Wadsworth  might  nevertheless  govern  himself  according 
to  circumstances  under  his  more  immediate  view.  Gene 
ral  Wadsworth  called  together  the  senior  officers  of  corps, 
read  this  letter,  and  asked  their  opinions.  Nothing  was 
decided  on.  Meanwhile,  the  enemy,  maneuvering  with 
great  caution  if  not  with  some  hesitation,  moved  in  force 
by  their  right  towards  the  river  in  such  a  way  as  to  recon 
noitre  our  whole  front  and  left  in  part.  Finding  it  difficult 
to  believe,  perhaps,  that  so  small  a  body  of  men  as  that  in 
view  was  the  whole  force  they  were  to  contend  with,  they 
then  returned  by  their  left,  always  skirting  the  woods,  and 
presented  themselves  in  line  on  our  right  flank.  During 
these  marches  and  counter-marches  of  the  enemy,  we  were 
consulting,  and  at  last  determined  to  avail  ourselves  of  the 
possibility  of  retreating  suggested  in  General  Van  Rensse- 


APPENDIX.  219 

laer's  letter.  It  was  designed,  accordingly,  to  throw  our 
right  on  the  road  leading  from  the  hill  to  the  village,  and 
form  with  the  river  in  our  rear.  To  do  this  it  was  neces 
sary  to  inarch  by  the  left  which  brought  the  militia  in  front 
of  the  column.  They  soon  broke,  on  the  commencement 
of  the  enemy's  fire,  and  a  perfect  rout  ensued.  Not  a 
boat  being  ready,  nor  any  appearance  of  an  attempt  to 
bring  them,  we  surrendered — were  taken  into  the  village  of 
Queenstown,  and  treated  with  the  greatest  delicacy  and 
humanity  by  General  Sheafle.  The  wounded  were  attend 
ed  to  here  ;  the  prisoners,  private  soldiers,  were  collected 
and  marched  to  Newark  ;  and,  after  being  about  an  hour 
in  the  village,  we  marched  with  a  gua'rd,  which  was  neces 
sary  to  protect  us  from  the  Indians,  to  Fort  George.  We 
arrived  there  just  at  dark. 

I  arn,  with  great  respect, 

Your  obedient  Servant, 

JOHN  CHRYSTIE, 

Lieutenant-Colonel  13th. 
General  THOMAS  H.  GUSHING,  Adjutant-General. 


[No.  13.] 

"  Colonel  Cochrane,  formerly  an  aid-de-camp  to  Sir 
George  Prevost,  and  at  present  Military  Inspector,  and  at 
tached  to  the  District  of  New  Brunswick,  states,  *  that  the 
regular  troops  in  the  Canadas  and  New  Brunswick,  at  the 
commencement  of  the  war  of  1812  between  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain,  did  not  exceed  two  thousand 


220  APPENDIX. 

men ;  bit  were  increased  from  time  to  time,  till,  in  1S15, 
their  numbers  amounted  to  about  sixteen  thousand  five 
hundred.' 

(Signed,)  JAMES  WATSON  WEBB." 

April  2Qlh,  1630. 


[No.  14.] 

For  orders  given  from  the  26th  of  June  to  the  1st  of 
August  to  General  Dearborn,  see  Appendix  No.  10.  To 
these  we  now  add  the  following  : — Jlugust  the  8//i. — 
'*  Should  the  recruits  and  volunteers  be  found  inadequate 
to  immediate  operations  on  the  frontier,  you  are  instructed 
to  call  on  any  Governor,  or  commander  of  a  division  or  a 
brigade,  for  as  many  militia  as  you  may  deem  necessary.'* 
Augvst  16//1. — "  Proceed  with  the  utmost  vigjor  in  your 
operations."  Jltigust  26th. — "  Every  thing  indicates  the 
necessity  of  early  and  efficient  operations  on  the  Niagara 
and  posts  below."  September  21s/. — "  Your  arrangements 
for  an  attack  on  the  British  posts  on  the  Niagara  will,  it  is 
hoped,  be  in  season."  The  General  about  this  time  pro 
posed  an  attack  to  be  made  at  the  same  time  on  Fort 
George,  Kingston,  and  Montreal ;  to  which  the  Secretary 
answered,  "  The  President  thinks  not  a  moment  should  be 
lost  in  getting  possession  of  the  British  posts  at  Niagara 
and  Kingston,  or  at  least  of  the  former." 


APPENDIX. 


[No.  15.] 

Letters  from  the  Secretary  of  War  to  General  Dearborn. 
War  Department,  February  Wth,  1813. 

"  I  have  the  President's  orders  to  communicate  to  you, 
as  expeditiously  as  possible,  the  outline  of  campaign  which 
you  will  immediately  institute  and  pursue  against  Upper 
Canada : — 

1st.  4000  troops  will  be  assembled  at  Sackett's  harbor. 

2d.  3000  will  be  brought  together  at  Buffalo  and  its 
vicinity. 

3d.  The  former  of  these  corps  will  be  embarked  and 
transported  under  convoy  of  the  fleet  to  Kingston,  where 
they  will  be  landed.  Kingston,  its  garrison,  and  the  British 
ships  wintering  in  the  harbor  of  that  place  will  be  its  first 
object.  Its  second  object  will  be  York,  (the  capital  of 
Upper  Canada)  the  stores  collected,  and  the  two  frigates 
building  there.  Its  third  object,  Forts  George  and  Erie 
and  their  dependencies.  In  the  attainment  of  this  last 
there  will  be  a  co-operation  between  the  two  corps.  The 
composition  of  these  will  be  as  follows  : 

1st.    Bloomfield's  brigade, 

2d.    Chandler's         do, 

3d.    Philadelphia  detachment,     - 

4th.  Baltimore  do, 

6th.  Carlisle  do, 

6th.  Greenbush  do, 

7th.  Sackett's  Harbor  do,     - 

4,030 
19* 


222  APPENDIX. 

8th.  Several  corps  at  Buffalo  under  the  com 
mand  of  General  Porter,  and  the  re 
cruits  belonging  thereto,  -  -  3,OOO 

Total,         7,030 

The  time  for  executing  the  enterprise  will  he  governed 
by  the  opening  of  Lake  Ontario,  which  usually  takes  place 
about  the  1st  of  April. 

The  Adjutant-General  has  orders  to  put  the  more  south 
ern  detachments  in  march  as  expeditiously  as  possible. 
The  two  brigades  on  Lake  Charnplain  you  will  move  so 
as  to  give  them  full  time  to  reach  their  place  of  destination 
by  the  25th  of  March.  The  route  by  Elizabeth  will,  I 
think,  be  the  shortest  and  best.  They  will  be  replaced  by 
some  new  raised  regiments  from  the  east. 

You  will  put  into  your  movements  as  much  privacy  as 
may  be  compatible  with  their  execution.  They  may  be 
masked  by  reports  that  Sackett's  Harbor  is  in  danger,  and 
that  their  principal  effort  will  be  made  on  the  Niagara,  in 
co-operation  with  General  Harrison.  As  the  route  to 
Sackett's  Harbor  and  to  Niagara  is  for  a  considerable  dis 
tance  the  same,  it  may  be  well  to  intimate,  even  in  orders, 
that  the  latter  is  the  destination  of  the  two  brigades  now  at 
Lake  Champlain. 

(Signed,)         JOHN  ARMSTRONG." 

War  Department,  February  24//;,  1813. 
"  Before  T  left  New-York,  and,  till  very  recently,  since 
my  arrival  here,  I  was  informed  through  various  channels, 
that  a  winter  or  spring  attack  upon  Kingston  was  not  prac 
ticable  on  account  of  the  snow,  which  generally  lies  to  the 
depth  of  two,  and  sometimes  of  three  feet,  over  all  that 
northern  region  during  those  seasons.  Hence  it  is  that 


APPENDIX.  223 

in  the  plan  recently  communicated,  it  was  thought  safest 
and  best  to  make  the  attack  by  a  combination  of  naval  and 
military  means,  and  to  approach  our  object,  not  by  directly 
crossing  the  St.  Lawrence  on  the  ice,  but  by  setting  out 
from  Sackett's  Harbor,  in  concert  \vith,  and  under  convoy  ot 
the  fleet.  Later  information  differs  from  that  on  which  this 
plan  was  founded  ;  and  the  fortunate  issue  of  Major  For- 
syth's  last  expedition  shew.-:,  that  small  enterprises,  at  least, 
may  be  successfully  executed  at  the  present  season.  The 
advices,  given  in  your  letter  of  the  14th  instant,  have  a 
bearing  also  on  the  same  point,  and  to  the  same  effect.  If 
the  enemy  be  really  weak  at  Kingston,  and  approachable 
by  land  and  ice,  Pike,  (who  will  be  a  brigadier  in  a  day  or 
two,)  may  be  put  into  motion  from  Lake  Champlain  by  the 
Chateaugay  route,  (in  sleighs)  and,  with  the  two  brigades, 
cross  the  St.  Lawrence  where  it  mny  be  thought  best,  de 
stroy  the  armed  ships,  and  seize  and  hold  Kingston,  until 
you  can  join  him  with  the  other  corps  destined  for  the  fu 
ture  objects  of  the  expedition  ;  and,  if  pressed  by  Prevost 
before  such  junction  can  be  effected, he  may  withdraw  him 
self  to  Sackett's  Harbor,  or  other  place  of  security,  on  our 
side  of  the  Hoe.  This  would  be  much  the  shorter  road  to 
the  object,  and  perhaps  t'he  safer  one,  as  the  St.  Lawrence 
is  now  every  where  well  bridged,  and  offers  no  obstruction 
to  either  attack  or  retreat.  Such  a  movement,  will,  no 
doubt,  be  soon  known  to  Prevost,  and  cannot  but  disquiet 
him.  The  dilemma  it  presents  will  be  serious.  Either 
he  must  give  up  his  western  posts,  or,  to  save  them,  he  must 
carry  himself  in  force,  and  promply,  to  Upper  Canadi.  In 
(he  latter  case  he  will  be.  embarrassed  for  subsistence. 
His  convoys  of  provision  will  be  open  to  our  attack?,  on  a 
line  of  nearly  one  hundred  rniles,  and  his  position  at 
Montreal  much  weakened.  Another  decided  advantage 


224  APPENDIX. 

will  be,  to  let  us  into  the  secret  of  his  real  strength.  If 
he  be  able  to  make  heavy  detachments  to  cover,  or  to  re 
cover  Kingston,  and  to  protect  his  supplies,  and  after  all 
maintain  himself  at  Montreal  and  on  Lake  Champlain,  he 
is  stronger  than  I  imagined,  or  than  any  well- authenticated 
reports  make  him  to  be. 

With  regard  to  our  magazines,  my  belief  is,  that  we 
have  nothing  to  fear  ;  because,  as  stated  above,  Provost's 
attention  must  be  given  to  the  western  posts  and  to  our 
movements  against  them.  He  will  not  dare  to  advance 
southwardly  while  a  heavy  corps  is  operating  on  his  flank 
and  menacing  his  line  of  communication.  But  on  the 
other  supposition,  they  (the  magazines)  may  be  easily 
secured  ;  1st,  by  taking  them  to  Willsborough ;  or  2d, 
to  Burlington ;  or  3d,  by  a  militia  call,  to  protect  them 
where  they  are.  Orders  are  given  for  the  march  of  the 
eastern  volunteers,  excepting  Ulmer's  regiment  and  two 
companies  of  axe-men  sent  to  open  the  route  to  the 
Chaudiere. 

"  The  southern  detachments  will  be  much  stronger  than 
I  had  supposed.  That  from  Philadelphia  will  amount  to 
nearly  one  thousand  effectives. 

(Signed,)  "JOHN  ARMSTRONG." 


[No.  16.] 

Extract  from  a  letter  of  the  late  Major-General  Brown. 

11  Head- Quarters,  Broivnville,  July  20M,  1813. 
"  I  have  delayed  giving  the  estimate  you  requested,  of 
the  enemy's  forces  in  Canada,  during  the  years  1812  and 


APPENDIX.  225 

1813  of  the  late  war,  that  I  might  examine  my  minutes 
and  papers  the  more  carefully. 

"  At  the  commencement  of  the  war,  Sir  George  Provost 
had  the  command  of  very  few  regulars.  The  number 
placed  under  the  orders  of  Governor  Brock  for  the  de 
fence  of  Upper  Canada,  was  never  equal  to  twelve  hun 
dred  men ;  and  at  no  time  did  the  command  of  this 
distinguished  chief  consist  of  less  than  '  one  third  of  old 
men  and  invalids  fit  only  for  garrison  duty.'  No  con 
siderable  increase  of  force  on  the  pait  of  the  enemy  took 
place  duiing  the  campaign  of  1812,  and  1  have  never  been 
able  to  discover  that  at  the  opening  of  the  campaign  of 
1813,  [June  26th,]  there  were  more  than  five  thousand 
regular  troops  in  the  Canadas.  The  force,  whatever  it 
may  have  been,  was  piincipally  in  the  Upper  province. 
By  the  27th  of  May  of  that  year,  the  enemy  had  assem 
bled  on  the  Niagara  about  two  thousand  men,  to  resist 
any  incursion — and  at  Kingston,  about  one  thousand,  for 
the  projected  attack  on  Sacket's  Harbor,  under  the  com 
mand  of  Sir  George  in  person.  The  two  columns  would 
not  have  exceeded  three  thousand  combatants,  and  I  havo 
it  from  unquestionable  authority  that  the  left  column  sus 
tained  a  loss  of  fn\\four  hundred  men." 


[No.   17.] 

Lellcr  of  Colonel  Connor,  of  the  ISt/i  of  March,  1816. 
"  Of  the  immense  dep6t  I  know  nothing  but  by  report, 
which  stated  that  it  had  been  carried  to  Sacket's  Harbor, 


226  APPENDIX. 

and  had  there  been  burnt  by  the  mistake  of  the  Commo 
dore's  brother.  Of  the  contents  of  Sheafe's  papers,  many 
of  which  Colonel  King  and  myself  examined,  I  know 
enough  to  convince  me  that  during  the  winter  and  spring 
of  1813,  the  British  garrison  of  Kingston  was  extremely 
weak  and  quite  insufficient  for  defence. 

"  I  am,  &c. 

(Signed)  "SAMUEL  CONNOR." 

"  GENERAL  ARMSTRONG." 


[No.   18.] 

Letter  from  the  Secretary  of  War  to  General  Dearborn. 
(Private.) 

"  Washington,  15th  May,  1813. 

"  DEAR  GENERAL, — Your  affair  of  the  27th  ult.  is 
matter  of  public  and  private  congratulation ;  much  quali 
fied,  however,  by  the  loss  of  Pike  and  the  escape  of  the 
frigate,  the  capture  or  destruction  of  which,  was,  according 
to  the  Commodore's  calculations,  to  give  him  a  decided 
and  permanent  ascendency  on  the  Lake.  Another  draw 
back  upon  it,  less  apt  to  be  noticed  by  ordinary  critics, 
but  in  itself  very  vexatious,  is  the  escape  also  of  Sheafe 
with  the  main  body  of  his  regular  force.  Under  the 
present  circumstances  of  Great  Britain,  bound  as  she  is, 
neck  and  heels,  to  the  prosecution  of  the  war  in  Europe, 
she  can  ill  afford  to  send  to  this  country,  either  men  or 
money,  to  support  the  petite  guerre  in  which  she  has  so 
inconsiderately  involved  herself  with  us.  From  informa* 


APPENDIX.  227 

tion  the  most  direct  and  respectable,  I  am  assured  that 
her  regular  force  in  both  the  Canadas  has  at  no  time  since 
the  declaration  of  war  exceeded  three  thousand  men ;  and 
that  at  the  present  time,  by  casualties,  (death,  desertion, 
&c.,  always  at  work  thinning  the  ranks  of  an  army)  this 
force  is  reduced  at  least  one-fifth.  Taking  then  this  fact 
for  granted,  we  cannot  doubt  but  that  in  all  cases  in  which 
a  British  commander  is  constrained  to  act  defensively, 
his  policy  will  be  that  adopted  by  Sheafe — to  prefer  the 
preservation  of  his  troops  to  that  of  his  post,  and  thus 
carrying  off  the  kernel  leave  us  only  the  shell.  To  coun 
teract  this  policy,  becomes,  therefore,  a  special  duty  on 
our  part — requiring  the  strictest  attention,  as  well  in  pro 
jecting  as  in  executing  our  attacks.  On  this  head,  my 
distance  from  you  and  my  very  insufficient  knowledge  of 
the  topography  of  the  country  in  which  you  act,  make  it 
improbable  that  any  suggestion  I  could  make,  has  not 
already  presented  itself  to  your  mind.  As  a  general 
maxim,  however,  I  may  be  permitted  to  say,  that  in  con 
centrating  our  whole  force  on  any  given  point  of  an 
enemy's  position,  we  necessarily  leave  all  others  open  to 
him  for  escape  ;  whence  it  follows,  that  to  deprive  him 
of  this  advantage,  two  attacks  (if  our  force  permit  it) 
should  be  made,  and  one  of  these  so  directed  as  to  shut 
him  out  from  all  means  of  retreat ;  or  at  least  to  force 
him  into  roads,  where  finding  little  or  no  accommodation, 
he  may  sustain  the  greatest  possible  loss.  In  your  late 
affair,  I  have  thought  (perhaps  erroneously)  that  had  the 
descent  been  made  between  the  town  and  the  barracks, 
things  would  have  turned  out  better.  On  that  plan,  the 
two  batteries  you  had  to  encounter,  would  have  been  left 
out  of  the  combat ;  and  Sheafe,  instead  of  retreating  to 


228  APPENDIX. 

King-ton,  must  have  sought  refuge  at  fort  George.  In 
the  F;ffY!r  before  you,  nothing  will,  I  hope,  be  omitted,  nor 
any  thing  be  misunderstood  ;  and  that  with  regard  to  the 
garrison  in  particular,  it  will  not  be  permitted  to  escape 
to-day  that  it  may  fight  us  tD-morrow.  For  obvious  rea 
sons,  I  have  made  this  letter  private.  On  the  records  of 
the  War  Department  it  would  appear  to  carry  with  it 
an  official  ceris-ure,  whereas,  it  is  in  truth  nothing  more 
than  the  suggestions  of  one,  who  for  both  your  sake, 
and  his  own,  wishes  you  the  fullest  and  most  unqualified 
prosperity." 


[No.   19.] 

"  Head-  Quarters,  Kingston,  July  11M,  1813. 

"  DEAR  SIR, — Having  sent  Captain  McDonald  to 
England  with  despatches,  your  letter  of  the  27th  ultimo, 
addressed  to  him,  I  opened.  I  was  much  pleased  it  con 
tained  a  report  of  Mr.  R.  Dickson's  arrival  at  Mackinac 
on  the  llth. 

"  Your  wants  have  been  supplied  as  far  as  I  had  the 
ability  of  doing  so.  In  addition  to  the  specie  and  paper- 
money,  and  articles  of  clothing,  forwarded  for  the  right 
division  from  hence,  in  charge  of  Captain  Chambers 
and  Lieutenant  M'Cl^an,  a  considerable  supply  of  shoes, 
trowsers,  &c.,  were  embarked  in  a  flotilla  going  to  York 
a  few  days  ago,  for  Detroit  and  Michilimackinac. 

*4  The  ordnance  and  naval  stores  you  require  must  be 
taken  from  the  enemy,  whose  resources  on  Lake  Erio 


APPENDIX. 

must  become  yours.  I  am  much  mistaken  if  you  do  not 
find  Captain  Barclay  well  disposed  to  play  that  game.  I 
conclude  the  whole  of  the  forty-first  regiment  is  placed 
under  your  command.  The  presents  for  the  Indians  are 
not  arrived  from  England,  but  I  shall  direct  two  hundred 
guns  for  them,  to  be  purchased  at  Montreal  and  forwarded 
to  you,  with  a  proportion  of  powder  and  ball  by  the  Ottawa. 

"  I  request  you  will  communicate  with  me  upon  all 
occasions,  with  the  characteristic  frankness  which  distin 
guishes  a  zealous  and  good  soldier. 

"  I  have  the  honor,  Sac. 

"GEORGE  PROVOST." 

"BRIGADIER-GENERAL  PROCTOR." 

St.  David's,  July  I8th,  1813. 

"  SIR, — I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt 
of  your  letter  of  the  10th  instant,  and  have  to  inform  you 
in  reply  thereto,  that  a  force  of  nearly  four  hundred  men 
are  directed  to  march  in  successive  divisions  upon  Long 
Point,  as  detailed  in  my  letter  to  General  Proctor  of  this 
day's  date.  I  am  fully  impressed  with  the  indispensable 
necessity  of  an  attack  upon  Presque  Isle,  and  should  have 
co-operated  with  you  long  ago,  had  I  possessed  the  means 
of  so  doing.  I  trust  it  will  not  yet  be  too  late,  and  that 
you  will  lose  no  time  in  making  your  arrangements  for 
taking  up  the  troops  from  Long  Point. 
"  I  have  the  honor  to  be,  Sir, 

"  Your  most  obedient  servant, 

"FRANCIS  DE  ROTTENBURG, 

"Major- General." 
"  COMMODORE  BARCLAY." 

20 


230  APPENDIX. 


[No.  20.] 

Extract  from  Governor  Duncan's  Report. 

"  McAffee,  the  historian  of  the  late  war,  and  Dawson, 
the  biographer  of  General  Harrison,  have  studiously  kept 
out  of  view,  that  the  object  of  the  invasion  was  the  de 
struction  of  our  ships  under  Commodore  Perry  at  Presgue 
Ish,  and  the  boats  and  stores  at  Cleveland.  These  were 
looked  upon  with  great  solicitude  by  the  British,  were  re 
connoitred,  and  on  one  or  two  occasions  were  attempted 
to  be  destroyed  by  landing  a  small  force  from  their  fleet. 

"  They  have  also  failed  to  account  for  the  movement 
of  the  whole  British  force  down  the  Lake  in  the  direction 
of  Cleveland  and  Erie,  before  their  defeat  at  Sandusky ; 
which  was  attacked  to  gratify  their  Indian  allies,  who  de 
manded  the  scalps  and  plunder  of  the  place.  They  have 
kept  out  of  view  the  fact,  that  General  Harrison  had  deter 
mined  to  retreat  to  the  interior  after  burning  all  the  supplies 
he  had  collected ;  that  he  ordered  Major  Croghan  to  aban 
don  and  burn  fort  Stephenson ;  that  his  refusal  to  obey  and 
failure  to  arrive  at  head- quarters,  prevented  this  retreat, 
and  consequent  destruction  of  our  fleet  and  millions  of  public 
stores ;  and  the  exposure  also,  of  Jive  hundred  miles  of 
frontier,  to  the  combined  enemy.  Both  have  stated,  that 
General  Harrison  never  doubted  that  Major  Croghan 
would  be  able  to  repulse  an  enemy  of  near  two  thousand 
men  (and  which  they  say  he  understood  to  be  five  thou 
sand)  with  one  hundred  and  thirty  men,  (Croghan's  effective 
force  on  the  day  of  the  battle,)  one  six-pounder,  with  am 
munition  for  only  seven  shots,  and  about  forty  rounds  for  the 


APPENDIX.  231 

small  arms,  when  the  fact  was  notorious,  that  General  Har 
rison  was  heard  to  say  during  the  siege,  while  the  firing 
could  be  heard  in  his  camp,  and  speaking  of  Croghan, 
*  The  blood  be  on  his  own  head,  I  wash  my  hands  of  it,'  not 
doubting  for  a  moment,  nor  did  any  one  with  him,  that  the 
garrison  would  he  cut  off. 

"  These  historians  have  also  published  two  letters,  as 
part  of  their  history,  written  by  Major  Croghan  and  others, 
to  allay  the  excitement  against  Harrison,  for  his  neglect  to 
support  Croghan,  when  he  lay  irilhin  three  hours1  march  of 
the  fort,  with  a  strong  force.  Those  patriotic  officers 
wrote  these  letters,  it  has  been  said,  to  save  the  army  and 
prevent  them  from  following  up  the  indignation  manifested 
in  the  States  against  the  General  destined  to  command 
them — believing  it  of  the  utmost  importance  at  that  mo 
ment,  that  he  should  stand  well  with  the  army  and  the 
country ;  and  it  is  further  said  that  they  were  written 
under  the  belief,  that  every  thing  should  be  placed  before 
the  public  in  a  proper  light  at  the  end  of  the  campaign. 
(Signed)  "JOSEPH  DUNCAN." 

"  GENERAL  MERCER, 
"  Chairman  of  a  Committee  of  the  House  of  Representatives." 


Second  Order  to  Major  Croghan. 

*'  Head-  Quarters,  Camp  Seneca, 

"Adjutant-General's  Office,  July  27ih,  1813. 

"  SIR, — Immediately  on  receiving  this  letter  you  will 

abandon  fort  Stephenson,  set  fire  to  it  and  repair  with 

your  command  this  night  to  head-quarters.      Cross  the 

river  and  come  up  upon  the  opposite  side,     li  you  should 

deem,  and  find  it  impracticable  to  mak«  good  your  march 


APPENDIX. 

to  this  station,  take  the  road  to  Huron  and  pursue  it  with 
the  utmost  circumspection  and  despatch.     By  command. 

"  God  be  with  you. 

"A.  H.  HOLMES,  Assistant  Jldjulant- General 
"  P.  S.     Effect  your  retreat  in  the  manner  heretofore 
directed  you. 

"  A.  H.  HOLMES,  A.  A.  G» 
"  MAJOR  CROGHAN." 


[No.  21.] 

Letter  from  Colonel  R.  JVT.  Johnson. 

"December  22d,  1834. 

"  DEAR  SIR, — I  have  just  received  your  favor  of  the 
17th,  containing  certain  inquiries  as  to  the  battle  of  the 
Thames,  5th  of  October,  1813,  in  Upper  Canada. 

" 1st.  The  mounted  regiment  under  my  command,  con 
sisted  of  one  thousand  men  at  the  time  of  the  charge. 

"  2d.  They  were  armed  with  muskets  and  rifles,  and 
tomahawks  or  small  hatchets,  and  butcher-knives. 

"  3d.  The  British  had  one  brass  field-piece,  (six- 
pounder,)  the  same  that  was  taken  by  us  in  the  revolu 
tionary  war  at  Saratoga,  and  retaken  from  us  at  the 
surrender  of  Detroit  by  General  Hull.  It  was  placed  in 
the  road  near  the  Thames,  not  far  from  the  centre  of  the 
British  line. 

"  4th.  The  British  formed  two  lines,  resting  on  the 
Thames  and  running  out  to  a  swamp  two  or  three  hun 
dred  yards  from  the  river  and  parallel  with  it. 


APPENDIX.  233 

"  5th.  I  presume  Proctor  was  stationed  considerably 
in  the  rear  of  his  troops,  and  probably  commenced  his 
flight  the  moment  he  saw  his  forces  defeated  and  taken 
prisoners. 

"  6th.  I  think  the  best  ground  for  defence  was  selected. 

"  7th.  The  [militia]  infantry  were  stationed  a  reasona 
ble  distance  in  the  rear  of  the  mounted  regiment,  in  order 
of  battle,  say  from  one  half  to  one  mile.  My  brother, 
Colonel  James  Johnson,  charged  the  British  forces  with 
the  first  battalion,  (five  hundred  men,)  and  succeeded 
without  the  loss  of  a  man — one  horse  killed,  shot  in  the 
head — in  advancing,  he  received  the  fire  of  one  line  of 
the  British,  and  then  of  the  other,  in  close  succession  ; 
the  cannon  was  not  fired.  I  crossed  the  swamp  with  the 
second  battalion,  (five  hundred  men,)  and  fought  against 
the  Indians,  (supposed  fourteen  hundred  warriors,  under 
Tecumseh,)  without  any  aid  whatever.  A  regiment  was 
ordered  to  re-enforce  me  at  the  close  of  the  battle  ;  but 
did  not  reach  us  until  the  battle  was  over  and  the  Indians 
had  fled.  The  official  report  is  incorrect  in  saying,  that 
the  hard  fighting  on  the  left  was  by  a  part  of  Governor 
Shelby's  men.  We  had  no  assistance,  except  that  of  a  few 
scattering  volunteers  from  the  infantry,  who  mi^ht  have 
pushed  into  our  ranks.  I  was  wounded  and  could  give 
no  information  to  the  commanding  General,  and  he  did 
not  know  at  ths  time  he  made  his  report,  that  I  had  crossed 
the  swamp  with  my  regiment ;  as  when  he  gave  the  order 
to  make  the  charge,  he  thought  from  my  information,  that 
I  could  not  cross  the  swamp ;  which  I  discovered  I  could 
do  a  few  minutes  after  he  left  me,  and  believing  that  it 
was  most  safe,  and  that  my  regiment  was  sufficient,  I 
divided  my  force  as  stated  above,  and  the  victory  on  both 
20 


234  APPENDIX. 

sides  was  complete  ;  but,  no  doubt,  the  instantaneous 
capture  of  the  British,  and  the  early  death  of  the  Indian 
chief,  were  powerful  operating  causes  in  our  favor. 

I  am,  &c., 

(Signed)     R.  M.  JOHNSON. 

N.  B.  //  is  due  to  truth  to  state,  that  I  requested  Gene 
ral  Harrison  to  permit  me  to  charge,  and  knowing  that,  1 
had  trained  my  men  for  it  during  our  short  service,  he  gave 
the  order. 


[No.  22.] 

Red  Hook,  January  2d,  1812. 

DEAR  EUSTIS — Yesterday's  mail  brought  your  hypo 
thetical  note,  which  I  hasten  to  answer  by  a  few  suggestions 
that,  if  approved,  may  be  readily  drawn  out  into  as  much 
detail  as  may  be  useful. 

1st.  An  abundant  supply  of  what  is  technically  called 
the  materiel  of  war  is  indispensable.  This  single  term  in 
cludes  arms,  equipments,  and  ammunition,  in  all  their 
varieties ;  tents,  blankets,  and  clothing ;  cavalry  and 
draught-horses ;  oxen,  wagons,  carts,  entrenching  tools, 
&c.  &c.  To  make  a  competent  provision  of  these  will 
require  a  large  expenditure  of  money,  but  to  this  you  must 
submit,  for  two  unanswerable  reasons — the  one,  that  without 
them,  war  cannot  be  made,  either  morally  or  successfully; 
the  other,  that  their  cost,  now,  will  be  from  50  to  100  per 
cent,  less  than  it  will  be  after  the  declaration  of  war. 


APPENDIX.  235 

2d.  When  obtained,  these  supplies  should  be  placed  in 
magazines,  the  location  of  which  must  be  governed  by  two 
considerations — the  security  of  the  articles  deposited  in 
them,  and  the  facility  and  safety  with  which  these  may  be 
brought  into  use.  To  each  magazine  should  be  attached  a 
Laboratory,  for  fixing  ammunition,  making  and  mending 
gun  and  other  carriages,  repairing  arms,  &c. 

3d.  If  you  have  remote  posts,  liable  to  attack,  and  diffi 
cult  to  sustain,  and  having  no  direct  or  important  bearing 
on  the  progress  or  issue  of  the  war,  hasten  to  dismantle 
them  and  withdraw  the  garrisons. 

4th.  Resting,  as  the  line  of  Canadian  defence  does,  in 
its  whole  extent,  on  navigable  lakes  and  rivers,  no  time 
should  be  lost  in  getting  a  naval  ascendancy  on  both,  for 
c&leris  paribus,  the  belligerent  who  is  the  first  to  obtain 
this  advantage,  will  (miracles  excepted)  win  the  game. 
Whether  the  commercial  craft,  at  present  employed  on 
these  waters,  can  be  made  useful  for  the  purpose,  I  do  not 
know  ;  but  among  the  sages,  now  assembled  at  Washing 
ton,  you  cannot  fail  to  find  some  one  who  can  answer  the 
question. 

5th.  Without  a  knowledge,  nearly  approximating  the 
truth,  of  the  force  you  will  have  to  contend  with  ;  of  the  dis 
position  made  of  this,  and  of  the  character,  physical  and 
artificial,  of  the  posts  occupied  by  it,  you  will  be  compelled 
to  make  war  conjeciurally  ;  and,  of  course,  on  data  fur 
nishing  no  just  conclusions  with  regard  to  either  the  number 
or  composition  of  your  own  army,  or  of  the  kind  and  ex 
tent  of  operations  which  ought  to  be  assigned  to  it.  That 
a  state  of  peace,  like  the  present,  will  be  more  favorable 
than  one  of  war  for  acquiring  this  preliminary  information, 
cannot  be  doubted  ;  and  if  it  be  true,  as  I  have  been  told, 


236  APPENDIX. 

that  the  British  posts  are  victualled  by  American  contract 
ors,  these  agents  (who  by  their  vocation  must  have  free 
access  to  them)  may  probably  form  the  safest  and  surest 
medium  through  which  to  obtain  it.  But,  whatever  be  the 
means  employed  for  accomplishing  this  object,  a  moment 
should  not  be  lost  in  putting  them  into  exercise. 

6th.  The  number  and  composition  of  your  army  (as 
already  suggested)  should  be  decided  by  the  service  given 
it  to  perform,  and  the  kind  and  degree  of  resistance  your 
enemy  may  be  able  to  oppose  to  it.  Though,  from  pre 
sent  appearances,  it  be  true  that  the  exigencies  of  the  war 
in  Europe  will  disable  England  from  sending  promptly  any 
important  aid,  strictly  military,  to  the  Canadas  ;  it  does 
not  follow  that  she  will  omit  to  employ  such  other  means 
as  she  may  possess,  to  supply  the  deficiency.  Of  these, 
the  most  vexatious  to  us  would  be  a  portion  of  her  armed 
vessels,  acting  separately  or  in  squadron,  on  our  long  and 
defenceless  line  of  sea-coast ;  while,  at  the  same  time, 
hordes  of  savages  are  let  loose  on  the  women  and  child 
ren  of  the  West.  And  that,  in  the  event  of  war,  Great 
Britain  will  not  hesitate  to  employ  this  policy  in  both 
its  branches,  cannot  be  doubted  by  those  who  have  any  re 
collection  of  what  her  past  conduct  towards  the  United 
States  has  been,  or  who  are  now  capable  of  perceiving  the 
impunity  to  herself  and  the  mischief  to  us  with  which  she 
may  pursue  it. 

From  this  general  view  of  the  subject  it  follows,  that  in 
composing  your  army,  you  must  be  careful  to  provide  corps 
specially  adapted  for  two  purposes — the  protection  oj  your 
own  frontiers^  eastern  and  western,  and  the  invasion  of 
those  of  your  enemy.  Of  each  of  these  I  offer  the  fol 
lowing  outline. 


APPENDIX.  237 

For  the  former,  divide  your  coast  into  military  districts 
— open  in  each  a  rendezvous  for  volunteer-association  and 
local  defence,  with  engagements  commensurate  with  the 
war,  and  pay  and  emoluments,  such  as  are  now  given  to 
the  regular  army.  Of  this  description  of  force  the  maxi 
mum  may  be  twenty  battalions  located  as  follows  : 

1  at  Portsmouth,  2  at  Boston,  1  at  Newport,  3  at  New- 
York,  1  at  Philadelphia,  3  at  Baltimore,  3  at  Norfolk,  2  at 
Charlestown,  1  at  Savannah,  and  3  at  New-Orleans. 
Each  of  these  stations  to  be  well  supplied  with  heavy  guns 
for  position — furnaces  for  heating  shot,  light  pieces,  well 
horsed,  for  field  service,  and  muskets  and  bayonets  for 
camp  and  garrison  duty.  Corps,  thus  constituted  and 
equipped,  well  instructed  in  the  use  of  their  arms  and  res 
pectably  commanded,  will  do  much  to  check,  if  they  do  not 
entirely  prevent,  predatory  excursion — the  evil  most  to  be 
apprehended  from  the  crews  of  single  ships,  or  from  those 
of  small  squadrons  not  sustained  by  infantry. 

For  western  defence  employ  western  men,  accustomed 
to  the  rifle  and  the  forest,  and  not  unacquainted  with  the 
usages  and  stratagems  of  Indian  warfare.  To  their  cus 
tomary  arms  add  a  pistol  and  a  sabre  ;  and  to  ensure  ce 
lerity  of  movement,  mount  them  on  horseback.  Give 
them  a  competent  leader  and  a  good  position,  within 
striking  distance  of  Indian  villages  or  British  settlements. 
Why  not  at  Detroit,  where  you  have  a  strong  fortress  and 
a  detachment  of  artillerists  ?  Recollect,  however,  that  this 
position,  far  from  being  good,  would  be  positively  bad 
un'ess  your  naval  means  have  an  ascendancy  on  Lake 
Erie ;  because  Buffalo,  Erie,  Cleaveland,  and  the  two 
Sanduskys  must  be  its  base  or  source  of  supply.  The 
maximum  of  this  corps  may  be  six  battalions. 


238  APPENDIX. 

Lastly,  for  a  successful  invasion  of  the  Canadas,  (the 
great  operation  of  the  war,  because  that  only  by  which 
Great  Britain  can  be  brought  to  a  sense  of  justice,)  you 
must  rely  on  a  regular  army.  Of  this  description  of  force, 
you  have  now  the  skeletons  of  ten  regiments ;  which,  if 
completed,  will  give  you  ten  thousand  combatants — a  corps 
that,  in  the  present  circumstances  of  England,  and  aided  by 
militia  for  the  purposes  of  demonstration,  will  be  compe 
tent  to  great  achievements.  Hasten  then  to  fill  up  the  rank 
and  file  of  your  present  establishment :  and  to  existing  in 
ducements  for  enlisting,  add  an  increased  pay,  and  a  liberal 
bounty  at  the  end  of  the  war. 

Should  better  information  with  regard  to  your  enemy's 
strength  make  an  increase  of  your  own  expedient,  give 
one  or  two  additional  battalions  to  enchof  your  seven  regi 
ments  of  infantry — a  mode  of  increasing  an  army  much  to 
be  preferred  to  creations  altogether  new.  For,  besides 
being  obviously  more  economical,  the  direct  association  of 
raw  recruits  with  old  soldiers  has  the  effect  of  making  the 
former  efficient  in  half  the  time  it  would  otherwise  take  to 
do  so — the  example  of  comrades  being  a  principle  of 
tuition  much  more  active  than  the  instruction  of  officers. 

On  this  head  it  is  but  necessary  to  add,  that  the  whole  of 
your  disposable  or  field  force,  when  obtained,  should  be 
immediately  assembled  at  some  given  point,  from  which, 
the  moment  that  war  shall  be  authorized,  it  may  begin  its 
operations.  Under  present  views,  Albany,  or  its  neighbor 
hood,  should  be  the  place  of  this  rendezvous  ;  because, 
besides  other  recommendations,  it  is  here  that  all  the  roads 
leading  from  the  central  portion  of  the  United  States  to  the 
Canadas,  diverge — a  circumstance  which,  while  it  keeps 
up  your  enemy's  doubts  as  to  your  real  point  of  attack, 


APPENDIX.  239 

cannot  fail  to  keep  his  means  of  defence  in  a  state  of 
division. 

7th.  In  sketching  the  composition  of  an  army,  two 
branches  of  it,  the  one  having  charge  of  its  discipline  and 
its  movements,  the  other  of  its  subsistence,  must  not  be 
forgotten.  For  the  first  (a  General  Staff)  I  refer  you  to 
Grimoard's  publication,  which  I  sent  to  the  war  department 
from  Paris,  some  years  ago.  If  this  book  be  not  already 
translated  into  English,  no  time  should  be  lost  in  natu 
ralizing  it  for  the  use  of  the  army. 

The  second  or  feeding  department,  is  of  three  kinds — 
that  founded  on  Caesar's  maxim,  that  "  war  should  sustain 
war,"  though  fashionable  at  present,  is,  in  fact,  a  system  ot 
indiscriminate  plunder  ;  forbidden  alike,  as  I  hope,  by  the 
moral  feelings  and  political  views  of  the  United  States. 
The  remaining  two  are  sufficiently  known,  under  the  names 
of  the  Contract  and  Commissariat  systems.  To  recom 
mend  either,  as  exclusively  and  under  all  circumstances  the 
best,  would  show  only  great  ignorance  or  great  folly.  In 
old  and  well-peopled  districts,  where  corn  and  cattle  are 
abundant,  prices  little  subject  to  change,  roads  safe  and 
unobstructed,  and  the  means  of  transportation  (teams  or 
boats,  easily  procured,  the  contract  plan  is  the  best — be 
cause  the  most  economical,  sufficiently  punctual  in  the  dis 
charge  of  its  engagements,  and,  from  the  settled  character 
of  its  terms,  rarely,  if  ever,  embarrassing  the  government 
with  extra  or  unexpected  charges.  In  districts  of  an  op 
posite  character,  where  the  population  is  thin  and  poor, 
supplies  scarce  and  high  priced,  roads  few  and  bad,  and 
much  exposed  to  obstruction,  the  commissariat  must  be 
submitted  to  ;  though  certainly  liable  to  great  abuse,  from 
the  ignorance,  indolence,  or  knavery  of  the  agents  em- 


240  PPENDIX. 

ployed.  The  best  remedy  for  the  evils  of  this  system 
will  be  found  in  subjecting  the  agents  to  military  law,  and 
in  rigorously  enforcing  its  provisions. 

8th.  and  lastly.  A  project  of  campaign,  conformed  to 
military  maxims,  must  embrace  three  things:  1st.  Jin 
object  of  important  or  decisive  character ;  the  attainment 
of  which  will  give  a  successful  issue  to  the  campaign  if 
not  to  the  war.  2d.  A  line  of  operation,  as  short  and  per 
pendicular  to  this  object,  as  possible ;  and  3d.  Jl  welt 
secured  6ase,  on  which  must  be  accumulated  and  ready  for 
transportation,  all  supplies  necessary  to  sustain  the  opera 
tion.  Each  of  these  rules  has  its  own  special  laws,  but  it 
is  only  of  the  first  that  I  will  say  more  at  present  than  a 
few  words. 

In  invading  a  neighboring  and  independent  territory  like 
Canada — having  a  frontier  of  immense  extent ;  destitute 
of  means  strictly  its  own  for  the  purposes  of  defence ;  se 
parated  from  the  rest  of  the  empire  by  an  ocean,  and  hav 
ing  to  this  but  one  outlet — this  outlet  forms  your  true  object 
or  point  ofaiiack;  because,  if  gained,  every  thing  depend 
ing  upon  it  is  gained  also.  Such  was  the  consequence  of 
the  capture  of  Quebec  in  the  war,  which  ended  in  1763  ; 
and  such  would  again  be  the  consequence  of  the  reduction 
of  that  capital,  had  we  the  means  to  effect  it.  Unfortu 
nately,  from  deficient  foresight  in  the  government,  these 
are  wanting.  Still,  though  unable  to  do  what  in  the  ab 
stract  would  be  best,  it  by  no  means  follows  that  we  should 
omit  to  do  what  may  be  both  practicable  and  expedient. 
Such,  in  my  opinion,  would  be  the  capture  oj  JMontreal — 
a  post,  which,  commanding  alike  the  navigation  of  the  St. 
Lawrence  and  the  Otawa,  if  seized  and  heici,  would  give 
the  same  control  over  all  that  portion  of  the  Canadas  lying 


APPENDIX.  241 

westward  of  itself,  that  Quebec  now  exercises  over  the 
whole  territory  :  Kingston,  York,  Fort  George,  Fort  Erie, 
and  Maiden,  cut  off  from  their  common  base,  must  soon 
and  necessarily  fall.  To  reach  this  object,  your  line  of 
operation  may  be  taken  on  either  side  of  Lake  Champlain, 
provided  you  have  secured  the  command  of  the  lake  ;  in 
which  case  also,  Albany,  Greenbush,  Troy,  Whitehall,  &c. 
covered  by  a  dense  population,  or  secured  by  a  large 
river,  no  where  fordable  by  infantry,  will  give  you  a  suffi 
cient  base.  When  begun,  the  movement  should  be  made 
rapidly  and  audaciously  ;  and  the  better  to  secure  its  suc 
cess,  three  demonstrations  by  masses  of  militia,  may  be 
employed  :  one  on  the  Niagara,  to  keep  within  their  walls 
the  garrisons  of  Forts  George  and  Erie  ;  a  second  at 
Sackett's  Harbor,  to  produce  a  similar  effect  on  whatever 
force  may  be  found  at  Kingston  ;  and  a  third  in  Vermont, 
so  placed  on  the  eastern  side  of  the  Sorel  as  to  menace 
the  British  posts  on  that  river. 

Though  taking  for  granted,  as  stated  above,  that  the 
capture  of  Montreal  would  involve  that  of  all  posts  west 
ward  from  itself,  it  will  no  doubt  be  proper  that  the  six  bat 
talions  of  mounted  gun-men  should  march  on  Maiden,  as 
soon  as  they  shall  be  apprised  that  the  campaign  on  Lake 
Champlain  is  opened.  And  here  we  must  stop  :  what 
remains  of  the  subject,  being  Tactical,  and  governed  by 
circumstances  as  they  occur  in  the  camp  or  the  field, 
must  be  entirely  left  to  the  genius  and  judgment  of  your 
Commanding  General.  I  am,  &c. 

(Signed)     JOHN  ARMSTRONG. 

Hon.  WILLIAM  EUSTIS,      Secretary  of  War. 


21 


242  APPENDIX. 


[No.  23.] 

Letter  from  General  Harrison  to  the  Secretary  of  War. 
"Head-Quarters,  Chilicothe^  March  17M,  1813. 

"  SIR, — The  known  candor  of  your  character,  is  a  suf 
ficient  security  for  my  receiving  your  pardon  for  the  liberty 
I  take,  in  making  objections  to  the  plan  of  operations 
communicated  in  your  letter  of  the  5th  instant.  If  there 
is  a  positive  certainty  of  our  getting  the  command  of 
Lake  Erie,  and  having  a  regular  force  of  three  thousand 
five  hundred,  or  even  three  thousand,  well-disciplined 
men,  the  proposed  plan  of  setting  out  from  Cleveland, 
and  landing  on  the  northern  shore,  below  Maiden,  would, 
perhaps,  be  the  one  by  which  that  place  and  its  depen 
dencies  could  be  most  easily  reduced.  I  am  unacquainted 
with  the  extent  of  the  preparations  that  are  making  to 
obtain  the  naval  superiority  upon  Lake  Erie,  but,  should 
they  fail,  and  the  troops  be  assembled  at  Cleveland,  it 
would  be  difficult  to  get  again  upon  the  proper  track  for 
making  the  attack  round  the  head  of  the  Lake.  The  at 
tempt  to  cross  the  Lake  from  Cleveland  should  not  be 
made  with  any  other  than  well-disciplined  troops.  A 
comparatively  smaller  number  of  men  of  this  description 
could  effect  the  object,  and  for  those,  means  of  convey 
ance  might  be  found;  but  the  means  of  transporting  such 
an  army  as  would  be  required  of  militia  or  undisciplined 
regulars,  could  not  be  procured.  I  can  see  no  reason 
why  Cleveland  should  be  preferred  as  the  point  of  em 
barkation  for  the  troops,  or  the  deposite  of  provisions  or 
stores.  These  are  already  accumulated  at  the  Rapids  of 
Miami,  or  in  situations  to  be  easily  sent  thither,  to  an 


APPENDIX.  243 

amount  nearly  equal  to  the  consumption  of  a  protracted 
campaign.  Although  the  expense  and  difficulty  of  trans 
porting  the  provisions,  artillery  and  stores  for  an  army, 
round  the  head  of  the  Lake,  would  be  very  considerable, 
the  Lake  being  possessed  by  our  ships,  and  the  heavy  bag 
gage  taken  in  boats  along  its  margin,  the  troops  would 
find  no  difficulty  in  the  land  route.  The  force  contem 
plated  in  your  letter  is,  in  my  opinion,  not  sufficient  to 
secure  success.  Admitting  that  the  whole  should  be 
raised  by  the  time  pointed  out,  they  would  be  very  little 
superior  to  militia ;  the  officers  having,  with  scarcely  an 
exception,  to  learn  their  duty  before  they  could  instruct 
their  men  ;  we  have  therefore  no  alternative  but  to  make 
up  by  numbers  the  deficiency  of  discipline. 

"  I  am  well  aware  of  the  intolerable  expense  which  at 
tends  the  employment  of  a  large  militia  force.  We  are 
now,  however,  in  a  situation  to  avoid  those  errors  which 
made  that  of  the  last  campaign  so  peculiarly  heavy.  Our 
supplies  are  procured,  and  so  deposited  that  the  period 
for  the  march  of  the  army  from  the  advanced  posts  can 
be  ascertained  to  an  hour,  and  of  course  the  troops  need 
not  be  called  out  until  the  moment  they  are  to  act.  Ex 
perience  has  convinced  me  that  militia  are  more  efficient 
in  the  early,  than  in  the  latter  part  of  their  service.  Upon 
the  whole,  it  is  my  decided  opinion,  that  the  Rapids  of 
Miami  should  be  the  point  of  rendezvous  for  the  troops, 
as  well  as  the  principal  dep6t.  Indeed,  it  must  neces 
sarily  be  the  first  deposite — the  provisions  for  the  army 
being  so  placed  that  they  can  be  taken  to  the  Lake  in  no 
other  way.  The  artillery  and  a  considerable  supply  of 
ammunition  are  already  there.  Boats  and  perouges  have 
been  built  in  considerable  numbers  on  the  Au  Glaize  and 


244  APPENDIX. 

St.  Mary's  rivers  ;  and  every  exertion  is  now  making  to 
increase  them,  intended  for  the  double  purpose  of  taking 
down  the  provisions  to  the  Rapids,  and  for  coasting  the 
Lake  with  the  baggage  of  the  army  in  its  advance.  I  had 
calculated  upon  being  able  partially  to  use  this  mode  of 
transportation,  even  if  the  enemy  should  continue  their 
naval  superiority  on  the  Lake  ;  but  with  this  advantage  on 
our  side,  the  whole  baggage  of  the  army  could  be  safely 
and  expeditiously  carried  along  the  coast  in  the  boats  and 
perouges,  which  could  be  taken  into  the  strait  to  transport 
the  army  to  the  Canada  shore. 

"  As  I  have  before  observed,  the  army,  unencumbered 
with  heavy  baggage,  would  find  no  difficulty  in  marching 
round  the  Lake  at  any  season,  but  what  the  enemy  would 
create,  and  we  have  the  means  of  subsisting  a  force  that 
would  be  irresistible. 

"  The  objections  to  proceeding  this  way,  stated  in  my 
letter  to  Colonel  Munroe,  arose  from  the  time  that  would 
be  necessary  to  construct  boats  after  we  should  have  ar 
rived  at  the  strait ;  but  this  objection  is  entirely  obviated 
by  our  obtaining  the  command  of  the  Lake,  as  the  boats 
and  perouges  built  upon  the  Miami  will  answer  the  pur 
pose.  With  regard  to  the  quantum  of  force,  my  opinion 
is,  that  not  only  the  regular  troops,  designated  in  your  let 
ter,  but  a  large  auxiliary  corps  of  militia  should  be  em 
ployed.  The  only  objection  arises  from  the  expensiveness 
of  troops  of  that  description.  This,  however,  could  not 
be  an  object,  considering  the  very  short  time  that  it  would 
be  necessary  to  employ  them.  Let  the  moment  for  the 
commencement  of  the  march  from  the  Rapids  be  fixed, 
and  the  militia  might  be  taken  to  that  point,  proceed  and 
accomplish  the  object,  and  return  home  in  two  months. 


APPENDIX.  245 

"  Amongst  the  reasons  which  make  it  necessary  to 
employ  a  large  force,  I  am  sorry  to  mention  the  dismay 
and  disinclination  to  the  service  which  appears  to  prevail 
in  the  western  country;  numbers  must  give  that  confi 
dence  which  ought  to  be  produced  by  conscious  valor 
and  intrepidity,  which  never  existed  in  any  army  in  a 
superior  degree,  than  amongst  the  greater  part  of  the 
militia  who  were  with  me  through  the  winter.  The  new 
draughts  from  this  State  are  entirely  of  another  character, 
and  are  not  to  be  depended  on.  I  have  no  doubt,  how 
ever,  but  a  sufficient  number  of  good  men  can  be  procured, 
and  should  they  be  allowed  to  serve  on  horseback,  Ken 
tucky  would  furnish  some  regiments  that  would  be  not 
inferior  to  those  that  fought  at  the  river  Raisin  ;  and  they 
were,  in  my  opinion,  superior  to  any  militia  that  ever  took 
the  field  in  modern  times.  Eight  troops  of  cavalry  have 
been  formed  in  Kentucky,  to  offer  me  their  services,  and 
several  of  them  were  intended  for  twelve  months'  volun 
teers.  Governor  Shelby  has  some  thoughts  of  taking  the 
field  in  person — a  number  of  good  men  will  follow  him. 

"  Every  exertion  shall  in  the  meantime  be  used  to 
forward  the  recruiting  service ;  for  a  few  weeks  I  think 
that  my  service  would  be  more  useful  in  that  than  in  any 
other  employ ment." 

"  War  Department,  April  4th,  1813. 
"  SIR, — Your  despatches  of  the  17th  ultimo,  from  Chili- 
cothe,  have  been  received,  and  I  hasten  to  repeat  to  you 
the  views  of  the  President,  in  relation  to  the  next  cam 
paign,  and  the  injunctions  growing  out  of  these,  with 
regard  to  the  employment  of  militia,  &c. 

"  Our  first  object  is  to  get  a  command  of  the  Lakes. 
21* 


246  APPENDIX. 

Means  to  accomplish  this  object  have  been  taken,  and 
we  have  the  fullest  assurance,  that  by  the  first  day  of  June 
it  will  be  accomplished. 

"  This  fact  assumed,  there  can  be  no  longer  a  doubt 
by  what  means,  or  by  what  route,  the  division  of  the  army 
assigned  to  you,  ought  to  approach  Maiden.  A  passage 
by  water  will  carry  you  directly  to  the  fortress  you  would 
attack,  without  impairing  your  strength  by  fatigue,  or 
diminishing  it  by  battle.  A  passage  by  land  will,  on  the 
other  hand,  call  for  great  efforts,  and  expose  you  to  great 
losses,  which  if  they  do  not  destroy,  will  at  least  cripple 
you.  The  former  will  be  easy,  safe  and  economical ;  the 
latter,  difficult,  dangerous,  and  enormously  expensive. 

"  On  the  other  supposition,  that  we  fail  to  obtain  com 
mand  of  the  Lake,  a  new  question  will  arise — whether 
the  campaign  shall  take  an  offensive  or  defensive  char 
acter  ?  Be  this  question  determined  as  it  may,  the  utmost 
extent  which  can  be  given  to  the  force  employed,  will  be 
seven  thousand  effectives. 

"  Various  reasons  determine  this  point.  The  enemy 
have  never  had  in  the  field,  for  the  defence  of  Maiden, 
more  than  two  thousand  men.  Their  number  has  no 
doubt  been  hitherto  limited  by  their  means  of  subsistence, 
and  this  cause  is  not  likely  to  suffer  any  material  change 
in  their  favor  during  the  ensuing  campaign.  More  than 
seven  thousand  men,  therefore,  would  be  unnecessary  on 
our  part.  Again,  to  maintain  a  greater  number,  would 
be  impracticable  in  the  present  state  of  the  treasury. 

"  It  now  remains  only  to  signify  to  you,  clearly  and 
distinctly,  the  kind  of  force  the  government  mean  hereafter 
to  employ  in  offensive  operations,  if  it  can  be  obtained. 

"  When  the  legislature,  at  their  last  session,  adopted  the 


APPENDIX.  247 

measure  of  augmenting  the  army  to  fifty-two  regiments 
of  the  line,  it  was  expressly  with  the  view  of  superseding 
hereafter  the  necessity  of  employing  militia,  excepting  in 
moments  of  critical  invasion.  In  ohedience  to  this  policy, 
the  President  assigned  to  the  eighth  military  district  of  the 
United  States,  four  of  these  new  regiments,  which,  if  filled, 
and  superadded  to  the  two  regiments  of  the  line  now  in  that 
district,  and  the  twenty-fourth  now  in  march  for  it,  will  give 
a  total  of  seven  regiments,  or  seven  thousand  men.  This 
number  forbids  the  belief,  that  any  employment  of  militia 
draughts  will  be  necessary,  when  it  shall  have  been  collect 
ed.  Until,  however,  this  be  done,  or  at  least  until  time  be 
given  for  the  experiment,  so  many  militia  only  are  to  be 
called  out,  as  shall  be  necessary  for  the  defence  of  your 
posts  on  the  Miami,  and  of  your  dep6ts  of  provision  on 
the  Lake.  And  should  the  recruiting  service  go  on  less 
prosperously  in  the  patriotic  States  of  Kentucky  and  Ohio, 
than  in  other  parts  of  the  Union,  you  are  in  that  case,  and 
in  that  case  only,  authorized  to  call  out  so  many  militia 
draughts  as  will  make  good  the  deficiency  ;  and  organizing 
these  under  the  rules  already  prescribed,  await  the  farther 
orders  of  the  President  in  your  camp  at  the  Rapids. 

"  To  these  orders  I  have  to  add,  that  you  will  regard  it 
as  your  duty  to  keep  this  department  regularly  and  fre 
quently  informed  of  the  actual  condition  of  the  troops  under 
your  command ;  as  well  in  regard  to  equipment  and  sup 
plies  of  provision  and  ammunition,  as  to  number,  discipline 
and  health ;  and  that  your  weekly  and  monthly  reports 
shall  include  also  the  state  of  the  ordnance  and  quarter 
master's  departments,  noting  particularly,  the  number  of 
horses  and  oxen  employed  by  both.  You  will  readily  per 
ceive  the  necessity  of  giving  this  order,  when  I  state,  that 


248  APPENDIX. 

no  return  of  any  description  from  your  division  of  the  arr 
has  ever  been  received  at  the  Adjutant- General's  office.  Yr  jju 
proportion  of  the  new  staff  has  been  given  to  you.  Cap 
tain  Adams  has  been  appointed  Assistant  Adjutant-Gen 
eral,  and  Mr.  Bartlett,  Deputy  Quartermaster-General  of 
your  division.  The  Brigadiers  Me  Arthur  and  Cass  are 
employed  in  superintending  the  recruiting  service.  A  letter 
from  the  latter,  gives  reason  to  believe  that  this  will  go  on 
well  in  the  State  of  Ohio. 

"  I  am  &c. 

(Signed)  "JOHN  ARMSTRONG." 

"  MAJOR-GENERAL  HARRISON, 

"  Com.  8th  Mil.  Dist.  U.  S» 


Letter  to  Governor  Meigs,  of  Ohio. 

(Private.) 
"  War  Department,  March  28th,  1813. 

"  SIR, — I  have  this  moment  been  informed  by  a  Senator 
from  Ohio,  that  the  plan  of  campaign  presented  to  Gen 
eral  Harrison,  has  not  been  fortunate  enough  to  meet  the 
approbation  of  that  officer ;  and  that  there  is  reason  to 
fear  that  the  objections  made  to  it  on  his  part  (which  it 
appears  he  has  taken  no  pains  to  conceal)  are  likely  to 
make  an  unfavorable  impression  on  public  opinion. 

"  Under  these  circumstances,  I  have  believed  it  to  be 
my  duty  to  exhibit  to  your  Excellency  a  brief  view  of  the 
objections,  fiscal  and  military,  to  the  land  march,  which  the 
General  prefers  ;  and  on  the  other  hand,  to  state  the 
grounds  on  which  the  approach  to  Maiden  is  directed  to 
be  made  by  water,  and  under  convoy  of  the  fleet. 

"  1st.   The  great  expensiveness  of  a  land  movement. 


APPENDIX.  249 

The  cost  to  the  public  (according  to  a  statement  made  in 
December  last  by  the  General)  for  l  transportation  atone,' 
during  the  six  weeks  required  for  a  land  march  to  Maiden, 
would  of  itself  be  sufficient  to  build  and  equip  a  naval 
force  on  Lake  Erie,  which  would  give  us  a  decided  and 
permanent  command  of  that  Lake. 

"  2d.  The  increased  number  of  the  army,  which  accord 
ing  to  another  statement  of  the  General,  will  be  indispen 
sable,  from  the  altered  character  of  the  western  militia  ; 
composed  as  it  will  now  be  of  men  greatly  inferior  to  the 
gallant  bands  of  the  last  campaign,  and  with  regard  to 
whom,  numbers  alone  must  compensate  for  the  want  of  spirit 
and  patriotism. 

"  3d.  The  bad  policy  of  any  plan  which,  like  that  pro 
posed  by  the  General,  leaves  your  enemy  to  choose  the 
time  and  place  of  this  attack,  and  with  these,  the  power  of 
compelling  you  to  hazard  a  battle,  upon  plans  and  dispo 
sitions  of  his  making. 

"  4th.  The  farther  and  incalculable  advantage,  of  avail 
ing  himself  to  the  utmost  of  the  Indian  hordes  attached  to 
him — who,  on  a  long  march  of  six  weeks,  through  swamps, 
forests,  and  thickets,  will  find  a  battle-ground  in  every 
mile,  peculiarly  adapted  to  their  arms,  powers,  and  habits 
— a  circumstance  which  renders  them  more  formidable 
than  double  the  number  of  British  grenadiers  would  be, 
on  the  same  ground. 

"  On  the  other  hand,  if  we  turn  to  the  new  plan,  none  of 
these  objections  against  it  will  be  found.  It  makes  neci  s- 
sary  no  augmentation  of  force,  nor  increase  of  expenditure. 
It  carries  you  directly  to  your  object,  in  full  health  and 
spirits — unimpaired  by  battle,  hunger,  or  fatigue.  It  avoids 
all  the  waste  and  embarrassment  of  land  transportation, 


250  APPENDIX. 

and  what,  on  military  principles,  will  alone  decide  the 
question  of  preference  between  the  two  modes  of  pro 
ceeding,  it  instantly  and  completely  neutralizes  the 
whole  Indian  force,  (now  noted  by  the  General  at  four 
or  five  thousand  combatants,)  and  leaves  the  battle  to 
be  fought  on  the  part  of  the  enemy,  by  British  regu 
lars  and  Canadian  militia. 

u  Your  Excellency  will  best  know  how,  and  to  whom 
to  communicate  these  views. 
"  I  am,  &c., 

"JOHN  ARMSTRONG." 


[No.  24.] 

"WAR  DEPARTMENT, 

Wilna,  Octnber  30/A,   1R13. 

"  SIR  :  I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt 
of  your  letters  of  the  5th  and  24th  instant. 

"  The  despatch  by  Captain  Brown,  of  the  22d  inst., 
and  which,  with  him,  was  lost  in  Lake  Erie,  suggested, 
as  an  ulterior  movement,  the  coming  down  to  the  Ni 
agara  river,  and  putting  yourself  on  the  right  and  rear 
of  De  Rottenburg's  position  before  Fort  George ;  while 
General  McClure,  with  his  brigade  of  militia,  volun 
teers,  and  Indians,  should  approach  it  in  front.  The 
enemy  seems  to  have  been  aware  of  this,  or  some 
similar  movement,  as  he  began  his  retreat  on  the  9th, 
and  did  not  stop  until  he  had  gained  the  head  of  Bur 
lington  bay,  where  I  understand,  by  report,  he  yet  is. 
This  is  his  last  stronghold  in  the  peninsula  j  routed 


APPENDIX.  251 

from  this  he  must  surrender,  or  make  his  way  down 
Lake  Ontario  to  Kingston.  His  force  is  estimated  at 
twelve  or  fifteen  hundred  effectives,  the  capture  or 
destruction  of  which  would  be  a  glorious  finale  to 
your  campaign.  Our  operations  in  this  quarter  are 
but  beginning  at  a  time  when  they  ought  to  have  ended. 
"I  am,  &c., 

"  JOHN  ARMSTRONG." 
"  Major-General  HARRISON." 

"  BOONVILLE,  November  3c?,  1813. 
"  When  I  wrote  to  you  from  Wilna  it  was  doubtful 
whether  our  attack  would  be  made  directly  upon 
Kingston  or  upon  Montreal.  Reasons  exist  for  pre 
ferring  the  latter,  and  have  probably  determined  Gen 
eral  Wilkinson  to  go  down  the  St.  Lawrence.  In  this 
case  the  enemy  will  have  at  Kingston,  beside  his  fleet, 
a  garrison  of  twelve  or  fourteen  hundred  men;  had 
we  not  a  corps  in  the  neighborhood,  these  might  do 
mischief,  and  even  render  insecure  the  winter  station 
of  our  fleet.  To  prevent  this,  it  is  deemed  advisable 
to  draw  together  at  Sacket's  Harbor  a  considerable 
military  force.  There  are  now  at  that  post  between 
four  and  five  hundred  men  of  all  descriptions,  sick, 
convalescent,  and  effective  ;  Colonel  Scott's  detach 
ment  (about  seven  hundred)  are  on  their  march  thither, 
and  it  is  barely  possible  that  Colonel  Randolph's  (not 
arriving  in  time  to  move  with  the  army)  may  be  there 
also ;  this  does  not  exceed  three  hundred  and  fifty. 
McArthur's  brigade  added  to  these  will  make  a  force 
wholly  competent  to  our  object.  This  new  disposition 
will  render  necessary  the  employment  of  so  many  of 
the  militia  arid  volunteers,  now  in  service  under  Gen- 


252  APPENDIX. 

eral  McClure,  as  you  may  deem  competent  to  the  safe 
keeping  of  forts  George  and  Niagara  and  their  de 
pendencies.  I  am,  &c., 

"JOHN  ARMSTRONG." 
"Major-General  HARRISON." 


"  HE  AD -QUARTERS, 

Newark,  JVou.  16M,  1813. 

"  SIR — Commodore  Chauncey  with  the  fleet  arrived 
here  yesterday  morning,  and  informed  me  that  he  was 
ready  to  receive  the  troops  to  convey  them  down  the 
lake  ;  and  that  the  season  was  so  far  advanced,  ren 
dering  the  navigation  dangerous  to  the  smaller  vessels, 
that  it  was  desirable  they  should  be  embarked  as  ex- 
peditiously  as  possible.  Jls  a  very  small  part  of  the 
militia  and  volunteers  had  arrived,  and  the  situation  of 
SackeCs  Harbor  appeari?ig  to  me  to  require  immediate 
reinforcement,  I  did  not  think  proper  to  take  upon  my 
self  the  responsibility  of  postponing  the  departure  of 
the  troops  for  the  lower  part  of  the  lake,  conformably  to 
the  directions  contained  in  your  letter  of  the  3d  inst. 

"The  information  I  received  yesterday  from  two 
respectable  citizens  who  were  taken  near  Fort  Meigs 
in  June  last,  and  who  made  their  escape  in  an  open 
boat  from  Burlington,  confirms  me  in  the  propriety  of 
sending  them  off.  These  men  state  that  the  troops 
were  hurrying  to  Kingston  from  York  as  fast  as  possible  ; 
the  regulars  going  down  in  boats,  and  the  militia 
-bringing  the  latter  back. 
"  I  am,  &c., 

"WILLIAM  HENRY  HARRISON." 

"  Hon.  JOHN  ARMSTRONG,  Secretary  of  War" 


APPENDIX.  253 

[No.  25.] 

IN  producing  the  disaster  at  Queenstown,  two  causes 
were  efficient,  which,  as  they  are  not  touched  upon  in, 
the  text,  we  will  note  here.  It  appears  from  the  letter 
of  General  Van  Rensselaer,  given  below,  that  the  as 
sailing  force  was  to  consist  of  two  columns  ;  the  one, 
composed  of  militia,  led  by  Colonel  Solomon  Van 
Rensselaer  ;  the  other,  of  regular  troops,  commanded 
by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Chrystie.  Instead  of  remaining 
at  the  head  of  his  corps,  the  first-mentioned  of  these 
officers,  embarked  with  a  part  of  the  regular  detach" 
ment,  and  was,  soon  after  reaching  the  Canada  shore, 
disabled  by  wounds.  The  movement  of  the  militia 
column  became  necessarily  embarrassed  by  the  ab 
sence  of  its  commander,  and  this  absence  will  also 
sufficiently  account  for  the  insubordination  and  reluc 
tance  to  embark,  afterward  evinced  by  that  portion  of 
the  American  force.  Had  Colonel  Van  Rensselaer 
remained  at  his  post,  instead  of  thrusting  himself 
where  his  presence  was  not  needed,  the  militia  would, 
in  all  probability,  have  crossed  the  river,  and  the  re 
sult  of  the  action  have  been  different.  Again :  why 
did  not  General  Wadsworth,  after  the  first  success  of 
the  attack,  take  possession  of  the  village  in  his  front, 
which  would  have  afforded  a  covering  to  his  troops, 
and  more  than  counterbalanced  the  inequality  of 
numbers  which  existed  between  the  two  armies,  after 
the  arrival  of  General  Sheafe  and  his  reinforcement  1 
22 


254  APPENDIX-, 

Letter  from  General  Van  Rensselaer  to  General  Dear 
born,  October  Ikth,  1812. 

HEAD-QUARTERS,  Lewistown. 

SIR  :  As  the  movements  of  the  army  under  my 
command,  since  I  had  last  the  honor  to  address  you, 
on  the  8th  inst.,  have  been  of  a  very  important  char 
acter,  producing  consequences  serious  to  many  indi 
viduals,  establishing  facts  actually  connected  with  the 
interest  of  the  service,  and  safety  of  the  army ;  and 
as  I  stand  prominently  responsible  for  some  of  these 
consequences,  I  beg  leave  to  explain  to  you,  sir,  and 
through  you  to  my  country,  the  situation  and  circum 
stances  in  which  I  have  had  to  act,  and  the  reasons 
and  motives  which  governed  me ;  and  if  the  result  is 
not  all  that  might  have  been  wished,  it  is  such,  that 
when  the  whole  ground  shall  be  viewed,  I  shall  cheer 
fully  submit  myself  to  the  judgment  of  my  country. 

In  my  letter  of  the  8th  inst.,  I  apprised  you  that  a 
crisis  in  this  campaign  was  rapidly  approaching,  and 
that  (to  repeat  the  same  words)  "  the  blow  must  be 
soon  struck,  or  all  the  toil  and  expense  of  the  cam 
paign  go  for  nothing ;  and  worse  than  nothing,  for  the 
whole  will  be  tinged  with  dishonor."  Under  such 
impressions  I  had,  on  the  5th  inst.,  written  to  Briga 
dier-General  Smyth,  of  the  United  States  forces,  re 
questing  an  interview  with  him,  Major-General  Hall, 
and  the  commandants  of  United  States  regiments,  for 
the  purpose  of  conferring  on  the  subject  of  future 
operations.  I  wrote  Major-General  Hall  to  the  same 
purport.  On  the  llth,  I  had  received  no  answer 
from  General  Smyth ;  but  in  a  note  of  the  10th,  Gen 
eral  Hall  mentioned  that  General  Smyth  had  not  yet 
then  agreed  upon  any  day  for  the  consultation. 


'     I 


APPENDIX.  255 

In  the  meantime,  the  partial  success  of  Lieutenant 
Elliot,  at  Black  Rock,  began  to  excite  a  strong  dispo 
sition  in  the  troops  to  act.  This  was  expressed  to  me 
through  various  channels,  in  the  shape  of  an  alterna 
tive  ;  that  they  must  have  orders  to  act,  or  at  all  haz 
ards  they  would  go  home.  I  forbear  here  comment 
ing  upon  the  obvious  consequences  to  me  personally, 
of  longer  withholding  my  orders  under  such  circum 
stances. 

I  had  a  conference  with  as  to  the  possibility  of 

getting  some  person  to  pass  over  to  Canada  and  obtain 
correct  information.  On  the  morning  of  the  4th,  he 
wrote  to  me  that  he  had  procured  the  man  who  bore 
his  letter  to  go  over.  Instructions  were  given  him  ; 
he  passed  over,  and  obtained  such  information  as  war 
ranted  an  immediate  attack.  This  was  confidentially 
communicated  to  several  of  my  officers,  and  produced 
great  zeal  to  act  j  more  especially,  as  it  might  have  a 
controling  effect  on  the  movements  at  Detroit,  where 
it  was  supposed  General  Brock  had  gone,  with  all  the 
force  he  dare  spare  from  the  Niagara  frontier.  The 
best  preparations  in  my  power  were  therefore  made  to 
dislodge  the  enemy  from  the  heights  of  Queenstown, 
and  gain  possession  of  the  village,  where  the  troops 
might  be  sheltered  from  the  inclemency  of  the  weather. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Fenwick's  flying  artillery,  and  a 
detachment  of  regular  troops  under  his  command, 
were  ordered  to  be  up  in  season  for  Fort  Niagara. 
Orders  were  also  sent  to  General  Smyth  to  send  down 
from  Buffalo  such  detachment  from  his  brigade  as  ex 
isting  circumstances  in  that  vicinity  might  warrant. 
The  attack  was  to  have  been  made  at  4  o'clock  of  the 
morning  of  the  llth,  by  crossing  over  in  boats  from 


256  APPENDIX. 

the  old  ferry  opposite  the  heights.  To  avoid  any  em 
barrassment  in  crossing  the  river  (which  is  here  a 
sheet  of  eddies),  experienced  boatmen  were  procured 
to  take  the  boats  from  the  landing  below  to  the  place 
of  embarkation.  Lieutenant  Simms  was  considered 
the  man  of  greatest  skill  for  this  service.  He  went 
ahead,  and  in  the  extreme  darkness,  passed  the  in 
tended  place  far  up  the  river,  and  there,  in  a  most  ex 
traordinary  manner,  fastened  his  boat  to  the  shore,  and 
abandoned  the  detachment.  In  this  front  boat  he  had 
carried  nearly  every  oar  which  was  prepared  for  all 
the  boats.  In  this  agonizing  dilemma  stood  officers 
and  men,  whose  ardor  had  not  been  cooled  by  exposure 
through  the  night  to  one  of  the  most  tremendous 
northeast  storms,  which  continued  unabated  for  twenty- 
eight  hours,  and  deluged  the  whole  camp.  The  ap 
proach  of  daylight  extinguished  every  hope  of  success, 
and  the  detachment  returned  to  camp.  Colonel  Van 
Rensselaer  was  to  have  commanded. 

After  this  result,  I  had  hoped  the  patience  of  the 
troops  would  have  continued,  until  I  could  submit  to  a 
council  the  plan  suggested  in  my  letter  of  the  8th,  that 
I  might  act  under,  and  in  conformity  to,  the  opinion 
which  might  then  be  expressed.  But  my  hope  was 
idle,  and  the  previously  excited  ardor  seemed  to  have 
gained  new  heat  from  the  late  miscarriage.  Brave  men 
were  mortified  to  stop  short  of  the  object,  and  the 
timid  thought  laurels  half  won  by  the  attempt. 

On  the  morning  of  the  12th,  such  was  the  pressure 
upon  me  from  all  quarters,  that  I  became  satisfied  that 
my  refusal  to  act  would  involve  me  in  suspicion,  and 
the  service  in  disgrace.  Viewing  affairs  at  Buffalo  as 
yet  unsettled,  I  had  immediately  countermanded  the 


APPENDIX.  257 

march  of  General  Smyth's  brigade,  upon  the  failure  of 
the  first  expedition ;  but  having  now  determined  to 
attack  Queenstown,  I  sent  new  orders  to  General 
Smyth  to  march ;  not  with  the  view  of  his  aid  in  the 
attack,  for  I  considered  the  force  detached  sufficient, 
but  to  support  the  detachment  should  the  conflict  be 
obstinate. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Chrystie,  who  had  just  arrived 
at  the  Five  Mile  creek,  had  late  in  the  night  of  the 
first  contemplated  attack,  gallantly  offered  me  his  own 
and  his  men's  service,  but  he  got  my  permission  too 
late.  He  now  again  came  forward,  had  a  conference 
with  Colonel  Van  Rensselaer,  and  begged  that  he  might 
have  the  honor  of  a  command  in  the  expedition.  The 
arrangement  was  made.  Colonel  Van  Rensselaer  was 
to  command  one  column  of  three  hundred  militia,  and 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Chrystie  a  column  of  the  same 
number  of  regulars. 

Every  precaution  was  now  adopted  as  to  boats,  and 
confidential  and  experienced  men  selected  to  manage 
them.  At  an  early  hour  of  the  night,  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Chrystie  marched  his  detachment  by  the  rear 
road  from  Niagara  to  camp.  At  7  in  the  evening, 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Stranahan's  regiment  moved  from 
Niagara  Falls  ;  at  8  o'clock,  Mead's  ;  and  at  9,  Lieu 
tenant-Colonel  Blain's  regiment  marched  from  the  same 
place.  All  were  in  camp  in  good  season.  Agreeably 
to  my  orders  issued  upon  this  occasion,  the  two  col 
umns  were  to  pass  over  together  ;  and  as  soon  as  the 
heights  should  be  carried,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Fen- 
wick's  flying  artillery  was  to  pass  over,"then  Major 
Mullany's  detachment  of  regulars,  and  the  other  troops 
to  follow  in  order. 

22* 


258  APPENDIX. 

At  dawn  of  day  the  boats  were  in  readiness,  and  the 
troops  commenced  embarking  under  the  fire  of  a 
commanding  battery  mounting  two  18-pounders  and 
two  6.  The  movement  was  soon  discovered,  and  a 
brisk  fire  of  musketry  was  poured  from  the  whole  line 
of  the  Canada  shore.  Our  battery  then  opened  to 
sweep  the  shore,  but  it  was  for  some  minutes  too  dark 
to  direct  much  fire  with  safety.  A  brisk  cannonade 
was  now  opened  on  the  boats  from  three  different 
batteries — our  battery  returned  their  fire,  and  occa 
sionally  threw  grape  upon  the  shore,  and  was  itself 
served  with  shells  from  a  small  battery  of  the  enemy. 
Colonel  Scott,  of  the  artillery,  by  hastening  his  march 
from  Niagara  Falls  in  the  night,  arrived  in  time  to  re 
turn  the  fire  with  two  6-pounders. 

The  boats  were  somewhat  embarrassed  with  the 
eddies,  as  well  as  with  a  shower  of  shot ;  but  Colonel 
Van  Rensselaer,  with  about  one  hundred  men,  soon 
effected  his  landing  amid  a  tremendous  fire  directed 
upon  him  from  every  point ;  but  to  the  astonishment 
of  all  who  witnessed  the  scene,  this  van  of  the  column 
advanced  slowly  against  the  fire.  It  was  a  serious 
misfortune  to  the  van,  and  indeed  to  the  whole  expe 
dition,  that  in  a  few  minutes  after  landing,  Colonel  Van 
Rensselaer  received  four  wounds.  Under  so  severe  a 
fire,  it  was  difficult  to  form  raw  troops.  By  some 
mismanagement  of  the  boatmen,  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Chrystie  did  not  arrive  until  sometime  after  this,  and 
was  wounded  in  the  hand,  in  passing  the  river.  Col 
onel  Van  Rensselaer,  still  able  to  stand,  with  great 
presence  of  mind  ordered  his  officers  to  proceed  with 
rapidity  and  storm  the  fort.  This  service  was  gal 
lantly  performed,  and  the  enemy  driven  down  the  hill 


APPENDIX.  259 

in  every  direction.  Soon  after  this,  both  parties  were 
reinforced,  and  the  conflict  was  renewed  in  various 
places — many  of  the  enemy  took  shelter  behind  a  stone 
guard-house,  where  a  piece  of  ordnance  was  briskly 
served.  I  ordered  the  fire  of  the  battery  to  be  di 
rected  against  the  guard-house,  and  it  was  so  effectu 
ally  done,  that,  with  eight  or  ten  shot,  the  fire  was  si 
lenced.  The  enemy  then  retreated  behind  a  large 
storehouse  ;  but  in  a  short  time  the  rout  became  gen 
eral,  and  the  enemy's  fire  was  silenced,  except  from  a 
one  gun  battery  so  far  down  the  river,  as  to  be  out  of 
reach.  A  number  of  boats  now  passed  over  unan- 
noyed,  except  from  the  one  unsilenced  gun.  For 
sometime  after  I  had  crossed  over  the  victory  appear 
ed  complete  ;  but  in  the  expectation  of  future  attacks, 
I  took  measures  for  fortifying  my  camp  immediately. 
The  direction  of  this  service  I  gave  to  Lieutenant 
Totten,  of  the  engineers.  But  very  soon  the  enemy 
were  reinforced,  by  a  detachment  of  several  hundred 
Indians  from  Chippewa.  They  commenced  a  furious 
attack,  but  were  met  and  routed  by  the  rifle  and  bay 
onet.  By  this  time  I  perceived  my  troops  were  em 
barking  very  slowly.  I  passed  immediately  over  to 
accelerate  their  movements,  but  to  my  astonishment  I 
found  that,  at  the  moment  when  victory  was  in  our 
hands,  the  ardor  of  the  unengaged  troops  had  subsi 
ded.  I  rode  in  all  directions,  urged  the  men  by  every 
consideration  to  pass — -but  in  vain. 

At  this  time,  a  large  reinforcement  from  Fort 
George  was  discovered  coming  up  the  river.  As  the 
battery  on  the  hill  was  considered  an  important  check 
against  their  ascending  the  heights,  measures  were 
immediately  taken  to  send  them  a  fresh  supply  of  am- 


260  APPENDIX* 

munition,  as  I  learned  there  was  left  but  twenty  shot 
for  the  18-pounders.  The  reinforcement  obliqued  to 
the  right  from  the  road,  and  formed  a  junction  with 
the  Indians  in  the  rear  of  the  heights.  Finding,  to 
my  infinite  mortification,  that  no  reinforcement  would 
pass  over ;  seeing  that  another  severe  conflict  must 
soon  commence  ;  and  knowing  that  the  brave  men  on 
the  heights  were  quite  exhausted,  and  nearly  out  of 
ammunition,  all  I  could  do  was  to  send  a  fresh  supply 
of  cartridges.  At  this  critical  moment,  I  despatched 
a  note  to  General  Wadsworth,  acquainting  him  with 
our  situation — leaving  the  course  to  be  pursued  to  his 
own  judgment,  with  assurance,  that  if  he  thought 
best  to  retreat,  I  would  endeavor  to  send  over  as  many 
boats  as  I  could  command,  and  cover  his  retreat  by 
every  fire  I  could  make.  But  the  boats  were  dis 
persed,  many  of  the  boatmen  had  fled  panic-struck, 
and  but  few  got  off.  But  my  note  could  but  little 
more  than  have  reached  General  Wadsworth,  about 
4-  o'clock,  when  a  most  severe  and  obstinate  conflict 
ensued,  and  continued  about  half  an  hour  with  a  tre 
mendous  fire  of  cannon,  flying  artillery,  and  musketry. 
The  enemy  succeeded  in  re-possessing  their  battery, 
and  gained  advantage  on  every  side ;  the  brave  men 
who  had  gained  the  victory,  exhausted  of  strength  and 
ammunition,  and  grieved  at  the  unpardonable  neglect 
of  their  fellow-soldiers,  gave  up  the  conflict." 


14  DAY  USE 

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